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ABSTRACT
Symbolic Student Speech 
Since Tinker
by
George W. Flanders
Dr. G erald C. &)ps, Ebcamining Committee Chair 
Professor of Educational Leadership 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
When students exercise their F irst Amendment r i ^ t  of firee speech, it 
can sometimes conflict with the obligation of public school officials to m aintain  
a  safe and orderly environm ent on their campuses. Three Supreme Court 
decisions—Tinker v. Des Moines. 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Bethel v. F raser.
478 U.S. 675 (1986), and Hazelwood v Kiihlmmar 484 U.S. 260 (1988)—have 
addressed the m ost common types of student expression. Hazelwood dealt 
w ith school-sponsored printed m aterial and Fraser established ground rules to 
handle public address by students. In both instances, the Supreme Court 
endorsed the school’s authority  to regulate the am ount of “free speech” th a t 
can be exercised by students in  the public schools.
Only Tinker, the  earliest of the three decisions and heavily quoted from  
in the other two, spoke to the issue of symbolic speech: th a t which is neither
iii
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spoken aloud nor published for distribution. Symbolic speech is the type most 
frequently encountered in  schools, given the Court’s endorsem ent of 
reasonable prior restrain t of the printed word and schools’ careful monitoring 
of students’ public speaking.
Over the years, student speech cases have found judges seeking to 
resolve issues which were not exact fits for these landmarks by quoting “sound 
bites” from one or more of them. This has resulted in rulings  which often can 
raise more questions than  they answer.
This study ta in te d  symbolic student expression: th a t w hich is neither 
spoken aloud nor published. In reviewing case law dealing w ith th is type of 
speech, the study determinedhow the various federal courts have interpreted 
the T inker landm ark over the past three decades. The study investigated 
possible patterns in the courts’ rulings which could provide additional 
guidance for today’s harried school adm inistrators.
IV
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CH A PTER l
INTRODUCTION 
On February 8,1990, public school teachers went on strike in  
McMinnville, Oregon. Mindful of its obligation to continue instruction, the 
school district responded by hiring replacem ent teachers. On February 9, two 
students whose frithers were among the strik ing frculty appeared a t  school 
with buttons and stickers on their clothing. The buttons, which had obviousty 
been conceived and ordered well in advance for the students to w ear, bore 
slogans like “I’m  Not Listening, Scab” and “Do Scabs Bleed?” The students 
were suspended for the day when they refused to remove the buttons.
On February 13, the next scheduled day of school, they reappeared with 
other buttons and stickers which displayed slogans including “Scabs” with a 
line drawn through tiie word (no scabs), “We W ant Our Real Teachers Back,” 
and “Students U nited for Fair Settlem ent.” One sticker read “Scab We Will 
Never Forget,” (a sentim ent typical of a  striking teacher, not of a  student).
The students were ordered to remove th e ir stickers and buttons on  grounds 
that wearing them  was disruptive. A ttorneys for the students filed an action
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2in district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983/ claiming th a t there had been no 
disruption and that the school adm inistrators’ reason for dem anding the 
removal of the buttons was &lse and pretextual, violating the students’ F irst 
Amendment r i^ t s  to freedom of expression. In  response, the school district 
moved to dismiss the com plaint for failure to sta te a glaim pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court agreed with 
school officials that the slogans on the buttons were “offensive’’ and  
“inherently disruptive.” The school d istrict’s m otion to dismiss was granted.
The students appealed, and the m atter was brought before the N inth 
Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in Portland, Oregon. C h an d la r v  M nM innville 
Schl. Dist.. 978 F.2d 524 (9th CJircuit, 1992), described more fully later, ended 
in a  reversal in favor of the students. The court relied heavily on argum ents 
presented in three Supreme (Doimt cases handed down between 1969 and 1988 
which lower courts across the nation routinely cite as precedents to  assist in 
deciding the merits of sim ilar cases. These landm ark decisions were:
(1) Tinker et al. v. Des Moines Independent Conununitv School D istrict 
et al., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In December of 1965 students wore black 
arm bands to school in protest of the war in W etnam , and were suspended 
when they refused to remove them. The d istrict court for the Southern 
D istrict of Iowa — Tinker e t al. v. Des Moines Independent Cnmmnnitv School
1 This section of the code forbids any person or agency to deprive a  citizen of 
“r i^ t s ,  privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3District e t aL. 258 F. Supp. 971 (1966) — upheld the school's authority in the 
m atter. An appeal heard gn hanc by the E i^ th  Circuit Court o f ^ p e a ls  ended 
in a  divided court. By default, th is result did not a lte r the lower court’s stand, 
but opened the way for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. G ranting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court ru led  5-4 in frivor of the student appellants. 
Tinkar established that adolescent students may mcerdse their constitutional 
r i ^ t  of free speech in school, as long as no “m aterial and substantial 
disruption” f quoting Burnside v. Bvars. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Circuit, 1966)] of 
the school’s educational mission occurs in the process. “M aterial and 
substantial disruption” has become the measuring stick for m any subsequent 
rulings involving students’ symbolic speech.
(2) Bethel School D istrict No. 403 v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). While 
T in k a r was an  example of non-verbal, “symbolic” expression, the Fraser case 
concerned itself with a high school student’s speech which contained 
unm istakable sexual innuendo. Against the advice of teachers whose opinions 
he had solicited, when Fraser spoke to his audience of 600 high school 
students— m any of whom were ju s t 14 years old—the reaction was predictably 
unruly. F raser was suspended, and his frther responded by taking the school 
district to court. The district court for the W estern D istrict of W ashington and 
later the N inth Circuit (üourt of Appeals both ruled in  favor of Fraser, holding 
that his speech was akin to T inker’s armband—ju st another part of a student’s 
constitutionally protected r i ^ t  o f free expression.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4As it had in the Tinker m atter, th e  Supreme Court overturned the 
original ruling. In effect, Fraser se t lim its  on student verbalization^ while 
confirming th a t reasonable regulatory authority over students’ utterances 
belongs to school officials. Chief Justice W arren Burger, w riting the court’s 
opinion:
“The undoubted fineedom to advocate unpopular and 
controversial views in schools and classrooms m ust be balanced 
against society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior...[The F irst 
Amendment r i^ t s  of school children]...are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in  o ther settings.” 
and later. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
“.. .Simply because the use of an offensive form of 
expression may not be prohibited to adults m aking what the 
speaker considers a political point, it does not follow that the 
same latitude m ust be perm itted to children in a  public school.” 
Even in dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens said:
2 Fraser’s speech: “ 1 know a m an who is firm—he’s firm  in  his pants, he’s 
firm in his shirt, his character is firm —but m ost.. .of all, his belief in you, the 
students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff K nM m an is a  man who takes his point and 
pounds it in. If  necessary, he’ll ta k e  an issue and nail it to  the wall. He doesn’t  
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing un til finally—he 
succeeds. Jeff is a  man who will go to the  very end—even the climax, for each 
and every one of you. So vote for Je ff for AS.B. vice-president—he’ll never 
come between you and the best our h i ^  school can be.”
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5“The fre t th a t the speech m ay not have been offensive to 
his audience - o r th a t he honestly believed that it would be 
inoffensive - does not mean th a t he had a  constitutional r i ^ t  to 
deliver it. For th e  school not the student - must prescribe the 
rules of conduct in  an  educational institution.”
References to the F raser ruling has not, however, been lim ited to other 
cases involving verbalized expression; judges have recognized th a t the 
symbolic communication o f students should be subject to the same analysis 
and review as th a t which is spoken out loud.
(3) Hazelwood School D istrict v. Kiihlmeior. 484- IT S. 2fi0 (1988).
Having previewed an issue o f the school-sponsored newspaper, a M issouri high 
school principal directed th a t the  student journalists remove two articles 
dealing with divorce and teen  pregnancy, which he believed were inappropriate 
for the young audience served by the paper. The district court for the Eastern 
D istrict of Missouri upheld the  school’s r i ^ t  to exercise prior restrain t of 
student expression, but the 8 th  Circuit Court of .^ p ea ls  overturned the ruling. 
In the case cited, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision, 
advising that:
“[T]he standard articulated in T inker for determining when a 
school may punish student expression need not also be the 
standard for determ ining when a  school may refuse to lend its 
name and resources to the dissem ination of student
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
663q)ressioii...educators do not offend the F irs t Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and  content o f studen t 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as th e ir 
actions are reasonably related to legitim ate pedagogical
concerns.”
and
“S tudent preparation for adult experiences does not necessarily 
ensure adult experiences on the school campus. For example, 
schools need not tolerate student speech th a t is inconsistent w ith 
the school’s basic educational mission.”
Hazelwood is sometimes cited in symbolic expression cases when 
written words are involved; but the  usefulness of th is precedent is lessened 
when the student expression takes place outside the lim iting context o f school- 
sponsored publications.
The Supreme Com t’s student speech precedents do not cover all 
possible modes o r combinations o f expression. A lth o u ^  these landm ark 
rulings have been, and continue to be, cited scores of tim es in other actions 
alleging students’ freedom of speech violations, the outcomes of subsequent 
cases have been as divergent as the opinions of the Justices in the split decision 
of Tinkftr- to be presented later.
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7Purpose of the  Study
This study examined cases involving qnnbolic expression, where the 
symbol may or may not include words. Symbolic student practices which have 
arisen since Tinkmr include other arm band incidents, buttons bearing 
questionable messages, clothing bearing slogans and illustrations, sit-ins, 
walk-outs, picketing, tattooing, and ethnic and religious adornment, to 
mention a few. The examples are many, focusing directly on adolescent 
students’ freedom of speech in the school setting. Numerous representative 
rulings were analyzed to detect any patterns th a t m i^ t  provide guidance for 
school adm inistrators who m ust deal w ith symbolic speech issues.
Research Questions
In the course of reviewing the rulings of the various federal 
courts—district, circuit, and supreme—in  cases dealing w ith symbolic student 
expression, the study has s o u ^ t answers to the following questions:
1. Do the courts agree on the Supreme Court’s T in k e r findings after 
th irty  years?
2. In the light of relevant case law, what is the meaning of the 
“m aterial or substantial disruption” referred to in Tinker?
3. Have the courts’ interpretations of the Tinker precedent worked 
over time to change our general understanding of it?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84. Do other circuits follow the conceptual framework se t down by 
the N inth Circuit Court of Appeals in  Chatidler?
5. When there are religious overtones in symbolic expression, is it 
dealt with differently by the courts than  secular symbolic speech?
6. M ust someone be called a  nam e out loud to have effect, or can an 
insult take place in the form of a  the slogan on a button worn on another’s 
person? (Do Scabs Bleed? — We’re N ot Listening, Scab — Scab, We Will 
Never Forget).
7. Is insulting or intim idating symbolic expression in  a  public school 
classroom more protected than sim ilar insults delivered on a  public street?
Definition  of Terms
Definitions offered by the courts are used when available. The default 
authority is Merriam-W ebster (1994).
Fighting words: Words which “by their very utterance inflict ipjuiy or 
tend to incite an immediate breach o f the peace.” U.S. Supreme C ourt in 
Chanlinskv v. N ew  Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Scab: 3 a: a  contemptible person; b (1): a worker who accepts 
employment o r replaces a union worker during a  strike; b (3): one who works 
for less than union wsiges or on nonunion term s. Merriam-Webster (1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9Slogan: 1 æ  A w ar a y  o r rallying cry; b : a  word or phrase used to 
aq>ress a  characteristic position o r stand o r a  goal to be achieved. M erriam- 
W ebster (1994).
Symbol 5: An act, sound, or object having cultural significance and the 
capacity to excite or objectify a  response. M erriam-W ebster (1994).
Svmbolic speech: A person’s conduct which expresses opinions or 
th o u ^ ts  about a  subject which may or m ay no t be protected by the F irst 
Amendment. Actions which have as th e ir prim ary purpose the expression of 
ideas as in the case of students who wore black arm  bands FTinkerl to protest 
the war in Vietnam. Such conduct is generally protected under the F irst 
Amendment as “pure speech” because very little  conduct is involved. Black’s 
law dictionary (6th ed., 1990).
Rationale
We live in an age when adolescents are  continually challenging 
authority as they attem pt to define themselves in the context of increasin^y 
complex entrance into adulthood. There are  m any young people struggling 
th ro u ^  these difficult yeeus w ithout the kind of parental guidance and/or 
extended family support th a t has been provided in the past. Assuming by 
default many of the social responsibilities for which families were traditionally 
accountable, schools have become identified w ith the adult authority th a t 
adolescents are trying to throw  off. In the process, the evolving constitutional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
r i ^ t s  o f students are often the subject of inquiry—and litigation—involving 
school authorities.
Since the Tinker decision was handed down, students have experienced 
m ore success in defending th e ir F irst Amendment rights in court. Against the 
traditional backdrop of in loco parentis, some school adm inistrators find it 
difficult to recognize, le t alone accept, the lim its imposed on their au thority  
when i t  comes to student r i^ t s .  This study was intended to help 
adm inistrators find comfortable legal ground on which to base th e ir decisions 
regarding student symbolic expression.
Lim itations and Delimitations
Some lim itations and delimitations should be considered w hen the 
results o f th is study are reviewed:
1. With m inor exceptions, the case law examined in the study was 
represented by actions b ro u ^ t in  the federal courts. Even though the r i ^ t s  
in question are also guaranteed in  many state constitutions, the ultim ate 
authority  in such m atters rests w ith the federal court system.
2. The full text o f the court’s opinions is not presented except when 
a  more detailed analysis of the case requires it. For reference purposes, the 
m ajority’s Tinker opinion appears in the .^pendix .
3. An arbitrary cutoff date of May 15,1998 was imposed on 
the inclusion of completed and published federal court cases in the study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4. Because of the sheer bulk o f  cases d tin g  T inker (2.194). only
those involving secondary school students were examined. Some selected non- 
school/non-student cases were referenced owing to their relevance to the 
inquiries made by the study, and to their having been cited in court opinions.
Significance of the Study 
This study addressed an area of school adm inistration where little, if 
any, solid guidance exists. Principals need to be aware of trends in the courts, 
and to be confident about passing along th a t information to th e ir faculties and 
adm inistrators. In an age when school districts are frequent targets of 
expensive litigation for a  variety of alleged o v ersi^ ts  and misdeeds, any help 
that might prevent a lawsuit should be welcomed by school leaders. The study 
attem pted to provide an analytical fr-amework for adm inistrators to reference 
when dealing with symbolic expression incidents, possibly helping schools to 
reduce the risk  of (a) making errors in judgm ent and (b) creating liability by 
unintentionally abridging students’ legitim ate F irst Amendment r i^ t s  of firee 
speech.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LAW AND LITERATURE 
A change in the traditionally conservative attitude of the U.S. Supreme 
Court toward student rights pertaining to symbolic speech dates back to the 
mid-1940s, when the case of W est Virginia S tate Board of Education e t al. v. 
Barnette et aL. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) was decided. In Barnette, th e  issue was 
w hether or not students were obliged to obey school regulations th a t included 
the mandatory salute and pledge of allegiance to the flag as part o f the school’s 
daily opening ocerdses. A lth o u ^  the students’ protest against the pledge was 
based on religious grounds, the Court’s find ing in the students’ favor set the 
stage for subsequent litigation concerning the F irst Amendment rights of 
school children. Amiens curiae^ briefs were filed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American B ar Association’s Committee on the 
Bill of R i^ ts  urging the court to affirm the decision of the lower court 
(Southern District of West Virginia) which favored the students, as well as by 
the American Legion, urging reversal of the lower court.
3 Friend of the court
12
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In a  d o u b ly  decision—given th a t the nation  was going th ro n g  some of 
the darkest days o f W orld W ar U and patriotism  was peaking—the Suprem e 
Court ruled in frvor o f the students. The C ourt thereby reversed its earlier 
position in M itiersville School D ist v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which also 
bore on the refusal o f children to salute the American flag. The Gobitis 
decision had been w ritten  by Justice Felix F rankfurter, a  leading supporter o f 
judicial restrain t who was reluctant to interfere w ith the policies of the 
executive or legislative branches of governm ent unless those policies were 
clearly unconstitutionaL Three years later. Justice Robert H. Jackson w rote 
the Barnette decision. The reversal of Gobitis served notice that the 
tem peram ent of the Court was undergoing a  liberal shift under H arlan F.
Stone, whose years as Chief Justice “were m a rked  by changing constitutional 
views and by division w ithin the Supreme C ourt.” (Murphy, 1996).
The W etnam E ra
The federal courts were relatively silent on students’ r i^ t s  issues u n til 
the outbreak of hostilities in Vietnam. The nation  was deeply divided over the 
sending of American troops to honor com mitm ents to the all but defunct 
Southeast Asia T reaty Organization, formed afte r France’s defeat by 
(Communist forces in  W etnam. As the Allied body count continued to rise, 
protests escalated. Inevitably, students became deeply involved. D raft cards 
were burned publicly. Even those too young to  be drafted took part.
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T h e  T in k e r  A rm h « T iH «
In  December of 1965,15-year-oId John F. Tinker, his 13-year-old sister 
M aiy Beth, and their friend 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt were part of a  
m eeting o f like-minded adults and students a t the Eckhardt residence in Des 
M oines, Iowa. It was decided th a t in order to publicize their objections to the 
V ietnam  hostilities and the attendant loss of life, the group would wear black 
arm bands (the traditional symbol of mourning) during the holiday season and 
b y  engaging in fasting. The idea was not new; some of the group had 
dem onstrated their position in  the same way earlier. It was decided th a t the 
young people would wear their arm bands to school
In  a  hastily-called meeting, principals of Des Moines public schools, 
learning of the students’ plan, adopted the policy that students who wore such 
arm bands to school would be asked to remove them. If the students refused, 
they would be suspended u n til they reappeared a t school w ithout the 
controversial, thereby potentially disruptive, symbols. OfGdals said they were 
fearful th a t the armbands would create a disruption on campus by offending 
o ther youngsters whose relatives were in  the armed services in  Vietnam.
M ary Beth and Christopher wore their armbands to school on the 16th 
o f December. John Tinker wore his the following day. All three were 
suspended (along with four other students), and did not retu rn  to school un til 
C hristm as recess was over and the agreed-on period for wearing the arm bands
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had expired. The youngsters’ o th ers filed in district court, seeking an 
iigunction to prevent school officials’ disciplining of the students.
The district court was unsympathetic. Tt m W  in T inker At al. v. Des 
Moines Independent Cnm m nnitv School D istrict e t aL. 258 F.Supp. 971 (S.D. 
Iowa, 1966) th a t the adm inistrators were well within their authority in acting 
to prevent a  disturbance which would in terrup t school discipline. Undaunted, 
the plaintifis appealed. The E i^ th  Œ rcuit court, hearing T inker «t  aL v. Des 
Moines Independent Cnm m nnitv  School D istrict e t aL. 383 F.2d 988 (8th 
Circuit, 1968) found itself divided equally. Accordin^y, the district court’s 
decision was not affected. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. 
Tinker e t  al. v. Des Moines Indépendant Cnmmunitv School D istrict et al.. 393 
U.S. 503 (1969), the stage was set for it to either reinforce the authority of 
school officials or to break new ground in the area of student r i^ ts .
In  a  5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 8th Circuit, looking 
carefully a t both Burnside v. Bvars. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Circuit, 1966) and 
Blackwell v. Issaquena Countv Board of Education. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Circuit, 
1966). In those two cases, to be discussed later, the same panel of judges, on 
the same day, ruled oppositely on very sim ilar m atters. The difference was 
th a t in  one case it was shown th a t there had been disruption on campus on 
account of students’ "fi:eedom buttons;” and in the other, there had been no 
disruption. Relying partly on lh a t distinction, the Supreme (k)urt held that
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the Tinker arm bands had not caused m uch fiiss during instructional time, and 
conunented that:
“I t  can hardly be argued th a t...studen ts... shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression a t the 
schoolhouse gate.”
Hence, T inker extended F irst Amendm ent fireedom of speech r i ^ t s  to 
adolescent students, provided that their exercise of those r i ^ t s  does not 
compromise the orderly environment o f th e  school Justice Abe Fortas, writing 
for the majority, declared that
“In order for the S tate in  the person of school officials to 
justify  prohibition of a  particu lar expression of opinion, it m ust 
be able to show that its action was caused by som ething more 
than  a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
th a t always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
Justice Fortas also made the point th a t in  T inker there was
“...no evidence w hatever of petitioners’ [students] 
interference, actual or nascent, w ith the school’s work o r of 
collision with the r i^ t s  of o ther students to be secure and to be 
let alone.”
A particularly poignant phrase in  the Tinker opinion was th a t which 
immortalized the Burnside “m aterial and substantial disruption” doctrine on
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which subsequent courts have leaned so heavily. To suppress pure or symbolic 
speech, schools m ust justify th e ir decision by showing;
“facts which m ight reasonably have led school authorities 
to  forecast substantial disruption of or m aterial interference with 
school activities.” Tinker, a t 514.
For years, the federal courts have assum ed that the m aterial and 
substantial disruption standard is dispositive on questions o f secondary and 
elem entary school student speech. B ut an  equalfy valid position is th a t Tinker 
defined public schools as limited public forum s, opening subsequent cases to 
examination by the  traditional tim e, place, and manne r  analysis. (Dever, 1985) 
referring to Uov v. T^niaiana 379 U.S. 559  (1965).
It is often instructive to look into the makeup of the Supreme Court in 
order to appreciate its internal dynamics and to hold a  ruling up to stronger 
light. Abe Fortas had gained fame earlier in  his appeal to the same Court on 
behalf of Clarence E arl Gideon, a  Florida man who had been convicted without 
benefit of counsel: Gideon v. W ainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Memphis-bom 
Fortas, having gained a  reputation as a  strong advocate for individual 
freedoms, was nam ed to the Supreme C ourt in  1965 by President Lyndon 
Johnson. He served un til 1969. Not long after the Tinker  decision was handed 
down, Fortas resigned following widespread criticism o f his association with 
Louis E. Wolfson, who had been convicted o f stock m anipulation in  1967.
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The thin nuqorily’s opinion in T inker was rebutted in  a  spirited dissent 
w ritten  by 83-year-oId Justice Hugo L. Black, a  Franklin Roosevelt appointee 
from Alabama who served on the Court for over three decades from his 
appointm ent in 1937 un til his death in 1971. (Freyer, 1987). Mr. Justice Black 
wrote:
“I  have never believed th a t any person has a r i ^ t  to give 
speeches o r engage in dem onstrations where he pleases and when 
he pleases. This Court has already rejected such a notion. In  Cox 
V T^nigiann [379 U.S. 559 (1965)], for example, the (üourt clearly 
stated th a t the r i^ t s  of free speech and assembly 'do not m ean 
th a t everyone with opinions o r beliefs to mcpress may address a  
group a t any public place and a t any tim e’... I th in k  th e  re c o rd  
overw helm ing ly  show s th a t  th e  a rm b an d s d id  ex a c tly  
w h a t th e  e le c te d  school o ffic ia ls  ««d p rin c ip a ls  fo re saw  
th e y  w ou ld , th a t  is , to o k  th e  s tu d e n ts ’ m inds o ff th e ir  
c lassw ork  a n d  d iv e rte d  th e m  to  th o u g h ts  abou t th e  
h ig h ly  em o tio n a l su b jec t o f  th e  V ie tn am  w ar. [Emphasis 
added]. And I repeat that if  the tim e has come when pupils of 
state-supported schools, kindergartens, gram m ar schools, or h i ^  
schools, can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their 
minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new
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revolutionaiy era of permissiveness in th is  country fostered by 
the judiciary...! wish therefore...to Hisriaim any purpose to hold 
that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and 
elected school officials to surrender control o f the American 
public school system to public school students.”
Mr. Justice Black was not finished. He went on to say:
“It may be th a t the nation has outworn the old-fashioned 
slogan th a t 'children are to be seen and not heard,’ but one may,
I hope, be perm itted to harbor the th o u ^ t th a t taxpayers send 
children to school on the premise tha t a t th e ir age they need to 
leam , not teach...Turned loose with lawsuits for damages and 
injunctions against their teachers as they are here, it is nothing 
but wishful thinking to im agine  that young, im m ature students 
will not soon believe it is their r i ^ t  to control the schools rather 
than the right of the States tha t collect the taxes to hire the 
teachers for the benefit of the pupils. T h is ca se , th e re fo re , 
w holly  w ith o u t c o n s titu tio n a l reaso n s in  nqr ju d g m en t, 
su b jec ts a ll th e  p u b lic  schools in  th e  n a tio n  to  th e  w him s 
an d  c a p ric e s  o f  th e ir  loudest-m ou thed , b u t m aybe n o t 
th e ir  b r i^ i te s t ,  students.** [Emphasis added].
According to civil libertarian law professor Thomas I. Emerson, the 
significance of the Tinker decision lay not only in the C ourt’s delineation of
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the scope o f student F irst Amendment rights b u t in  the Court’s willingness to 
second-guess public school authorities (Em erson, 1970, p. 608).
I f  the m atter in  Tinker haH been heard a  century earlier in  the Supreme 
(Dourt under Chief Justice Salmon Chase, a  different ruling m i^ t  well have 
been handed down, perhaps also offering the advice th a t if  any sim ilar student 
insubordination took place in the future, it should be dealt w ith in  the wood 
shed and  n o t in  the courtroom. There is a  strong h in t of this persuasion in  
Justice Black’s Tinker dissent.
Since Tinker, a  myriad of “free speech for kids” cases have fOled 
courtroom s as litigious parents —as often as not accompanied by advocates 
from the ACLU—test the will of school authorities in the liberal clim ate of 
extending constitutional r i^ t s  to m inors, whom some authorities regard as 
being unprepared to accept the responsibilities and self restrain t th a t go along 
with the full ensemble of adult rights.
The Tinker arm bands were passive expressions of personal opinion. 
When a  student wears words or m eaningful symbols on his or h e r person, this 
type of expression takes on a new meaning. A review of the “freedom button” 
cases which the Tinker court cited is in  order. Both these events took place 
after the now famous armband incident, b u t were concluded prior to the 
Supreme (Court’s review of Tinker.
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Burnside’s Voter Registration Buttons 
Shortly after the start o f the  1964-1965 sdiool term in  Philadelphia, 
Mississippi, Principal Montgomery Moore o f Booker T. W ashington High 
School learned th a t a  num ber of studen ts planned to wear buttons to school 
promoting the “One Man One Vote” initiative intended to increase voter 
registration am ong blacks. In an  exercise o f prior restraint, the principal told 
the student body th a t the buttons would not be allowed in school because t h ^  
had nothing to do w ith education, and  besides, they probably would “cause 
commotion.” When a  number of students wore their “freedom buttons” to 
school, they were sent home and la te r suspended un til they returned w ithout 
the buttons. The district court for the Southern District of M ississippi upheld 
the principal’s action, but when d ie m atter reached the Fifth C ircuit Court of 
Appeals, th a t court reversed. In its  Burnside opinion, the court said:
“Regulations which are essential in m aintaining order and 
discipline on school property are reasonable...[but]...w earing 
buttons on collars or sh irt fronts is certainly not in the class of 
those activities which inherently distract students and break 
down the regim entation of the classroom such as carrying 
banners, scattering leaflets, and speech making, aU o f which are 
protected methods of expressions, [sic] but all of which have no 
place in  an orderly classroom. If  the decorum had been so 
disturbed by the presence o f the 'freedom buttons,’ the  principal
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would have been acting w ithin his authority and the regulation 
forbidding the presence o f buttons on school grounds would have 
been reasonable. But the affidavits and testim ony before the 
d istric t court reveal no interference w ith educational activity and 
do not support a  conclusion th a t there was a  commotion or th a t 
the  buttons tended to d istract the minds of the students away 
from  their teachers. N or do we th ink th a t the mere presence of 
‘freedom buttons’ is calculated to cause a disturbance sufficient to 
w arran t their exclusion frrom school premises unless there is some 
student misconduct involved. Therefore, we conclude after 
carefully examining  all the evidence presented th a t the regulation 
forbidding the wearing of ‘freedom buttons’ on school grounds is 
arb itrary  and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on 
the  students’ protected r i ^ t  of free expression in the 
circumstances revealed by the record.”
Blackwell Case Involved Insubordinate Students 
Across town a t Henry W eathers High School, Principal O. E. Jordan 
found tha t his students were creating a  disturbance w ith very sim ilar buttons. 
They were distributing the buttons in  the hallways and pinning them  on 
classmates who had not asked for thenL One high schooler attem pted to put a 
button on a younger child, who began crying. At one point, a  school bus driver
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b ro u ^ t a  box of the buttons into a  classroom and  b ^ a n  passing them  ou t to 
the students without th e ir teacher’s  permission. Principal Jordan acted swiftly 
to gain control in the school, bu t over the next several days the situation 
escalated.
School Superintendent H. G. Fenton became involved, and suspensions 
of up to 20 days for student insubordination were not uncommon. Finally, as 
m any as 300 students from  various elementary and  secondary schools in  the 
community, who continued to wear their freedom buttons, were suspended for 
the balance of the school year. On behalf of the suspended students, injunctive 
relief was s o u ^ t in the district court for the Southern District of Mississippi, 
bu t it was denied. The Blackwell appeal was taken to the Fifth Circuit court. 
Ironically, the court’s ru ling in  this m atter came down on the same day as th a t 
of the Burnside case—which it  closely resembled.
In  Blackwell v. Issaquena Countv Board o f Education. 363 F.2d 749 (5th 
Circuit, 1966), the court ruled against the appellants, finding that substantial 
disruption had taken place, not only on the school grounds but also in 
classrooms. W riting for the appellate panel. Judge Gewin said:
“In  the case now before us, the affidavits and testim ony 
from the d istrict court present quite a  different picture fit)m the 
record in  Burnside where no disruption of classes or school 
routine appeared in evidence...[S]tudents conducted themselves
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in  a  disorderly m anner, disrupted classroom procedure, interfered 
w ith the proper decorum and discipline o f the  school and 
disturbed other students who did not w ish to participate...”
Chandler’s Scab Buttons 
A recent case involved buttons worn by students which contained 
potentially insulting  and disruptive messages. T t i  C b a T i d l a r  v  M e M i n n y i H e  
School D istrict. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Circuit, 1992), a  circuit court panel sitting  in 
Portland, Oregon heard an appeal from  the United S tates D istrict Court for 
the D istrict o f Oregon, where Judge Owen M. Fanner had  presided. The facts 
of the case were as follows (quoting the circuit court’s disposition);
“On February 8, 1990, the school teachers in McMinnville, 
Oregon commenced a  lawful strike. In  response to the strike, the 
school district hired replacem ent teachers. Chandler and Depweg 
were students a t McMinnville High School and their fathers were 
am ong the striking teachers. On February 9,1990, Chandler and 
Depweg attended school wearing various buttons and stickers on 
th e ir clothing. Two of the buttons displayed the slogans T’m N ot 
L istening, Scab’ and ‘Do Scabs Bleed?’ C handler and Depweg 
distributed similar buttons to some of th e ir classmates.
During a break in the m orning classes, a  temporary 
adm inistrator saw Depweg aim ing his cam era in  a  hallway as if  to
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take a photograph. The adm inistrator asserted th a t Depweg had 
no r i ^ t  to  take his photograph without perm ission and 
instructed Depweg to accompany him to the vice principal’s office. 
Chandler witnessed the request and followed Depweg into the 
office, where they were m et by vice principal W hitehead. 
W hitehead, upon noticing th e  buttons, asked both students to 
remove them  because they were disruptive. Depweg told 
W hitehead th a t his m orning classes had not been disrupted. A 
replacem ent teacher in one o f Depweg’s classes confirmed that 
there had been no disruption. Nonetheless, W hitehead ordered 
that the buttons be removed. Chandler and Depweg, in  the belief 
that the buttons were protected as a lawful exercise of free 
speech, refused to comply. They also refused to be separated. 
W hitehead then suspended them  for the rem ainder of the school 
day for willfrd disobedience.
Depweg and Chandler returned to school on February 13, 
1990, the next regularly scheduled school day, w ith different 
buttons and stickers on th e ir clothing. They each wore a  button 
that read ‘Scabs’ with a line draw n through it (Le., no Scabs), and 
a sticker th a t read ‘Scab, We Vfill Never Forget.’ In  addition, they 
displayed buttons with the slogans ‘Students U nited for Fair 
Settlem ent,’ and ‘We W ant O ur Real Teachers Back.’
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Approxhnately 1:45 p.m., assistan t vice principal Hyder asked 
Chandler to remove those buttons and stickers containing the 
word ‘scab’ because they were disruptive. Chandler, anticipating 
further disciplinary action, complied with the request.
Chandler and Depweg filed this action in district court, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a lly in g  th a t the school officials’ 
reasons for requesting the rmnoval of the buttons were false and 
pretextual, and therefore violated their F irst Amendment rights 
to fireedom of expression. They state th a t the buttons caused no 
classroom disruption. They fiirther allege th a t many of their 
classmates wore the same buttons, bu t tha t none were asked to 
remove them . Chandler and Depweg charge th a t the school 
singled them  out for punishm ent, in violation of their F irst 
Amendment r i ^ t s  to fiieedom of association, because they led the 
student protest against the school district’s decision to hire 
replacement teachers.
The school district moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a  daim  pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the motion, 
stating th a t the slogans on the  buttons were ‘offensive’ and 
‘inherently disruptive.’ ”
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The C ircuit Ooiirt^s A nalysis 
“We sta rt on agreed ground: students in  public schools do 
not ‘shed their constitutional r i ^ t s  to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ rT m k erl-- ‘T h^r cannot be 
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
prem ises unless school authorities have reason to believe th a t
such expression wiU substantially interfere w ith the work of the 
school o r impinge upon the r i^ t s  of o ther students.’ 
rHazelwoodl. quoting ITinkerl a t 509, 512-13. The schoolroom 
prepares children for citizenship, and the proper oxerdse of the 
F irst Amendment is a  hallm ark of citizenship in  our country. 
Nevertheless, th is educational experience has its  limitations. The 
F irst Amendment r i ^ t s  of public school students ‘are not 
autom atically coextensive with the r i ^ t s  o f adults in other 
settings. ’ IFraserl.. .S tudent preparation for adult experiences 
does no t necessarily ensure adult experiences on the school 
campus. For sa m p le , schools need not to lerate student speech 
th a t is inconsistent w ith the school’s ‘basic educational mission.’ 
rHazelwoodl...a t 266. Despite the fre t th a t the suppression of 
speech has obvious F irst Amendment implications, courts are not 
necessarily in the best position to decide w hether speech 
restrictions are appropriate. ‘The determ ination of what m anner
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of speech in  the classroom or in  school assembly is inappropriate 
properfy rests w ith the school board,’ and not w ith the  federal 
courts. See FFraserl ...a t 683, 685; lHazelwoodl...a t 267.
Q iandler and  Depweg argue th a t the district court applied 
an incorrect standard when it dismissed the com plaint as a 
m atter o f law. T h ^  contend th a t th is case is governed Iqr Tinker. 
In Tinker, jun io r h i ^  school students were suspended for 
wearing black arm bands in protest o f the Vietnam war. The 
Court held th a t display of the arm bands was a ‘silent, passive 
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or 
disturbance’ and th a t there was ‘no evidence whatever of 
interference, actual o r nascent, w ith the schools’ work or of 
collision with the r i ^ t s  of other students to be secure and to be 
let alone*. . TTinkftrl a t 508. The Court explained th a t ‘where 
there is no finding and no showing th a t engaging  in  the forbidden 
conduct would m aterially and substantially interfere w ith the 
requirem ents of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school, the prohibition cannot be sustained.’ Id. a t 509.
In this case, the district court dismissed the action 
a lth o u ^  there was no allegation of disruption or interference 
with the rights of o ther students, relying primarily on Fraser. 
Fraser involved a  speech given by a  student a t a  high school
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assembly. The speech contained sexual innumido and metaphor. 
IFraserl a t 683. The Court held th a t the school d istrict acted 
entirely w ithin its permissible authority in imposing sanctions 
upon F raser in response to his offenstvefy lewd and indecent 
speech. Unlike the sanctions imposed on the studen ts...in  Tinker 
the penalties imposed in th is case were unrelated to any political 
viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent the school 
officials from  determ ining th a t to perm it a  vulgar and lewd 
speech such as [Fraser’s] would underm ine the school’s basic 
educational mission.. A ccordin^y, it was perfectly appropriate for 
the school to disassociate itself to  make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with 
the “fundam ental values” of public school education.
The district court also relied upon Fraser’s distinction of 
[Cohenl. In Cohen [v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)], the Court 
held th a t a  man could not be criminally prosecuted for wearing a 
jacket bearing an obscene statem ent disapproving the draft. Id. at 
26. The Court pointed out th a t students have ‘the classroom right 
to wear T inker’s armband, bu t no t Cohen’s jacket.’ FFraserl... at 
682. T h e d is tr ic t co u rt ru le d  th a t  th e  b u tto n s  in  th is  case 
w ere  ak in  to  C ohen’s ja c k e t, (emphasis added)
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Chandler and Depw% aigue th a t Fraser is distinguishable 
from this case on three grounds. F irst, they contend th a t the 
buttons constituted a  ‘silent, passive e^qpression of opinion’...
‘akin to pure speech.’ Tinker 393 U.S. a t 508. They contrast the 
silent e2q>Tession of the buttons w ith the sexualfy implicit speech 
in  Fraser. Next, the students focus on the frict that the speech in  
Fraser was made a t a  school assembly, a  sanctioned school event, 
whereas their display of the buttons was a  passive expression of 
personal opinion. They cite language in Hazelwood that 
distinguishes between suppression of a  student’s personal 
expression tha t happens to occur on the school premises,’ and 
educators’ authority over ‘school-sponsored [activities] that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the im prim atur of the school’ Hazelwood. 484 
U.S. a t 271. Finally, Chandler and Depweg argue that because 
their buttons expressed a political viewpoint they are therefore 
accorded greater protection. They point out that the Court in 
Fraser distinguished between the lewd speech in  F raser and the 
political speech in Tinkmr thereby implying that restrictions on 
political speech should be governed by the more exacting T inker  
test. FrEtser, 478 U.S. a t 685.
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...W e tom  to Hazelwood for guidance in  interpreting the 
m eaning and scope o f the earlier Tinker and F raser cases. 
Hazelwood involved a  dispute over the deletion o f two pages of an 
issue o f a  school newspaper. The principal deleted the  pages 
because they contained an  article addressing students’ 
mqxeriences with pregnancy, and another article describing the 
impact o f divorce on students a t the school The newspaper was 
w ritten and edited by students in a  journalism  class as part of 
the school’s curxiculum [Emphasis added]. Hazelwood. 484 
U.S. a t 262-64. The Court declined to apply Tinker, holding 
instead th a t ‘the standard articulated in T in k er for determ ining 
when a  school may punish student expression need not also be 
the standard for determ ining when a school m ay refuse to lend its 
name and resources to the dissemination of studen t expression.’ 
Id. a t 272-73. The Court then  validated discretionary editorial 
control by school officials over the school- sponsored newspaper 
‘so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.’ Id. a t 273; see also Planned Parenthood of 
Southern Nevada v. Clark Countv School D is t. 941 F.2d 817, 828 
(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (‘first amendment affords educators 
greater control in deciding when the school w ill affirmatively
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promote o r lend its nam e and resources to particular speech’), 
citing Hazelwood. 484 U.S. a t 271-72.
A lth o u ^  Hazelwood is no t directly on point, i t  is 
instructive because it interpreted T inker and Fraser together.
The Court pointed out th a t there is a  difference between the First 
Amendment anafysis applied in  T in k e r  and that applied in 
Fraser...T he decision in F raser rested on the ‘vulgar, lewd, and 
plainly offensive’ character of a  speech delivered a t an  official 
school assem bly rather th a n  on any propensity of the  speech to 
‘m aterially disrupt classwork o r involve substantial disorder or 
invasion o f the r i ^ t s  of others.’ Hazelwood. 484 U .S. a t 271 n.4, 
q u o tin g  T in k e r . 393 U.S. a t 513.
We have discerned three distinct areas of student 
speech from the Supreme Court’s school precedents:
(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech,
(2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into 
neither of these categories. We conclude, as discussed 
below, that the standard for reviewing the suppression of 
vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech is 
governed by Fraser. 478 U.S. at 683-85, school- sponsored
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speech by Sbzfihoifld» 484 U.S. at 273, and all other 
speech by Tmlgai». 393 U.S. at 513-14. [Ehnphasis added].
We first address the question of w hether school officials 
may suppress vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, 
even when it is expressed outside the context of an  official school 
program or event. Hazelwood focused on two factors that 
distinguish F raser firom Tinker: (1) the speech was ‘vulgar, lewd, 
and plainly offensive,’ and (2) it was given a t an  official school 
assembly. Hazelwood. 484 U.S. a t 271 n.4. W hereas both of these 
factors were present in Fraser, we believe the deferential F raser 
standard applies when the first factor alone is present. ‘Surely it 
is a h i^ ily  appropriate function of a public school education to 
prohibit the use o f vulgar and offensive term s in  public 
discourse...’ Fraser. 478 U.S. a t 683.
‘A school need not tolerate student speech th a t is 
inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the 
government could no t censor sim ilar speech outside the school.’ 
Hazelwood. 484 U.S. a t 266, quoting Eiasfii:, 478 U.S. a t 685. 
Therefore, school officials may suppress speech th a t is vulgar, 
lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive without a  showing that such 
speech occurred during a school- sponsored event o r threatened to 
‘substantially interfere w ith [the school’s] w ork.’ Tinker. 393
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U.S. a t 509. Such language, by definition, may well ‘impinge[ ] 
upon the r i ^ t s  of other students,’ id., and therefore its 
suppression is ‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.’ Hazelwood. 484 U.S. a t 272-73.
We tu rn  next to the second category involving speech or 
speech-related activities th a t “students, parents, and members o f 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the im prim atur of 
the school” In  such cases, school officials are entitled to ‘greater 
control’ over student mq>ression. Id. a t 271. A school has the 
discretion to disassociate itse lf firom an entire range of speech, 
including ‘speech th a t is, for example, ungram m atical poorly 
w ritten, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar o r 
profane, or unsuitable for im m ature audiences.’ Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). According to Hazelwood, federal courts are 
to defer to a  school’s decision to suppress or punish vulgar, lewd, 
or plainly offensive speech, and to ‘disassociate itse lf fiom speech 
th a t a reasonable person would view as bearing the im prim atur o f 
the school when the decision is ‘reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.’ Id. a t 271,273.
The third category involves speech that is neither 
vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive, nor bears the 
imprimatur of the schooL To suppress speech in this
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category, school officials nmst justify their decision by 
lo w in g  facts which nng^t reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities.’ TTînkai». 393 
U.S. at 514. However, the "First Amendment does not 
require school officials to wait until disruption actually 
occurs. ..In fact, they have a duty to prevent the 
occurrence of disturbances.” Karp v. Rftcken, 477 F.2d 171, 
175 (9th Cir. 1973). [Em phasis added].
.. .We now tu rn  to th e  facts alleged in th is case. No effort 
was made by the school officials to suppress the buttons 
containing the statem ents ‘S tudents United for F a ir Settlem ent’ 
or ‘We W ant Our Real Teachers Back.’ Rather, th e  suppression 
only involved statem ents containing the word ‘scab.’ The word 
‘scab,’ in  the context most applicable to this case, is defined as a 
worker who accepts employment or replaces a union worker 
during a  strike.’ Webster’s T hird New In t’l D ictionary 2022 
(unabridged ed.) (1986).“* Although a  dictionaiy definition may 
not be determinative in all cases, it is helpful here. ‘To be sure, 
the word is most often used as an insult or epithet.’ Old
4 The reader will note the similarity o f th is  definition and the one cited in 
Chapter 1, firom a more recent Webster.
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Dominion Branch No. 496. NatT Ass’n  of Lette r  C arriers v. 
Austin. 418 U.S. 264 ,283 ,41L. Ed. 2d 745, 94 S. C t 2770 (1974). 
However, the word is also ‘common parlance in labor disputes 
and has specifically been held to  be entitled to the protection of §
7 of the NLRA.’ Id., citing Linn v. Union P lant flnard  W orkers. 
383 U S. 53, 60-61,15 L. Ed. 2d 582, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966). Given 
the requirem ent to construe th e  complaint in a  light m ost 
favorable to Chandler and Depweg, we are satisfied th a t these 
buttons cannot be considered per se vulgar, lewd, obscene, or 
plainly offensive within the m eaning of Fraser. At th is stage in 
the litigation, the school officials have made no showing th a t the 
word ‘scab’ reasonably could be so considered.”
The Cniirt’s R nling  
“This brings us to the second category of school speech. 
There is nothing in the com plaint alleging th a t Chandler and 
Depweg’s buttons reasonably could have been viewed as bearing 
the im prim atur of the school. The buttons expressed the personal 
opinion of the students wearing them, and they were displayed in 
a m aim er commonly used to convey silently an idea, message, or 
political opinion to the communiiy. See Burnside v. Bvars. 363 
F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1966). In  addition, they expressed a
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position on a  local political issue th a t was diametrically opposed 
to the school district’s decision to hire replacement teachers. 
Therefore, the complaint does no t show th a t a  reasonable person 
could have viewed the buttons as bearing the im prim atur of the 
schooL
We turn , therefore, to tiie  th ird  category of school speech 
and its standard: whether th e  ‘scab’ buttons were properfy 
suppressed because the school officials reasonably forecasted th a t 
they would su b sta n tia lly  d is ru p t, o r  m a te ria lly  in te r fe re  
w ith , school activities. Tinker. 393 U.S. a t 514. [Emphasis 
added]. The district court held th a t the ‘scab’ buttons were 
inherently disruptive, but noth ing  in the complaint or the 
analysis of the district court substantiates this conclusion. We 
conclude th a t the district court erred in  holding, without more, 
that the ‘scab’ buttons were inherently disruptive.
We express no opinion on the question whether, on 
remand, the sdiool district m ay be able to m eet the reasonable 
forecast test. We deal with a  Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a 
complaint, which may be granted only if  Chandler and Depweg 
could prove no facts to support th e ir claim. That is not the case 
here because w e h o ld  th a t  th e  ‘scab* b u tto n s  w ere n o t
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in h e re n tly  dxsnqptive.^ (Emphasis added] ...A lth o u ^  some o f 
the slogans employed by Chandler and Depweg could be 
interpreted as insulting, disrespectful o r even threatening, we 
m ust consider the  facts in  the l i ^ t  m ost favorable to the students 
in reviewing th e  d istrict court’s dism issal of the complaint.”
C hief Circuit Judge J . Clifford Wallace did no t overlook the potential 
insult b ro u ^ t into school by the word “scab.” On rem and, he opined, the 
school d istrict might attem pt to show th a t “scab” is such an inherently 
provocative and insulting word th a t school officials reasonably foresaw a risk  
of substantial disruption in a  classroom.
Reopened in 1992 following the circuit court’s reversal, the case was 
reterm inated on March 15, 1993 on stipulation of the parties with prejudice.
The r.handlftr case, because it  was labeled a close parallel to Tinker, provided 
the trigger th a t prompted th is  study. While the nbandlmr court drew upon
5 The concurrence suggests th a t we lend credence to the notion that there 
exists a  class of “inherently disruptive” words. On the contrary, we merely 
respond to the district court’s holding th a t the “scab” buttons were inherently 
disruptive. The district court stated in its order dism issing Chandler and 
Depweg’s second amended com plaint that: “Plaintiffs’ buttons were inherently 
disruptive.” ... Chandler and Depweg are appealing from the dismissal of th e ir 
second am ended complaint; th e  order dismissing th a t complaint thus forms the 
basis of th is appeal. As such, we address it, and we conclude th a t the district 
court erred in holding th a t ttie “scab” buttons were inherently disruptive. We 
cannot sim ply ignore the disfrict court’s holding. To do so would be to ignore 
the district court’s rationale for ruling the way it did. Thus, contrary to the 
concurrence’s stated fear, we are no t suggesting th a t “there mdsts a subclass o f 
words th a t are inherently disruptive.”
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Tinkftr. Frsser. Hazelwood, and others, i t  relied most heavily on Burnside's 
“m aterial and substantial disruption" doctrine. This study probed other 
symbolic speedi cases subsequent to T inkor to see if  the various courts have 
adopted o r dealt otherwise with the concept of “no harm, no foul" — or more 
realistically, “no m aterial o r substantial disruption, no case."
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY
This study included a  th o ro u ^  review of case law em anating from the 
federal court system dealing with symbolic expression issues involving public 
school students. Specifically, the following procedure was followed in  order to 
identify appropriate cases for analysis.
1. The Tinfepr case was “Shepardized"—a process that involved the 
m anipulation of a computerized data base o f U.S. case law to extract a  listing 
of all subsequent cases which have cited T inker
2. 2 ,194 federal and state cases since 1969 contain references to T in k e r 
For purposes of this study, hundreds of state cases were discarded since final 
authority on constitutional issues Ues with the federal courts. Additional 
hundreds of cases did no t involve educational settings, and were elim inated 
from consideration. Cases outside the K-12 spectrum  were also ignored, since 
the study focuses on the public schools, not on higher education. Each of those 
rem aining was examined for relevance. Those not dealing directly with 
symbolic student speech, o r providing instructive analysis on that subject, were 
bypassed. For example, a  very large num ber o f cases dealt with student 
publications — school-sponsored and “underground.”
40
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3. E adi of the symbolic speech cases was studied in  depth in  order to 
determ ine the facts a t issue, to note the court’s holding and its  rationale, and 
to review the dissenting opinion(s), if  any were published.
4. The cases were sorted by geographic region as represented by the 
federal circuit in  which each original com plaint began. This organization is 
p a rt o f the matrix of cases presented in  C hapter 5.
5. The various decisions were also grouped according to th e  nature of 
the expression; e.g., all cases involving the wearing of buttons containing 
slogans. The presentation of findingm in C hapter 4 followed th is form at in 
order to keep all like cases together, as well as to provide a  sm oother narrative 
for the reader.
6. Opinions were tabulated to detect patterns th a t m ight reveal a 
predisposition or predictability of judgm ent in  any of the Circuits.
Among the sources used during the study were:
1. The Clark County Law Libraiy and  UNLVs ^A^Uiam S. Boyd Law 
School’s library, indexes o f legal periodicals.
2. The case law and law journal databases on the Leris service, 
accessible th ro u ^  the School of Business a t the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas.
3. Law-based web sites on the In ternet, including:
• http://www.law.emoiy.edu/FEDCTS/
• http://www.findlaw.com/
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• http://www.law.mdiana.edu/law/
• http://www.lectlaw.coni/
• http://www.lawguru.com/search/
• http://www.gpo.ucop.edu/catalo^supreme/
• http://www.law.comeU.edu/
4. On-line journals available on the Internet
5. Jo u rn al articles available th ro u ^  the Educational Resources 
Inform ation C enter (ERIC)
Relevant opinion and com m entary le a n ed  from  law reviews and journal 
articles which address student symbolic expression have been quoted and/or 
cited in the study. A m sjor source for th a t activity included:
6. W est’s Education Law Reporter ( Ed.Law Rep. ) in the UNLV
main library
Education law and related textbooks were reviewed to supplement 
current literatu re, and are listed w ith the references.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The study focused on cases in the federal court system dealing with 
student symbolic expression in the years since the Supreme C ourt handed 
down the landm ark T inker decision in  1969. Answers were s o u ^ t  to the 
following questions;
1. Do the courts agree on the Supreme Court’s T in k e r  findings after 
th irty  years?
2. In  the l i ^ t  of relevant case law, what is the m ea n in g  of the 
“m aterial or substantial disruption” referred to in Tinker?
3. Have the courts’ interpretations of the T in k e r precedent worked 
over time to change our general understanding of it?
4. Do other circuits follow the conceptual framework set down by 
the N inth Circuit Court of ^ p e a ls  in  C hand ler?
5. W hen there are religious overtones in symbolic expression, is it 
dealt witih differently by the courts than  secular symbolic speech?
6. M ust someone be called a  nam e out loud to have effect, or can an 
insult take place in the form of a  the slogan on a button worn on another’s
43
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person? (Do Scabs Bleed? — We’re Not Listening, Scab — Scab, We Will 
Never Forget).
7. Is insulting or intimidating  symbolic expression in a  public school
classroom more protected than similar insults delivered on a public street?
Each of these questions is taken up in  the summary in Chapter 5. In 
the following, briefr of the numerous cases are presented. The symbolism of 
expression varies, as we shall see. Because of tha t, the cases have been 
organized chronologically within several ca t^o ries. Because T inker involved 
armbands, we first look a t other cases in which armbands—and another mute 
article of “pure speech”— have played a  part. Also mainly in the ^^etnam  era, 
some cases dealt w ith the way students were expressing their displeasure by 
dishonoring the flag and refiising to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. These 
cases follow the arm band incidents.
Thirdly, we examine the difficulties th a t arose around the retirem ent of 
time-honored school logos and sports team nam es, spurred by civil r i ^ t s  
concerns. What follows is an extensive examination of cases involving some 
very expressive t-shirts and other items of clothing worn by students. Next, 
we look at student dem onstrations—some passive, some not.
Three cases show how student expression with religious overtones were 
dealt with in different ways. We will then review a  half dozen cases which fidl 
into a category which ean only be labeled as nondescript. These are included 
as, in the words of a  favorite professor, a “firolic.”
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In  concluding th e  reviews, we delve into the m atter of buttons and tags 
worn by students because o f the sim ilarity o f these cases with the N inth  
Circuit’s C hand lp r v. M cM innville  (1992), which set wheels under th is stuify in 
the first place. Following the review of cases, we attem pt to find answ ers to 
our research questions. Finally, some guidelines are presented which could 
help a  school adm inistrator find a  way th ro n g  the thicket of symbolic student 
expression. Figure 1 illustrates geographical boundaries of the various circuits.
n j . d e
MD.VA.WV 
NC.sCGuam &No.
Mariana—r g
IFederal Circuit |
Figure 1. Geographical Boundaries of the Federal Circuits
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Armbands and Berets
Einhom  v. M ans. 300 F.Supp. 1169 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1969)
At the graduation ceremonies on June 5,1969, nearly two dozen seniors 
decided to distribute b rief tracts and to w ear arm bands over th e ir gowns in 
order to protest what they felt were im m oderate policies in effect a t the school. 
The armbands bore the legend “HUMANIZE EDUCATION.” The students 
wore the arm bands even th o u ^  th^r had been requested not to w ear any 
insignia which deviated from  the formal graduation attire. On the o ther hand, 
there was no report of disruption or disorder a t th e  Commencement exercises. 
The school composed a le tte r which it proposed to include in any participating 
student’s record requested by a  college o r universiiy, to the effect th a t the 
student had participated in  an  unsanctioned dem onstration.
It should be expected th a t the affected students would seek to stop such 
a communication from being included in th e ir records. They s o u ^ t  im'unctive 
relief in  the U.S. D istrict Court for the E astern  D istrict of Pennsylvania, 
expressing that (a) they feared that their chances of acceptance would be 
harm ed by the inform ation, and Ob) they contended th a t the school officials 
m ight attem pt to prevent succeeding graduates from expressing th e ir views in 
future graduation exercises. The court denied plaintifrs’ motion; “We perceive 
no threatened irreparable harm  flowing from the proposed le tte r...” The court 
also rejected the argum ent about hiture graduating classes, refusing to
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speculate about w hat they may o r may not choose to do, o r about what action 
the school m ight take. The school officials were advised to take the lessons of 
Titikftr seriously.
H ernandez v. School District N um ber One 315 F.Supp. 289 
(District of Colorado, 1970)
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Denver, Colorado high schools were 
experiencing the influx of a  sizeable number o f students of Mexican heritage.
As the 1969-1970 term  began a t North H i^  School, H ernandez asked on 
behalf of a  num ber of his fellow “Chicanos” if  they would be perm itted to wear 
black berets and long hair while in schooL H ernandez said the wearing of 
berets would be a  symbol of their Mexican culture; it would show unity among 
Mexicans; it would be a  symbol of respect, and a symbol of their dissatisfiiction 
with society’s treatm ent of their race, and of their desire to improve that 
treatm ent.
Principal Shannon, him self of Mexican descent, told Hernandez that he 
was sympathetic w ith their desire to generate respect for the Mexican culture. 
Shannon granted the request. He said they could try  it and see if everyone 
could Uve with it. A week or so later, the same students requested permission 
to have an observance of Mexico’s Independence Day (September 16) by having 
a  walkout of students to form a  parade and dem onstration. Despite an out-of­
control dem onstration the previous year a t another (West) high school in the 
qrstem, Shatmon granted th a t request as w ell He also arranged for assemblies
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a t the school to note the significance o f the day and to present appropriate 
Mexican entertainm ent. So so good. No dism ptions occurred other than 
absences due to the walkout.
Unfortunately, having been granted these concessions the black beret 
wearers (to quote Shannon’s la te r testimony) “...w ere becoming arrogant, and 
they were boisterous, and they were try ing  to have their way in  the things in 
school” Their berets were b a n g  used as a  symbol o f power to disrupt classes. 
When a  teacher was reading in  riasa a  paper on the significance of September 
16, Hernandez snatched the paper and told her he knew more about it than 
she did. They refused to give th e ir names to teachers when they caused 
disturbances during passing periods, shouting “Chicano power!” One teacher 
supervising hallways gave directions to some students. A black beret student 
stated “Don’t  listen to th a t old bag -  the berets will take care of her.”
In district court, it was shown th a t Shannon made a num ber of 
attem pts to induce the gang to moderate their conduct, to no avail Vfithin a 
m onth after they had been given permission to wear the berets, the students 
had succeeded in creating an  atm osphere of tension in the school and had been 
responsible for numerous incidents of disruption of the educational process. 
Shannon forbade the further wearing of berets, and when the students refused 
to comply he placed them on suspension. They sued through their parents, but 
in the meantime returned to school w ithout the berets.
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Q uoting Tinker, the court said “ ...[Q onduct ly  the student, in class o r 
out of it, which for any reason—w hether it  stems from tim e, place or types of 
behavior—m aterially disrupts class w ork o r involves substantial disorder or 
invasion o f the r i ^ t s  of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom o f speech.” The pla in tiffs had also a l l ie d  
violation o f their procedural due process r i ^ t s  by virtue of the  suspension 
w ithout a  w arning and hearing. On an  examination of the facts in  the case as 
well as the  leeway allowed school officials by Colorado statu te, the  court ruled 
in favor o f Principal Shannon.
Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School District. 311 F.Supp. 664
(N.D. Texas, 1970)
Discontented with certain educational policies and practices w ithin the 
schools of Tahoka, Texas, citizens of Mexican descent formed a  group known 
as Concerned Mexican American P arents began a num ber of efforts to 
communicate the ir feelings to school authorities. Meetings were organized and 
letters were sent. Finally, the parents group planned to take th e ir grievances 
to court.
In the  meantime, as an expression of support for those activities, a 
group of secondary students—not all o f whom were of Mmdcan descent—began 
wearing brown arm  bands to school. A t the time, no dress regulations covered 
the w earing of arm bands. Sensing a  approaching problem, the Board of 
Education m et and adopted a supplem ent to the student handbook th a t
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covered “any act, unusual dress, coercion o f other students, passing out 
literature, buttons, etc., o r apparel decoration th a t is disruptive, distracting, or 
provocative so as to incite students of o ther ethnic groups will n o t be 
perm itted.” The Board also adopted a  regulation tha t declared th a t a  student 
who violated the new  code could be tem porarily suspended on grounds of 
“incorrigibility. ”
When the inevitable disregard for the  ruling occurred, followed by the 
equally inevitable suspensions, the present case commenced. The court found 
th a t no material o r substantial interference had compromised educational 
processes, and quoted Tinker: “The w earing of an arm band for the  purpose of 
expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act th a t is w ithin the Free 
Speech Clause of the F irst Amendment.”
Butts V D allas Independent School District. 436 F.2d 728
(8th Circuit, 1971)
Students a t various Dallas, Texas high schools, protesting the hostilities 
in Vietnam, wore black armbands to schooL This was no passive Qunbolic 
speech in the eyes o f adm inistrators, however. There had been dem onstrations. 
Leaflets were distributed which bore the “peace symbol” and exhorted people 
to leave school and their jobs to attend a  gathering to promote a  moratorium. 
There was, in fact, substantial disorder before the day’s classes began. At one 
school a  bomb th reat was received.
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Based on all th is, adm inistrators suspended the arm band wearers, who 
th ro n g  their parents sought iqfunctive relief in the district court for the 
N orthern D istrict o f Texas. The court was unsympathetic and denied the 
m otion of plaintiffs. On grounds of Fourteenth Amendment protection, the 
m atter was taken to the Fifth Circuit C ourt of i^peals, which in  early 1971 
reversed the lower c o u rt In  the deeper probe into the situation m ade by the 
appeals court, it surfaced that there had been wearers of white arm  bands as 
well, and it was those students who had generated much of the commotion. 
None of the white arm  band students was suspended. Noting “hasty  staff 
work” as the reason for the one-sided suspensions, the court observed: “After 
all, over 44,000^ Americans have died in Vietnam and all of us m ust m ourn 
them . We differ only in  w hat we think the President and Congress ought to do 
to end the bloodshed.”
Jamfifi V Board of Education. 461 F.2d 566 (2nd District, 1974)
As a sidebar, i t  is perhaps interesting th a t teachers fared no better in 
m ost courts of original jurisdiction with th e ir arm  bands th a n  students did, 
a lth o u ^  the courts o f appeals have a way o f coming to the rescue. Charles 
Jam es, a probationary teacher of junior English a t Central High School in 
Addison, New York, wore a black arm  band to school on November 14,1969, a 
^fietnam M oratorium Day. He was prom ptly suspended. James returned to his
6 By the end of the war, the toll was over 47,000.
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teaching duties a  few days later, bu t he wore the arm  band again on December 
12, another M oratorium Day. This tim e his action resulted in his dismissal. At 
his appearance in district court, Jam es’ application for prelim inary m junction 
was denied. The Second Circuit Court of ^ p e a ls  reversed the lower court and 
Jam es was reinstated. The school’s petition for a  w rit of certiorari was denied 
by the Supreme Court. F urther action was taken in  d istrict court which 
resulted in Jam es’ receiving damages in th e  am ount of nearfy $21,000. 
Moreover, in the intervening time Jam es had  earned a  M aster’s degree, which 
entitled him to a higher position on the salary schedule. The new rate was used 
to calculate his award.
W.se V. Sauers. 345 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. P enn^lvan ia, 1972)
On the m orning o f May 7,1970, 11th grader B ennett \Wse wore a white 
arm  band bearing the words “Strike” to classes a t the Marple-Newtown Senior 
High School in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. He was not alone, between 30 
Emd 50 students had sim ilar arm bands reading “S trike,” “Rally,” or “Stop the 
Killing.” Before Wise’s m ath tead ier sent him  to the office, six or seven other 
students had been advised by Principal V incent Sauers th a t they would have to 
remove the arm  bands bearing such words. Sauers’ apprehension was fed by a  
general state of tension and unrest—sometimes violence—on campuses across 
the nation. Four students had been gunned down a t K ent State University ju s t 
three days earlier. At Marple-Newtown there had been the distribution of
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literature urging students to  attm id protest rallies. A general uneasiness lay 
over the nearly 2,000 students.
Sauers asked Vfise to  remove his arm  band, b u t Wise refused. A fter a  
conference w ith his m other, VRse borrowed a  m arker and wrote “Rally Sat.” 
on the reverse side of his arm  band. He then returned to dass. L ater Sauers 
spotted Vfise a t a  phone booth, in  the process of «*lKng the American Civil 
Liberties Union. At th a t tim e his arm  band read m erely “Rally.”
Sauers told Wise he could either wear a  black o r other plain arm  band, 
or wear one w ith a  peace sjm bol, a  dove, o r a  omega sign; in no case could he 
continue to wear the band th a t said “Rally.” Wise refused again, and  was 
suspended.
Wise rem ained out o f school until May 14, and the following week the 
Board met. On their agenda was disposition of the m atter. They upheld 
Sauers’ rationale for suspending Wise, but also lifted the suspension.
In district court action. Wise asked th a t the records of his suspension be 
expunged. After a careful review of Tinker the court ruled in favor of the 
school district, saying th a t “the limited restrictions imposed upon th e  students 
were reasonable and necessary. The refusal of a student to obey th e  reasonable 
requests in  th is case was insubordinate and unprotected activity.”
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The N ational Ehnblem 
Students recognize Qunbolism. W hether it’s sewn to  the seat of their 
pants, made into a  vest, flown upside-down or simply ignored, the American 
flag has received its  share of abuse from  protesting adolescents.
Frain v  Bamn 307 F.Supp. 27 (E.D. New York, 1969)
“America is perhaps the greatest country in the world,” wrote Raymond 
Miller, a  black 12th grader a t Jam aica H i^  School (New York) who went on to 
say that America m ust undergo certain basic changes and provide true 
equality, freedom, and justice for all. I t m ust end oppression of minorities, and 
give black people a  greater opportunity to advance. In his w ritten statem ent 
explaining his reason for not participating in the traditional pledge of 
allegiance to the flag that began each school day. Miller spoke for himself and 
his two white co-plaintiffs Mary F rain  and Susan Keller, jun io r high school 
students. Additionally, one of the girls had declared herself an  atheist who 
objected to the phrase “under God.”
The students declined to stand silently during the pledge because they 
felt that would indicate their support. They were also given the option of 
standing outside their classrooms in  the hall during the pledge, bu t refused 
th a t as well on the grounds th a t exclusion from the classroom was a 
punishm ent for mcerdsing their constitutional rights. At the jun io r h i^  
school, authorities responded by placing the 12-year-old girls on suspension.
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Publicity from th a t event apparently sharpened the high school principal’s 
in terest in  Miller’s behavior. It wasn’t  long before Miller was suspended too.
The aggrieved parties s o u ^ t injunctive relief from their suspensions. 
The prelim inary iigunctions were granted Iqr the district court, which 
consolidated the two complaints into a  s in ^ e  civil action. In its  ruling, the 
court found relevant conunent in the decisions of two Supreme Court Justices. 
In the Barnette opinion. Justice Robert Jackson said “If there is any fixed sta r 
in our constitutional constellation, it  is th a t no official, high o r petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli^on , o r other 
m atters of opinion[;] o r force citizens to confess by word or act th e ir faith 
therein.” In Tinker. Justice Abe Portas wrote “In order for the S tate in  the 
person of school officials to justify prohibition of a  particular expression of 
opinion, it must be able to show th a t its action was caused by som ething more 
than a  mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness th a t always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” By 'expression of opinion’ Portas was 
taken to mean silent or passive expression as well as spoken and/or acted.
Goetz V. Ansell. 477 F.2d 636 (2nd Circuit, 1973)
Honor student and class president Theodore Goetz expressed opinions 
identical to those of Raymond Miller in the preceding case. When he refused to 
stand and participate in the pledge, school officials offered him the options of 
standing silently during or leaving the classroom during the pledge. He
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dedined both offers. Fearing th a t Theodore m ight be sospmided, his m other 
s o u ^ t a  prelim inary iqjunction from the district court. The judge dism issed 
the complaint for frUure to exhaust adm inistrative remedies and also ruled 
against the plaintiff on the m erits of the  complaint.
When the m atter was appealed to  the  2nd Circuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, botii rulings were overturned. Judge Feinberg did not address the 
question of whether the doctrine of exhaustion of adm inistrative remedies 
applies in  a  section 1983 suit; and because the appellant’s older bro ther had 
been suspended the year before by the sam e school d istrict for identical 
behavior, declaring th a t “remedy” to be futile. Further, the court said th a t “if 
the state cannot compel participation in  the pledge, it cannot punish non- 
participation.” Being required to leave the  classroom m i^ t  be viewed by some 
as punishm ent, no m atter how benign the defendants’ motive m ight be. Judge 
Feinberg continued. The court recalled Justice B rennan’s document of 
concurrence in Abington School D istrict v. Schemno. 374 U.S. 203 (1963):
“The excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows, and is liable to be regarded 
with aversion, and subjected to reproach and insults.”
Symbols of the Confederaqy 
The Battle Flag of the Confederate S tates of America is, to some, a 
rem inder of the ante beUum South and slavery. O ther associated symbols can 
rouse sim ilar feelings of antipathy am ong blacks and others of like m ind. I t is
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sometimes difficult to discern w hether the use o f those symbols is prompted by 
a  desire to hum iliate people o f color o r whether it  is simply an  «(pression of 
regional and historical pride, w ithout a  darker agenda.
O ther m inorities have spoken out against the use o f symbols they found 
demeaning. Professional sports team s have been criticized for adopting nam es 
th a t offended some native Americans; e.g.. Chiefs, Redskins, and Braves— 
symbols which are employed in  a  complimentary sense since they imply 
strength  and prowess. I t is in teresting  to note th a t no citizens of Scandinavian 
heritage have yet objected to the  Viking symbol employed by M innesota’s NFL 
franchise. Still, the horror of slavery is a  difficult reality  to dispel, especially 
when so many descendants o f its  victims have not achieved full social equality.
Augustus V. School Board of Escambia Countv. 507 F.2d 152
(5th Circuit, 1975)
In  1960, a court order directed the School Board of Escambia County to 
reoi^anize the school system on a  unitary, non-radal basis. In 1973, the 
district court for the N orthern D istrict of Florida received a petition for 
prelim inary injunction against the use of the nam e “Rebels” as Escambia High 
School’s nickname, its use of th e  Confederate B attle Flag as a  school symbol, 
and the singing of the song “Dixie” a t school functions. The plaintiffs’ 
argum ent was th a t these practices were symbolic resistance to the 1960 court 
order to desegregate. I t was argued th a t the offensive practices generated a
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feeling o f inferiority among the  black students, and th a t the qmibols ware a  
cause of violence and disruption in  the schooL D uring the hearing, the 
plaintifT-intervenors dropped th e ir complaint about the Ringing of “Dixie.”
The prelim inary irqunction was granted, but numerous citizens and 
white students of the school protested that they had no t used the symbols in  
the m anner described in the complaint. The case under discussion, 361F.
Supp. 383, was a plea to make th e  prelim inary injunction perm anent. The case 
concluded w ith the court ru ling in  favor of the plaintiffs. I t was found th a t 
(a) the use o f the name “Rebels” and use of the flag  o f the Confederacy 
continued to be racially irritating, (b) the use of these symbols was a  nuyor 
cause of racial tension in the school, (c) the situation escalated with time,
(d) the use of the symbols was an  obstacle to the effective operation of a 
unitary school, (e) the disruption would likely continue if  the symbols were 
used, and (D even if  the symbols had not been chosen as racial irritants, they 
had that effect on the black students. A perm anent irgunction was issued. The 
court found th a t the symbols under discussion had the same effect as the 
“fighting words” referred to in the Supreme Court ru ling  in ChapliTiskv v. New 
Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
The Fifth Circuit Court of .^p ea ls, in its review of the district court’s 
findings, observed that the use o f the sjmibols discussed above were not the 
only cause of racial tension, and th a t the school had taken immediate steps to 
eliminate them . The only change made in the circuit court’s determination
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was to modify the iqjunction to make it a  tem porary one once again. Circuit 
Judge Moore wrote a  strong dissent in  which he referred to the “tyranny of the 
courts” th a t was created when t h ^  intervene in  the conduct o f students and 
spectators a t a  sporting event. “If the will of the vast mfqority is to be 
overridden a t the behest of a  small m inority,” Judge Moore continued, “then 
th a t concept of our so-called democratic system might as well be scrapped.”
Crosbv e t al. V. Holsinger. 852 F.2d 801 (4th Circuit, 1988)
A sim ilar case appeared in  the 4th Circuit Court of ^ p e a ls  in  the late 
1980s. Johnny Reb, the former cartoon symbol o f the Fairtex (Virginia) H i^  
School Rebels, was eliminated by principal H arry Holsinger after he received 
complaints from black students and parents. O ther students protested his 
decision in  various ways before finally bringing su it in  district court. The 
district court first dismissed the students’ com plaint as firivolous, b u t the 
d rcu it court reversed and remanded. 816 F.2d 162 (4th Circuit, 1987). At 
trial, the district court granted a  directed verdict in  favor of Holsinger as to the 
broad “censorship” claim, and the jury  also found in his favor on the claim of 
“protest restriction.” In 852 F.2d 801 (4th Circuit, 1988) the circuit court 
affirmed the results of tria l
Initially, after Johnny Reb had been elim inated as a  symbol of the 
school and its team s, the m^’ority students protested by holding rallies a t 
school, launching a  petition drive, attending a  school board meeting, and
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displaying blue ribbons. Only once did H olsinger interfere w ith  any of the 
student actions; on th a t occasion he prevented plaintiff Croslgr from  posting 
notices on the school bulletin boEuds. The next day he relented and  allowed the 
postings, but his in itial action gave rise to the civil action described.
In  its final determ ination, the C ircuit Judge wrote: “U nder the ... 
Suprem e Court decisions noted rTiuker, Fraser, and Hazelwood! ... school 
officials have the authorily  to disassociate the school from controversial speech 
even if it may lim it student expression. Principal Holsinger w as w ithin his 
power to remove a  school symbol th a t blacks found offensive.
Phillips V. Anderson Countv School D istrict 5 et al.. 987 F.Supp. 488 
(Anderson Div., Dist. of S. Carolina, 1997)
In the U.S. district court for the Anderson Division in South Carolina, 
su it for damages and for declaratory and  injunctive relief was brought by a 
m other on behalf of h er son James Kinley, a  student a t Lakeside Middle 
School. Kinley was suspended for w earing a  jacket to school th a t had been 
fashioned to look like the Battle Flag of the  Confederacy, on grounds th a t the 
jacket would result in  a  substantial and m aterial disruption o f and  interference 
w ith the educational process a t Lakeside. The defendants moved for summary 
judgm ent The district court sided w ith th e  school district and its  co­
defendants, among whom was Lakeside Principal Don. R. Saxon.
On the face of it, the judgm ent would appear to be in conflict w ith the 
T inker decision, by now considered by th e  courts as n«ct to holy w rit; bu t an
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exam ination o f the frets presented in court show the Court’s reasoning and the 
rationale for its decision. Since the Phillips m atter contains an excellent 
example o f the kind of disruption the T inker court would not have approved of, 
the findings of fret are excerpted as follows.
“Lakeside Middle School had eaq)erienced several incidents 
o f racial tension, including incidents resulting from its students 
wearing garm ents which depicted the Confederate Flag. Two such 
incidents occurred during the 1991-1992 school year. The first, 
which occurred in  the fril of 1991 as the students were lining up 
to change classes, involved an altercation between a  black female 
student and a  white male student wearing a shirt depicting the 
Confederate F la g . The classes were ultim ately disrupted and a  
student was nearly assaulted. The second incident occurred in the 
Spring of 1992 when another w hite male student wore a 
Confederate Flag T -shirt to schooL Racial remarks were 
exchanged am ong white and black students a t a frs t food 
restaurant directly across firom the schooL and a physical 
confrontation ensued. Some of the students were ipjured in  the 
fight, and the incident was reported to the Anderson County 
Sheriff’s Departm ent.
Three additional incidents occurred during the 1994-1995 
school year. In October of 1994, two black female students
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reported to the Lakeside principal... [Saxon]... th a t th^ r had 
observed a  white male student wearing a  garm ent depicting the 
Confederate Flag, and th a t when they asked him 'w hat he m eant’ 
by wearing the Flag, the student responded th a t he disliked black 
people. School personnel requested th a t the student remove the 
garm ent, and the student complied. Later th a t school year, in 
M arch of 1995, the same white student got into a  f i ^ t  with a 
black male student across the street from the schooL The 
following day, school officials were notified th a t the  white student 
had brought a  razor blade to school for the purpose of striking the 
black student. Upon receipt of this information, school officials 
s o u ^ t  out the white male student’s cousin in order to determine 
the student’s intention. The white male student’s cousin was 
Kinley. Although school officials eventually were able to persuade 
Kinley to reveal his cousin’s plan, Kinley was suspended for three 
days because of his involvement in the incident.
Another episode involving the Confederate Flag occurred in 
the Spring of 1995 when a  seventh-grade science teacher reported 
th a t a  black female student and a  white female student had 
gotten into an argument over the white student’s wearing a 
Confederate Flag bandanna. The m atter was settled when the
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white student complied with a  request that she remove the 
bandanna.
In  addition to these incidents directly related to the 
Confederate Flag, the school had experienced other incidents of 
racial unrest and tension, including a  verbal altercation and 
th reats o f physical violence by four white students tow ards black 
students during a  class in  November of 1995. By the 1994-1995 
school year. Lakeside had institu ted  an  informal policy of asking 
students to remove or tu rn  inside-out their Confederate Flag 
clothing before it created disruptions. Indeed, Kinley testified 
th a t he and his cousin had been asked to do so during th a t year 
and th a t both had complied w ith the request.
On Friday, January 5,1996 a t approximately 8:30 a.m., the 
A ssistant Principal of Lakeside, Mike Ruthsatz ... discovered 
Kinley w earing a Confederate F lag jacket and b ro u ^ t him to 
Principal Saxon’s office. Saxon asked Kinley to remove the jacket 
and to refirain fiom  wearing it to Lakeside because of the previous 
problems the school had experienced with students wearing 
clothing item s depicting the Confederate Flag. When Kinley 
refused to remove the jacket, his m other and stepfather were 
contacted by telephone and inform ed of the situation. Kinley 
testified his stepfrther told him  no t to remove the jacket. Phillips
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and her husband were advised th a t K in l^  could n o t w ear the 
jacket to school and that 5 n le y  m i^ t  be suspended for 
insubordination. According to Phillips’ testimony, h e r husband 
contacted the local press a t the  conclusion of the call w ith the 
school, and she and her husband left to go to the school When 
thQT arrived, th e  press was no t on-site, so th ^ r left and  w ent to 
the & st food restaurant across the  street &om the school Upon 
meeting a  television truck, they returned to the school and signed 
K in l^  out. The television station  then conducted an  interview  of 
Kinley and his stepfather. Kinley was ultim ately suspended from 
Lakeside for three days for refusing to comply w ith Saxon’s 
request to remove the Confederate Flag jacket.
The following Tuesday, January  9,1996, Saxon held a  
conference w ith Kinley and Phillips concerning Kinley’s 
three-day suspension. Saxon inform ed them th a t Kinley would be 
allowed to re tu rn  to Lakeside if  he did not wear the jacket.
Phillips kept Kinley out of school for the three-day suspension, 
which ended Friday, January 12,1996. On th a t day, Phillips 
brought Kinley back to school w earing the Confederate Flag 
jacket. Saxon again asked Kinley and Phillips to remove the 
jacket, but they refused. Saxon then  suspended Kinley for an 
additional five days.
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The following Tuesday, January  16,1996, Saxon held 
another conference with IQnley and Phillips concerning Kinley’s 
five-day suspension. Saxon continued to refuse to allow Kinley to 
wear the jacket to Lakeside, and Phillips continued to refiise to 
retu rn  Kinley to school unless he was allowed to wear the jacket. 
Ultimately, Phillips sent 5 n lq y  to live w ith a relative and 
enrolled Kinley in another middle schooL The lawsuit described 
followed. There is no indication w hether the alternative middle 
school allowed Kinley to w ear his jacket, or whether the move 
was intended simply to save face for the fiunily.”
T-shirts and Other Geuments That Offended
Gano v. School D istrict No. 411 of  Twin Falls Countv. 674 F.Supp. 796
(District of Idaho, 1987)
The plaintiff. Rod Gano, a  Twin Falls (Idaho) High School student and 
talented caricaturist, was requested by members of the senior class to draw a 
sketch of three school adm inistrators. Gano complied and his drawing was 
transferred to T-shirts to be sold to o ther students during homecoming week. 
Gano’s rendering was far firom complimentary. I t showed the three 
adm inistrators sitting  against a fence labeled "Bruin Stadium, Home of the 
Bruins." Each adm inistrator is holding a  different alcoholic beverage and is
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acting drunk. While one adm inistrator holds aloft a  beer mug, another holds 
a  wine cooler, while the th ird  grasps a  bottle of w hisky. A case of " l i ^ t  beer” 
sits nearly . The phrase, “I t  doesn’t  get any better than this,” not 
coincidentally lifted from a  then current television beer commercial, appears 
ju st below the caricature.
When the adm inistrators discovered the T-shirts and the plan to seU 
them to the students, they suspended the plaintiff. The suspension lasted two 
days, October 5 and 6,1987. Gano returned to school the following day. He 
was noted as being absent during second period on October 8. On th a t date he 
had worn the T-shirt to school, and was told to go home and diange during 
second period. He wore the T-shirt again on October 15,1987, and was sent 
home to change it. A lth o u ^  he was free to retu rn  to school w ithout the 
T-shirt, he failed to return  on October 16,1987, and is listed as being absent 
on that date. Gano was informed that as often as he chose to wear the 
offending sh irt he would be sent home to change it.
Through his father, Gano filed for prelim inary iigunction to prevent 
further suspensions tha t m i^ t  arise finm his wearing of the sh irt in question. 
The district court examined Gano’s situation in the l i ^ t  of the probability of 
his success in a trial on the m erits of the case and whether serious questions 
were raised and the balance of hardship tipped sharply in his favor. A fter a 
review of the facts, the court denied Gano’s motion. Judge M arion J. Callister 
was specific in his rationale:
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“In  th e  present case, the school has determ ined th a t the T -shirt—which 
is clearly offensive—cannot be tolerated. In  th is state, schools a re  statutorily 
charged w ith teaching about the ‘effects o f alcohoL’... When the school 
disciplines the plaintiff for wearing a  T-shirt frlsely depicting th e  
adm inistrators in an  alcoholic stupor, it is engaged in  its sta tu to ry  duty. It is 
teaching the students th a t &lsely accusing one of being drunk is not 
acceptable. The adm inistrators are role models, as stated by the U nited States 
Supreme Court, and their position would be severely compromised if this 
T-shirt w as circulated among the students. This case appears to  clearly fall 
w ithin th e  Bethel FFraserl precedent, and thus the court finds th a t the 
plaintiff has only a  minuscule chance of success on the m erits.
W ith regard to the balance of harm, the plaintiff would be effectively 
prevented firom fidsely accusing the adm inistrators of being drunks. The court 
cannot find th a t the plaintiff suffers much harm  by being so prevented. When 
this case is examined in its entirety, the plaintiff has so little success on the 
m erits and  would suffer so little harm  that the court finds th a t a  
prelim inary injunction is not w arranted.”
Broussard v. School Board of the Citv of Norfolk. 801 F.Supp. 1526
(E.D. Virginia, 1992)
W ell-meant expression can sometimes miss the m ark and go awry. 
Twelve-year-old Kimberly Broussard, a  student a t B lair Middle School in 
Norfolk, VA, attended a  ‘New Kids on the Block’ concert a t which she
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purchased a  T -shirt that sported on its front in  large block letters the words 
“DRUGS SUCK.” K m berly decided to wear her sh irt to  school, where some 
1,200 students aged 11 to 15 years were in attendance.
\figilant school adm inistrators spotted the T -shirt and informed Kimberly 
th a t they considered the word “suck” to be inappropriate in the school setting. 
She was asked to either tu rn  her sh irt inside-out o r to change into another the 
school bad on hand. Kimberly balked a t these options, and phoned home to see 
if  one o f her parents would bring a different sh irt to school. According to the 
court’s record of the events, lengthy and not particularly conciliatory telephone 
conversations ensued which involved various school authorities, Kimberly’s 
m other (Ruth Lord), and Kimberly’s step frther.
The disagreem ent hinged on three issues: (a) the immediacy of a 
threatened suspension if the girl did not change h er sh irt, (b) whether or no t 
the slogan “drugs suck” was in poor taste, and (c) w hether o r not the word 
“suck” had sexual connotations in the minds of middle schoolers who would 
see it if  Kimberly were allowed to wear the sh irt in  school. Meanwhile,
Kimberly protested that she had worn the sh irt to make the point with her 
schoolmates th a t using drugs is bad.
Mr. Lord came to the school, and when Kimberly continued to refuse to 
change her sh irt the two of them  lefr. The girl rem ained home for the balance 
of the school day. In  another call to the school, M rs. Lord said tha t Kimberly 
would be wearing the shirt on campus again. At th a t point, the principal placed
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Kimberly on a  one-day suspension. Norfolk School Superintendent Gene 
C arter wrote to the  Lords:
“Clothing containing messages couched in  strong language is 
inappropriate, especially when the language has an  overt sexual coimotation. 
Such messages are even more likely to be disruptive when directed at 
adolescents, as opposed to m ature adults.”
Educators a t th e  secondary level know th a t “suck” is part of the 
adolescent vocabulary, and th a t it carries varied m eanings according to 
context. B ut simply because a word is used frequently by students does not 
require the school to condone o r overlook its use. Such a  policy would bring 
well-deserved criticism  from parents and other taxpayers.
The Lords brought suit, contending tha t Kimberly’s F irst Amendment 
r i ^ t  of free speech had been denied her and th a t her Fourteenth Amendment 
right to procedural due process was also tram pled because of the suspension 
without notice.
The district court (Eastern D istrict o f  Virg in ia , Norfolk Division) decided 
that the family was well aware th a t disciplinary action could follow the girl’s 
repeated refusals to  change out of the offending garm ent, and accordin^y 
denied the due process claim. Judge Robert Doumar also ruled against 
Kimberly on the alleged free speech violation, relying on the testimony of a 
certain Dr. Spiva, professor of educational adm inistration a t nearby Old 
Dominion University, who said th a t in  his experience suggestive words such as
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suck undoubtedly create disruption am ong teenage students.
M clntire v. Bethel School e t aL. 804 F.Supp. 1415 
(W.D. Oklahoma, 1992)
Janet Corso, a  m inor plaintiff in th is action, designed a  T-shirt in 
November of 1991 which portrayed a  typical teen wearing “Guess” jeans, 
“Adidas” sneakers, and  a  “Raiders” baseball cap. She wrote down num erous 
slogans which she felt were candidates to be added to the shirt. One of them  
was “the best of the n i ^ t ’s adventures are  reserved for people with nothing 
planned.” Janet la ter said she liked th a t one and chose it for the sh irt she was 
designing because it conveyed the message “be spontaneous, have fun; if  you 
plan things, they often tu rn  out wrong.” She completed her design and had six 
of the shirts printed. She, Denise M clntire (the prim ary litigant), and o ther 
girls wore the shirts w ith some regularity during the 1991-1992 basketball 
season. No disturbance of any kind was noted by anyone as a  result of w earing 
the shirts.
Bethel Principal Charles Franklin adm itted th a t he had seen the sh irts 
being worn during th a t time, bu t had not realized th a t the slogan was copied 
from a  liquor advertisem ent for Bacardi B lack B ut Superintendent Jam es 
H arrod had known as early as November, having been informed by the m other 
of one of the girls who wore the shirts. However, he testified that the first he 
knew of the girls wearing their shirts to school was in  March 1992, a t which 
tim e he directed Mr. Franklin to suspend any  students who wore the sh irts in
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school. I t  was also brought ou t th a t he instructed Franklin to have the 
teachers give “pop quizzes” for which students not present would receive 
zeroes.
Testimony was heard  from  an advertising aqpert to the effect th a t the 
same slogan m i^ t  be used to prom ote a  variety o f products; in  the absence o f 
product identification i t  was no t a  “liquor ad .” A professor of social psychology 
testified th a t the T -shirt in  question “absolutely does not advertise Bacardi 
Black.”
The court found th a t M clntire and the other plaintifis had m et their 
burden of dem onstrating a  substantial likelihood of success on the m erits of 
their claim th a t their F irs t Amendment r i ^ t s  had been violated. The phrase 
employed on the sh irts conveyed an  idea. As such it was speech not 
encroaching on more im portant interests, and  therefore presumably protected 
by the F irst Amendment. The court w ent on to say that the defendants had 
failed to prove th a t the message on the sh irts advertised an alcoholic beverage.
Also, even though the T-shirts in question bore the words “Jrs. 91-92,” no 
mention was made of Bethel High School; consequently the shirts could not be 
conceived as bearing the im prim atur of the school. The court cleared away th e  
complaints against m ost o f the defendants, and ordered that no action be 
taken by the school against students w earing the shirts either before or after 
the ruling.
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Je d in  v. San Jacinto Unified Srfi. THst. 827 F.Supp. 1459 
(CJD. California, 1993)
Once again the need for school officials to establish sufficient reason to 
anticipate “m aterial and substantial disruption” before curtailing students’ 
r i ^ t s  o f free speech is a t issue. Plaintiffs in  th is action were four Je ^ in  
siblings aged 7, 9 ,12 , and 14 and 17-year-old Darcee LeBorgne. Revisions to 
the studen t dress code in the San Jacinto (California) Unified School D istrict 
denied students the r i ^ t  to wear clothing bearing writing, pictures, or any 
other insignia identifying professional sports teams or colleges on school 
district campuses o r a t school district functions. After the revisions were 
approved and sent to parents, the plaintiffs were on various occasions found to 
be in violation of the code and were threatened with suspension.
The in stan t action was broud^t in U.S. district court for the Central 
D istrict o f California by plaintiffs seeking declaratory and irqunctive relief 
alleging abuse of the ir F irst Amendment r i^ ts .
In  its  rum inations, the court reflected th a t a  forecast of substantial 
disruption depends on facts which would reasonably lead school officials to 
take action. In th is case, the adm inistrators of the schools involved cited the 
suspected presence of gang activity on th e ir campuses related to th e  wearing of 
the forbidden garm ents. Upon hearing evidence, however, the court said:
“As for the elementary school population of the San Jacinto 
School District, defendants have offered no proof a t all of any
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gang presence a t those schools or of any actual o r threatened 
disruption or m aterial interference with school activities. There 
accordin^y is no justification for application of th e  restrictive 
dress code to that elem entary school population and  the 
abridgm ent of free speech rights resulting therefrom.
As for the middle school population, a lth o u ^  some evidence 
of gang presence is offered, th a t evidence shows onfy a  negligible 
presence and no actual o r threatened disruption o f school 
activities. It is our view again th a t defendants have not carried 
th e ir burden of showing justification for application of the 
restrictive dress code to th a t middle school population and the 
abridgm ent of free speech resulting therefrom.
Evidence concerning the situation a t San Jacinto High 
School is conflicting. There is, for example, a substantial dispute 
as to w hether the wearing of sports oriented clothing is even a 
showing of gang colors on the San Jacinto High School campus. 
Reliable student testim ony indicates that gang members do not 
wear university or sports clothing on that campus b u t instead 
identify themselves by w earing white T-shirts and diddes, the 
la tte r being a brand of work pants. One witness, president of the 
San Jacinto High School Associated Student Body, a  member of 
the honor roll, president o f the San Jacinto H i^  School Future
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Farm ers o f America and student representative to the San 
Jacinto School District Unified Board o f Trustees, says th a t she 
has never observed the wearing o f college o r professional sports 
team  clothing to lead to any classroom or campus disruption o r 
disorder; th a t the ones most often w earing professional sports 
team  o r college clothing were school athletes; and th a t ... ‘The 
gang members a t San Jacinto High School wear their Pendleton 
shirts, Nike shoes, white t-shirts, baggy pants, dickie pants or 
black pants, hair styles and walk the ir walk ju st as they did last 
school year, 1991-92, and a t the beginning of the 1992-93 school 
year before [dress code changes] ... were ever implemented or 
enforced. The teachers and adm inistrators are not in touch with 
this issue on the campus...They have spent a  lot of time on this 
(clothing) issue instead of addressing the behavior of individuals 
...This whole prohibition against w earing college o r professional 
sports team  logos or writings has affected only the regular kids 
who follow the rules. The gang kids are still wearing their plain 
white T -shirts and dickie p an ts...’
O ther evidence supports the School D istrict position and in 
our view defendants have carried their burden of showing both a 
gang presence, albeit of undefined size and composition, and 
activity resulting in intim idation of students and faculty th a t
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could lead to disruption o r disturbance o f school activities and 
may justify curtailm ent of student F irst Amendment rights to the 
extent found in  enforcem ent of the d istrict’s dress code. While it 
is by no m eans certain th a t the otherwise offending dress code 
will negate th a t presence and possible disruption, we assum e th a t 
in carrying o u t th e ir duties defendants will recognize and from  
tim e to tim e review their encroachments o f F irst Amendment 
r i ^ t s  of th e ir student population and revise any restrictions to 
conform to the l i s t in g  situation.
In sum, we find and conclude th a t defendants have failed to 
carry their burden of proof of justification for the curtailm ent of 
elem entary and middle school students free speech contained in 
th a t portion o f their dress code forbidding the wearing of clothing 
free of writing, pictures or any in sign ia  which identifies any 
professional sports team  or college.”
This ruling would appear to gran t school authorities somewhat greater 
flexibility in dealing with potential problems a t the high school level th a n  a t 
schools where younger students are in attendance.
Baxter v. Vigo Countv Sch. Corp. e t al.. 26 F.3d 728 (7th Circuit, 1994) 
Between February, 1988 and May, 1991 Chelsie Baxter, a student a t Lost 
Creek Elem entary School (Terre H aute, In d ian a ), and h er parents attem pted
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to complain and object to grades and racial bias and certain  policies a t the 
schooL From  tim e to time, Chelsie arrived a t school w earing one of several T- 
shirts th a t read “UNFAIR GRADES”, “RACISM”, and “I HATE LOST 
CREEK”. Principal Ray Azar prohibited the shirts a t school and subjected 
Chelsie to disciplinary action. Restraining orders and alleged false prosecution 
were also said to have been directed a t Chelsie’s parents, Jam es and Wibna 
Baxter. Charges of educational ne^ect and abuse brought against the parents 
were dismissed.
The Baxters sued, asking for $1.5 million in com pensatory and punitive 
damages. They named a num ber of other individuals and  entities as co­
defendants, including the County and State Welfare Departm ents. In district 
court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre H aute Division, the complaint 
was dismissed for failure to state a  claim. In the 7th C ircuit Court of ^ p e a ls , 
it was noted th a t the Baxters bore the burden of showing th a t Chelsie enjoyed 
a clearly established r i ^ t  to wear her expressive T-shirts in school. They had 
relied on T inker to establish th a t right, but the court cited Fraser and 
Hazelwood language to point out (a) th a t the ages of the  students involved 
gave the school increased flexibility^ and (b) the em otional m aturity of the 
students was insufficient to allow student speech on potentially sensitive
7 Specifically, the Supreme Court in Fraser said: “[Slimply because the use of 
an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to  adults making what 
the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude m ust be permitted to 
children in public school.”
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topics. The court also mentioned the paucity of federal court rulings on free 
speech involving gram m ar school students. At length, the circuit court 
affirmed the earlier decision to disallow the Baxters’ complaint.
In Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice P o tter Stewart 
wrote in concurrence on the subject of extending the full r i ^ t s  of adults to 
m inor children: “I th ink  a  state may permissibly determine th a t, a t least in 
some precisely delineated areas, a  child — like someone in a  captive audience 
— is not possessed of th a t full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of first amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a  premise,
I should suppose, th a t a  state may deprive children of other r i ^ t s  — the r i ^ t  
to marry, for example, o r the right to vote — deprivations th a t would be 
constitutionally intolerable for adults.”
Pvie v. South Hadlev Srbnnl Gnmniittee et al.. 861 F.Supp. 157 
(District of M assachusetts, 1994)
In his final comments on the Pyle m atter. District Judge Michael A  
Ponsor wrote: “This case is a reminder th a t it is e a ^  to assume a  tempest in a 
teapot is trivial, unless you happen to be in the teapot.”
The novelty T -shirt industry continues to have an impact on the prurient 
interests of teens, as well as on the adm inistrators of their schools. In this 
case, two boys and th e ir father (at the tim e a  professor of constitutional law a t 
nearby Mt. Holyoke College), with ACLU assistance, disputed the authority of
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school officials to forbid the wearing of T-shirts whose inscriptions and 
graphics they found to be offensive and inappropriate in  schooL
The Pyle brothers arrived for classes one day a t South H adley H i^
School (M assachusetts) wearing T-shirts w ith printed slogans. One was “See 
Dick D rink  See Dick Drive. See Dick Die.” So & r not a  serious problem; but 
there was a  fourth line—”Don’t  Be a  Dick”—th a t upset adm inistrators. The 
other brother’s sh irt proclaimed “Coed Naked Band: Do I t to the  Rhythm .” 
O ther shirts the Pyle boys wore to school over tim e bore such messages as 
“Coed Naked Censorship—They Do It in  South Hadley,” a  sh irt celebrating 
the Sm ith College C entennial that said “A C entury of Women on Top,” and 
one showing the picture of two men in naval uniforms kissing  each other 
accompanied by the words “Read My Lips.” One sh irt bore the  picture of a 
m arijuana leaf and the slogan “Legalize It.” The c o n tro v e rt—a t times 
assuming an alm ost playfiil tone as each new provocative slogan made its 
appearance—continued th ro u ^  the school year as the Pyles defied w hat they 
believed were ill-defined regulations and taunted  school authorities, who 
continued to strive for consensus on a revised school dress code th a t would 
address the T-shirt problem.
In their first trip  to  court, the Pyles s o u ^ t  ipjunctive relief against the 
school’s ban on their su ^estiv e  apparel. Judge Ponsor found the  issue to have 
more in common w ith F raser than with Tinker, under which authority  the 
Pyles’ complaint rested. The motion for tem porary restraining order was
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denied. A four-day bench tria l followed m which the same court was asked to 
rule on two issues: (a) w hether the slogans on the  sh irts were vulgar and 
(b) w hether they had violated a  ban on clothing th a t ‘harasses, threatens, 
intim idates, or demeans’ certain individuals o r groups. Finding th a t no 
m aterial or substantial diaruption had occurred, the court allowed injunctive 
relief as to the school dress code, but found in  frivor of the defendants in all 
other m atters.
Judge Ponsor wrote: “[W lhether th is decision is correct or not, no court 
system in the world today, and none th a t has existed in  the history of the 
world, would take so much tim e to address tiie concerns of two h i ^  school 
students sent home over the ir T-shirts.”
Student Dem onstrations
Farrell v. Joel. 437 F.2d 160 (2nd Circuit, 1971)
Protesting the suspension of three fellow students, a  group of about 30 
h i ^  school students a t the Morgan School in  Clinton, Connecticut, assembled 
outside the sdiool’s adm inistrative offices and conducted a  “group sit-down.” 
When the group refused to disperse. Principal Rexford Avery read to them 
Rule 15(c) of the Board of Education’s policies:
“Pupils who walk out of school, sit in, dam age property, harass teachers 
will be dealt with as follow s:... 2. Pupils who walk out or sit in will be given 
the opportunity to retu rn  to their classes and appoint designated leaders [sic]
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to meet with the school officials to  discuss and seek solutions to the problem.
3. Pupils who fail to heed the w arning to return to classes and continue the 
walk-out and/or sit-in, will be suspended a t once.”
Upon the reading of the policy, some students left for class, but others 
remained. D uring a subsequent m orning break the crowd of students swelled 
to nearly 300. Fearing violence. Principal Avery called an  assembly at which 
student “leaders” were elected. The following week, after a period of relative 
calm, the m atter was taken up a t an open meeting of the school board. 
Afterward, the board voted in closed session to suspend Farrell and several 
others for 15 days. The district court issued a temporary restraining order 
which resulted in the appellant and the others only being out of school for ten 
days. The same court denied injunctive relief against Farrell’s suspension and 
held that the suspension did not violate her constitutional rights.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, 
citing Tinker: “The first amendment does not guarantee the right to 
substantially disrupt the operation of a school.” By now it should be apparent 
that there are sufficient “sound bites” in Tinker to fit alm ost any situation.
Gebert et al. v. Hoffinan et al.. 336 F.Supp. 694 
(E.D. Pennsylvania, 1972)
Other sit-in dem onstrations took place at Abington H i^  School (near 
Philadelphia) in mid December 1970, both during and after school hours. The 
school board acted promptly, obtaining a preliminary injunction in the Court
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of Common Pleas o f Montgomery County, restraining such behavior, 
suspending about 36 students, and enforcing the suspensions. The district 
court issued a tem porary restraining order eryoining school officials from 
continuing to prosecute the state court action and from continuing the 
suspensions. An evidentiary hearing was held two months later, and in June 
1971 the district court vacated its restraining order but retained jurisdiction 
over claims related to the student suspensions.
The students claimed that they had been within their F irst Amendment 
rights; and if they were rrristaken, there was no notice given prio r to the 
suspensions (no due process). The court looked to Cox v T^nimiana 379 U.S. 
559 (1965) and sim ilar Supreme Court rulings and found th a t “even outside 
the school environment, the Courrt has held th a t where speech is mixed with 
conduct, as in the case of a  sit-in, the state may reasonably regulate the time, 
place, and m anner o f such activity.” The test is threefold:
1. The state’s action m ust be content-neutral;
2. It m ust serve a  substantial and legitim ate governmental interest; and
3. It m ust leave open adequate alternative charmels of communication. 
Even in Tinker the C ourt said “[CJonduct by the student, in class or out of it, 
which for any reason—whether it stems from  time, place, or type of behavior— 
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder o r invasion of 
the rights of others is, of course, not im m unized by the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech.”
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The district court in the Gebert case ruled th a t the conduct of the sit-in 
participants disrupted the norm al operation of the school, and th a t the 
resulting suspensions did not tram ple on their F irst Amendment rights.
Karp V  Berken. 477 F.2d 171(9th Circuit, 1973)
Students including plaintiff Steven Karp, planned a chant and a  walkout 
a t an athletic awards ceremony a t Canyon del Oro High School in  Pima 
County, Arizona, protesting the non-renewal of a teacher’s contract. The local 
press was informed. The h i ^  school Principal and other officials later 
testified th a t the school athletes had threatened to stop the proposed 
dem onstration. Accordingly, the assembly was canceled because school officials 
feared a  walkout might provoke violence.
L ater in the morning, newsmen appeared on the campus and set up their 
equipment. During this time, Karp and other students, during a  firee period, 
were m illing around outside the building talking with the newsmen.
The ’^ ce-Principal testified to his impression th a t there was a  general 
atm osphere of excitement and expectation pervading the campus and 
classrooms. There was an intense feeling something was about to happen.
Some students actually walked out fix>m class, notw ithstanding the 
cancellation of the assembly.
About the time when the assembly walkout would have occurred, 
someone pulled the school fire alarm , which, had it not been previously
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disconnected by the ^fice-Principal, would have emptied every room in the 
entire schooL Approximately fifty students gathered in  the area of the 
multi-purpose room, talking am ong themselves and w ith news media 
personneL
Excited by the situation, tw enty to thirty of the jun io r high students 
who share facilities with the high school and who were eating a t the high 
school cafeteria during their lunch period, interrupted their lunch and ran into 
the area o f the multi-purpose room to watch the group o f students and news 
people gathered there. The junior high students ran  about the group excitedly 
and, as a result, their supervisors determined their lunch period should be 
shortened. They were returned to their classrooms earlier th a n  usual.
Karp went to the school parking lot, carried signs from his car to the area 
where the students had congregated near the multi-purpose room, and 
proceeded to distribute them. The Vice Principal ordered the students to 
surrender their signs, claiming they were not perm itted to have them. All 
obeyed except Karp. He finally gave up his sign when the official requested it a 
second time, and accompanied the Vice Principal into the office. Students 
began chanting, and pushing and shoving developed between the 
dem onstrators and some student athletes. When school officials intervened, 
the dem onstration broke up.
Karp was threatened with a  five-day suspension, bu t was offered a 
reduction to three days if he promised not to bring any more signs on campus.
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Backed by his father, Karp refused. As expected, the circuit court weighed the 
student’s r i ^ t s  as set down in Tinker, but also looked to Gravned v. Citv of 
Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Judge Wallace opined: “federal courts should 
treat the T inker rule as a finable one dependent upon the totality of relevant 
facts in each case.” Nonetheless, the court came down on the side of Karp in 
reversing and remanding the earlier proceedings. Karp’s signs were “pure 
speech,” the court said; and his suspension was a violation of his First 
Amendment rights.
Cintron v. State Board of Education et al.. 384 F.Supp. 674 
(District of Puerto Rico, 1974)
Two cases involving student picketing and unauthorized handbill 
distribution were consolidated by the district court for the District of Puerto 
Rico in the Cintron matter. A junior high student distributed leaflets to o ther 
students advocating Puerto Rican independence. He received a five-day 
suspension for his activities. In  the companion incident, two high school 
students participated in a picket line set up outside their school. A loudspeaker 
was used a t one point. Following the activity, the boys were given five-day 
suspensions. One of them was also reprimanded for distributing political 
literature. Temporary restraining orders were issued on behalf of the three.
The students claimed violations of their First, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights; bu t the court quickly disposed of the more 
frivolous claims (e.g., “cruel and unusual punishm ent”). Going directly to the
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validity of the school rules the plaintiffs had broken, the court found them  
unconstitutional and void on their free. The school’s actions were viewed as 
heavy handed, considering th a t the school had been able to take control of the 
situation as easily as it had. The boys’ suspensions were declared void and 
ordered permanently enjoined. The students’ records were also ordered 
expunged.
The cause of Puerto Rican independence has traditionally been taken up 
by each new generation th ro u ^ o u t the 20th Century. An equally strong 
sentim ent exists there for statehood.
Cases with Religious Overtones
Cheema v. Thompson. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Circuit, 1995)
As one might expect, when religious freedom is involved in freedom of 
expression m atters, the courts are especially carefiil in their decisions.
Consider the case of children of the Sikh* faith  who attend public schools 
wearing daggers as a  symbol of their religious beliefs. This practice has caused 
concern in several California communities. At Yuba City, Selma, and Live 
Oak, accommodation was reached successfully when the Khalsa Sikh 
population agreed to (a) dull the blades of the kirpans, (b) lim it th e ir length to
8 The Sikh faith originated in India, but num erous people of th a t persuasion 
have resettled in W estern nations, including the United States.
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2¥i inches, and (c) securely rivet the blades to their sheaths. B ut a  dispute in 
Livingston resulted in  legal action.
The m atter was b ro u ^ t to district court for the E astern D istrict of 
California, where the  school district was ordered to make accommodation for 
the wearing of kirpans un til the m atter could be argued on its m erits. This 
ruling stirred the pot even further. California Senate President pro tem Bill 
Lockyer was able to get a  bill passed to perm it the wearing o f kirpans in 
school. The m easure was vetoed by Governor Pete W lson. The inevitable 
appeal landed in the N inth Circuit. Excerpts of that court’s proceedings 
follow.
“.^peU ants Livingston Union School D istrict (the “school 
district”) appeal the district court’s preliminary injunction 
ordering them  to accommodate three schoolchildren’s religious 
practices un til th is dispute under the Religious Freedoms 
Restoration Act of 1993... can be litigated on the m erits. We 
review the district court’s prelim inary injunction for abuse of 
discretion...Finding none, we affirm.
Three young Khalsa Sikh children stand a t the center of this 
controversy: Rgjinder, Sukhjinder, and Jaspreet Cheema 
(together, the “children” or "Cheemas"). A central tenet of their 
religion requires them to wear a t all times five symbols of their 
faith: “kes” (long hair), “kangha” (comb), “kachch” (sacred
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underwear), “kara” (steel bracelet), and a  “kirpan” (ceremonial 
knife). This case began when the school district in which the 
Cheemas reside refused to allow the children to wear kirpans to 
schooL
The school district relied on its to ta l ban of all weapons, 
including knives, from school grounds. I t also pointed to two state 
statutes, both of which it th o u ^ t compelled its policy... As f r r  as 
the school district was concerned, there was nothing left to 
discuss; a  kirpan was unquestionably a  knife, and as such it  fell 
squarely within the absolute ban.
This left the Cheema children w ith two choices if  they 
wished to attend school: either leave the ir kirpans a t home (and 
violate a  fundamental tenet of their religion) or bring them  to 
school (and face expulsion and/or crim inal prosecution). The 
children did neither, electing instead to stay home while the ir 
parents brought this federal action under the Religious Freedoms 
Restoration Act [(RFRA)].
The district court faithfully applied RFRA to the facts of 
this case and came up w ith an injunction th a t it judged 
appropriate. We do not endorse the term s of the ipjunction, bu t 
neither do we th ink the district court abused its discretion. I f  the 
school district dislikes the injunction, it should use its
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opportunity to litigate th is dispute on the m erits to present the 
district court with adequate evidence from which a  fully informed 
decision can be made.
AFFIRM ED.”
A thoughtful dissent was w ritten by C ircuit Judge Charles E. Wiggins: 
“Evidence presented to the district court supported its 
finding of dangerousness. The district court was presented with 
an affidavit from a school secretary who was able to observe 
Jaspreet Cheema’s (supposedly unnoticeable) kirpan. Worse still, 
she observed that Jaspreet’s 4 year-old brother was wearing one, 
too. And, most alarmingly, the secretary stated th a t Jaspreet told 
her th a t “if anybody steals from me, I can put this to them .”
While making this statem ent he grabbed his kirpan. This 
occurrence is disputed.
Two other incidents involving the Cheema children and 
their kirpans, which are undisputed, also supported the district 
court’s original finding  A  first grade child subm itted an affidavit 
in which he stated th a t he saw Rajinder and Jaspreet Cheema 
w ith their kirpans out on the school grounds. He stated that 
Raqinder was attem pting to cut the rope on the flag pole, until 
Rajinder’s grandfather arrived and the children put their kirpans 
away. A  teacher from another school submitted an affidavit in
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which she reported having seen Rs^inder, Jaspreet, and H arpreet 
Cheema, on the same day, playing with their kirpans around the 
flag pole. She reported th a t she saw them  try  to hoist a  Idrpan up 
the flag pole.
There exists very little  case law on the issue of a  Sikh’s 
r i ^ t  to carry a  Idrpan in  public arenas. I suggest, however, tha t 
Sikhs are in a num ber of instances denied the r i ^ t  to exercise 
th is religious practice in the in terest of public security. For 
example, I imagine th a t a  Sikh is not allowed to carry a kirpan 
when boarding an airplane o r entering a federal courtroom. In 
each instance, the federal governm ent’s compelling interest in 
public safety outw ei^is the  Sikh’s F irst Amendment right to 
exercise his religion. Similarly, I believe th a t the school district’s 
compelling interest in school children’s safety outweighs the 
Cheema children’s r i ^ t  to w ear their kirpans in  school.
Furtherm ore, I challenge the mg^ority’s subtle suggestion 
th a t the school district lacks a  compelling in terest...T he nuyority 
implies th a t while the school district would have a  compelling 
in terest in  protecting the students flrom those fears which are 
reasonably related to a  real th reat, no such real th rea t even exists 
here. 1 rem ind the m ^’ority  th a t the issue before us involves a 
seven-or eight-inch knife w ith a  four-inch blade...The district
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court judge specifically noted that, having examined the Cheema 
children’s kirpans, he did not consider them  to appear harmless.
Furtherm ore, the district court judge specifically found that 
the weapon-like qualities of the kirpans make them "a danger to 
children in  schooL"... Such fiictual findings are not clearly 
erroneous. In addition, I emphasize the potential dangers of 
perm itting knives in school. F irst, we m ust be concerned with the 
abnorm al, non-law-abiding Sikh child. If such a child were to 
carry a  kirpan, he would pose a  substantially greater th rea t to the 
safely of the other children than he otherwise would because now 
he would be armed. Second, we must consider that a non-Sikh 
child may somehow seize a  Sikh child’s kirpan and threaten or 
harm  other children. Such a  child would not otherwise have 
access to a  knife while in school. Finally, and most im portantly, 
we m ust be concerned with the fact that the Sikhs a t issue are 
children and thus have the m aturity and judgment of children. 
Given tha t Sikhs are to use their kirpans in life-or-death 
situations, we would be forced to rely on school children to make 
the determ ination as to when their lives are at stake. Clearly, 
school officials need not knowingly expose the non-Sikh school 
children to such an unacceptable position of vulnerability.
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It is axiomatic th a t we owe our children a safe, and 
effective, learning environment. The current plan of 
accommodation, however, does not allow the school district to 
provide either. I tru st th a t a  better decision wiU be reached a t the 
conclusion of the pending trial. We simply cannot allow young 
children to carry long, wieldahle knives to schooL Period.”
nhalifr.nx y. New Canev Ind. Sch. D ist.. 976 F.Supp. 659
(S.D. Texas, 1997)
A school’s ban on certain symbolic expressions of religious belief can also 
result in litigation. No court hqs found that a  student wearing a simple cross 
or s ta r of David creates disruption or intim idation in school. It would seem 
unlikely tha t any similar symbol of personal religious belief would land the 
wearer in court. Nonetheless, the following item  appeared recently in 
Education Week, a  periodical aimed a t educators and other education 
stakeholders.
“The parents of two Texas h i ^  school students have filed a 
federal lawsuit challenging a  d istrict’s policy that bars Roman 
Catholic rosary beads as a  gang symbol. The 5,500-student New 
Caney district, about 30 miles south of Houston, has included 
rosaiy beads on its list of prohibited gang symbols for several 
years. Superintendent Jerry  Hall said.
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Two freshm en a t New C a n ^  School, David Chalifoux 
and Jerry  Robertson, began wearing the  heads early this year. In  
March, they were told they could not w ear them  outside their 
clothes because the beads were considered gang apparel.
The boys’ parents sued the d istrict in U.S. district court in 
Houston on May 19. The suit claims the  gang policy violates the 
boys’ F irst Amendment r i ^ t  to freedom of speech and free 
exercise of religion. I t seeks a halt to the  policy and unspecified 
monetary damages.
Mr. Hall said the district will defend its policy,” (Lawsuit 
filed over rosaiy, 1997).
A bench trial was held during late July, 1997. The court found that there 
had not been the slightest evidence of disruption on account of the students 
wearing their rosaries; nor had they ever been approacdied by known gang 
members on account of the rosaries. Because the plaintiff students claimed 
th a t they intended their rosaries to be an expression of their frdth, and because 
no contradictory evidence was brought by the district, the court ruled th a t the  
act was protected speech under the F irst Amendment. I t also found the scdiool 
d istrict’s policy that defined rosaries as gang-related void for vagueness. 
P laintiffs’ wearing of their rosaries was protected by their freedom of religion 
guarantees. The students were also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs, but no 
m onetary damages were awarded because no evidence of actual
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m onetary loss had been presented.
Stephenson v. Davenport rnTnmiiTiiiv School District.
Docket No. 96-1770 (8th Circuit, 1997)
When Brian na Stephenson was an  eighth grader in the Davenporrt, Iowa 
Community School District, she tattooed a  small cross between her thum b and 
index finger. She attended school for two and one-half years with the tattoo in 
plain view w ithout incident. According to courrt records, the girl intended her 
tattoo to be a form of “self expression. She did not consider the tattoo a 
religious symbol; nor did she intend the tattoo to communicate gang affiliation.
Later, attending Davenport W est H i^  School, she was an honor student 
with no record of gang activity or disciplinary problems. Meanwhile, gang 
presence in  district schools escalated. Student b ro u ^ t weapons on campus and 
violence resulted from gang members threatening other students who 
displayed rival gang signs or symbols.
At the beginning of the 1992-1993 school term , Brianna met with her 
sdiool counselor, Wayne Grarmeman, to discuss her class schedule. When 
Grarmeman noticed the tattoo he suspected that it m ight have gang 
significance. He notified Associate Principal Jim  Foy. Foy consulted Police 
Liaison Officer David Holden who, based on a drawing and description of the 
tattoo, stated  his opinion that it was a  gang symbol. Foy phoned Briarma’s 
mother and informed her the girl was suspended for the day because her tattoo 
was gang-related. The parents m et w ith Foy the following morning and agreed
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that Brianna would continue in school on a  tem porary basis with the tattoo 
covered by a  bandage. Foy informed the parents th a t Brianna needed to 
remove or alter the tattoo, or else the school would suspend her for ten days.
Brianna m et with a  tattoo specialist who advised her that laser treatm ent 
was the only effective method of removing the tattoo. Later, OfBcer Holden 
examined B rianna’s tattoo and confirmed his earlier opinion that it was a  gang 
symboL
School officials granted the girl a  two-week extension until the tattoo 
could be removed, but warned Mrs. Stephenson th a t if  the tattoo was not 
removed by the end of the two weeks, the school would suspend her a t the time 
and would recommend to the Advisory Council th a t she he excluded from 
school by the Davenport Board of Education.
The doctor performing the removal burned through four layers of skin in 
the process and then followed up the procedure w ith two months of various 
appointments a t which skin was scraped off with a  razor blade to prevent the 
bleeding of the tattoo. The procedure, which cost about $500, left a  scar on 
Briarma’s hand. The girl and her parents sued the school district, claiming 
that the school’s regulation was vague and over broad, and that the school had 
violated her procedural due process rights. They also alleged that the district 
had failed to adequately train  its persormel.
The district court granted summary judgm ent for the appellees (the 
school district) and the Stephensons appealed to the Eighth Circuit. That court
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affirmed in part and reversed in part. It found th a t the school’s regulation 
governing forbidden gang activity was void for vagueness because it used the 
term  “gang” without further definition; the ruling also said the regulation 
failed to provide restricting definition and standards for enforcement.
However, Brianna’s contention th a t she had been denied due process was 
thrown out since she had &ded to exhaust aU available adm inistrative 
remedies a t the schooL The allegation that district personnel were improperly 
trained was also discarded. By the time the Eighth Circuit’s opinion was 
handed down, the girl had graduated.
C. H. V. Oliva e t al.. 990 F.Supp. 341 (Dist. of New Jersey, 1997)
While C. H.’s son, Z. H. was in kindergarten in  1994, students in his class 
were asked to make posters depicting things for which they were thankful. Z.
H.’s poster professed his thanks for “Jesus.” All the posters were then pu t on 
display in the school hallway. An unknown person removed Z. H .’s poster 
because of its religious theme. When Z. H .’s teacher noticed, she rem ounted 
the poster, although in  a  less conspicuous position.
When Z. H. was promoted to first grade, his teacher Grace Oliva 
maintained a policy in  her room which rewarded students who had arrived a t a 
certain level of reading proficiency by allowing them  to read a book of their 
own choosing to the rest of the dass. This is what Z. H. planned to read:
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“Jacob traveled far away to his uncle’s house. He worked for his 
uncle, taking care o f sheep. While he was there, Jacob got m arried. He 
had twelve sons. Jacob’s big family lived on his uncle’s land for m any 
years. But Jacob w anted to go back home. One day, Jacob packed up all 
his animals and his family and everything he had. They traveled all the 
way back to where E sau lived. Now Jacob was afraid that Esau m i^ t  
still be angry a t him. So he sent presents to Esau. He sent servants 
who said ‘Please don’t  be angry any more.’ B ut Esau wasn’t  angry. He 
ran  to Jacob. He hugged and kissed him. He was happy to see his 
brother again.”
Ms. Oliva recognized th a t Z. H .’s selection had biblical implications, 
having been adapted from Genesis 29:1-33:20. She allowed the others to read 
their non-religious stories to the class, but only allowed Z. H. to read his story 
to her.
When Z. H .’s m other learned th a t Ms. Oliva considered the story to be 
inappropriate, she demanded th a t Z. H. be allowed to read his story to the 
entire class, and also demanded th a t an apology be made to both her son and 
herself. When Ms. Oliva failed to comply, suit was in itiated in U.S. district 
court for the District of New Jersey. The complaint was in two parts: (a) th a t 
the defendants had “willfully and intentionally” violated Z. H .’s r i^ t s  to 
freedom of expression under the F irst Amendment, and (b) that the 
defendemts, by failing to exercise their supervisory powers or to implement a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
policy to allow for expression of religious beliefs in  the classroom, aided in  th a t 
violation. The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief. In response, 
the defendants filed a  motion to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively, for 
sim unary judgment.
The defendants sought the protection of the Eleventh Amendment,^ 
which has consistently been interpreted to prohibit Federal courts from 
hearing suits b ro u ^ t by citizens against their own State. The court explained 
that “counties and municipalities, although considered persons acting under 
the color o f state law.. .are not considered part o f the state for purposes of 
Eleventh Amendment imm unity.” Nonetheless, the court granted the petition 
for sum m ary judgm ent and dismissed the complaint.
A Miscellany of Expression
The F lu tter of Hair in the 1970s 
Numerous cases involving students’ violation of school grooming  codes 
arose in the early 1970s as men and boys, taking the cue firom the pop culture, 
let their hair grow to near shoulder length (and some beyond). Because these 
cases are numerous, only two were selected for the purpose of recording the 
nature o f the complaints and the manner in which the courts dealt with
9 Which says: the judicial power of the United S tates shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced o r prosecuted against one of 
the U nited States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.
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them. A good many cases citing T inker were about students with long hair.
Crossen v. Fatsi. 309 F.Supp. 114 (Dist. of Connecticut, 1970)
A first year student a t Tourtellotte Memorial High School in Thompson, 
Connecticut, Raymond Crossen decided to grow a  full beard and mustache 
despite the school’s dress code—which was specific about hair length and facial 
hair. Raymond was advised of the regulations and was given a  weekend to 
comply. When he refused, he was ordered suspended until such time as he 
returned to school in conformity w ith the code. His father did not support 
Raymond’s position, but his m other did. Action was filed in district court to 
have the court order Raymond’s reinstatem ent. The plaintdfT-pupil claimed 
that his beard and mustache did not specifically defy the dress code, and even 
if it did, he had been denied his F irst Amendment right of free expression as 
well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
The court granted the relief sought by Raymond on grounds that the 
dress code was “vague, uncertain, and ambiguous.”
Diinham v. Pulsifer. 312 F.Supp. 411 (Dist. of Vermont, 1970)
Steven Dunham and co-plaintiffs Prentiss Sm ith and Paul Weber were 
enrolled a t Brattleboro, Vermont Union High School in  the 1969-1970 school 
year, good students and members of the school’s tennis team. The two emd 
other team  members decided to affect long hair styles. During the following 
weeks, six of the top eight players on the team  were dismissed because of their
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hair length. No o ther disciplinaiy problems were reported o r suggested during 
the court hearing on the m atter. Chief Judge Leddy opined:
“ I t  is to be noted th a t under the existing athletic code, Billy 
Kidd, the world frunous skier, would be unable to m ake the ski 
team. Joe Pepitone and Ken H arrelson, two colorful and popular 
msgor league ball players, would be unable to m ake the baseball 
team. Joe Namath would be barred from the football team  and 
Ron Hill, who won the Boston M arathon on April 19 of this year, 
would not even be perm itted to try  out for the track team .” 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the law was a t issue in this 
case. After learning th a t no similar grooming code was in place for students in 
general or for participants in other organized school activities—debate, band, 
glee club for example—the judge ruled on the  side of the plaintifrs.
Dillon V. Pulaski Cnim tv Special School District. 468 F.Supp. 54 
(Western Div., E.D. Arkansas, 1978)
Laura Beth Lester, a teacher a t N orth P ulaski High School in
Jacksonville, Arkansas, spotted plaintiff Leonard Dillon kissing a  girl in a
school hallway. When Ms. Lester twice directed Leonard to desist, he remarked
“What a drag.” Both Leonard’s behavior and his rem ark to the teacher were
in direct violation of rules in the school’s S tudent Conduct Handbook. Not
long after, the Dillons received a “recommendation for expulsion” notice in the
mail.
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A hearing was set up before the Pupil Personnel Committee of the school 
district, where the Dillons failed to get satisfaction on Leonard’s behalf. They 
then requested and were granted a school board hearing. A lth o u ^  Ms. Lester 
was present, the board refused to hear her testim ony. They voted to expel 
Leonard, and shortly thereafter the Dillons’ attorney brought suit in the 
district court for Eastern Arkansas.
The plaintiff asserted th a t he was denied his F ourteenth  Amendment 
right of due process by the sudden expulsion, and fu rth er claimed that his 
kissing the  young lady was p art of his F irst Amendment freedom of expression. 
Leonard sought an award o f damages and a  m andatory injunction that would 
reinstate him as a student in good standing. At one point in its opinion, the 
court said:
“Democracy a t work requires th a t citizens learn to question 
the decisions of those in authority, bu t these citizens must also 
learn to voice th e ir objections in a  reasonable and effective 
manner. One goal of the educational process, therefore, should be 
to instill in students a  respect for authority .”
Despite this admonition to young Dillon, the court ruled in his favor on 
the due process claim. The d istrict was ordered to reinstate him. But, because 
the plaintiff failed to establish th a t he had suffered harm , the award of 
damages am ounted to ju st one dollar.
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Fricke v. Lvnch. 491 F.Supp. 381 (Dist. of Rhode Island, 1980)
Prom tim e was nearing a t Cumberland High School in  Rhode Island. 
Plans were underw ay for a  lovely affair to be held a t the Pleasant Valley 
Country Club in  nearby Sutton, M assachusetts. Only couples would be allowed 
to attend, but a  student’s partner need not be a senior—or for th a t m atter 
even a student a t the high school. At the time tickets were bought, the student 
was required to list the name of his or her date. Senior Aaron Fricke decided 
the time had arrived for him to “come out of the closet. ” He asked principal 
Richard Lynch for permission to bring a  male escort. Perm ission was refused, 
but in the meantim e Aaron had asked a  former student to attend with him and 
had been accepted. The principal wrote the following le tte r to Aaron’s home: 
“D ear Aaron:
This is to confirm our conversation of Friday, April 11,1980, 
during which 1 denied your request to attend the Senior 
Reception on May 30, 1980 a t the Pleasant Valley Country Club 
in Sutton, M assachusetts, accompanied by a male escort. 1 am 
denying your request for the following reasons:
1. The real and present threat of physical harm  to you, your 
male escort and to others;
2. The adverse effect among your classmates, other students, 
the School and the Town of Cumberland, which is certain to
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follow approval of such a  request for overt homosexual 
interaction (male or female) a t a class function;
3. Since the dance is being held out of sta te and this is a 
function of the students of Cumberland High School, the School 
Departm ent is powerless to insure protection in  Sutton, 
M assachusetts. That protection would be required for property 
as well as persons and would expose all concerned to liability for 
harm  which might occur;
4. I t is long standing school policy th a t no unescorted 
student, male or female, is permitted to attend. To enforce this 
rule, a  student m ust identify his or her escort before the 
committee will sell the ticket.
1 suspect that other objections will be raised by your fellow 
students, the Cumberland School Department, parents and other 
citizens, which will heighten the potential for harm .
Should you wish to appeal my decision, you may appeal to 
the Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Robert G. Condon. You will 
be entitled to a hearing before him or his designee. If you are not 
satisfied with his decision, you may appeal to the Cumberland 
School Committee. You are entitled to be represented by counsel, 
to examine and cross examine witnesses and to present witnesses
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on your own behalf. Further procedural details m ay be obtained 
from the Superintendent’s office.
If  you have any further questions, please feel free to contact 
me. I am  sending a copy of th is le tter to your parents in  the 
event they wish to be heard.
Sincerely,
Richard B. Lynch, Principal’’
In a  la ter meeting, Aaron confirmed his conunitment to being gay, 
although he would no t rule out the future possibility that he m i^ t  tu rn  
bisexual. No accommodation could be reached on the subject of the  prom.
After Aaron filed suit, an event which was reported in Rhode Island and 
Boston newspapers, violence against him broke out at the school. He was 
assaulted by another student and received a  &cial cut which required five 
stitches to close. No fu rther problems arose. In his complaint, Aaron 
contended that the school’s action violated (a) his First Amendment right to 
free speech—dem onstrating his sexual orientation and th a t of his intended 
companion—and (b) his Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection 
of the law. (Mullins, 1981).
The District Court of Rhode Island cited Tinker- “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to fireedom of 
expression.” It fiu th er stated that no showing was made by the defendant that 
the forbidden conduct would “materially and substantially in terfere” with
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appropriate discipline in  the  operation of the school (or a t its functions). To the 
defense’s allegation th a t Fricke’s intended “expression” would infringe on the 
rights of other students, the court responded th a t the intended behavior was 
quiet and peaceful, dem anding no response from  others, and would be lost in a 
crowd of some 500 people.
A lth o u ^  ruling for Aaron, the court allowed th a t “the social problems 
presented by homosexuality are emotionally charged; conununity norm s are in 
flux, and the p ^ch ia tn c  profession is itself divided in its attitude...T his court’s 
role.. .is not to m andate social norms or impose its  own view of acceptable 
behavior. It is instead, to in terpret and apply the Constitution as best it can. 
The Constitution is not self-explanatory, and answers to knotty problems are 
inevitably inexact. All th a t an  individual judge can do is apply the legal 
precedents as accurately and honestly as he can, uninfluenced by personal 
predilections or the fear of community reaction, hoping each tim e to disprove 
the legal maxim that ‘hard  cases make bad law*.”
Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ.. e t al.. 655 F.Supp. 1353 
(W estern Div., S.D. Ohio, 1987)
E olations of their protections under the F irst and Fourteenth 
Amendments were alleged in a district court com plaint b ro u ^ t by W arren 
H arper and his sister Florence after they were prevented from entering the 
Edgewood High School (Ohio) Junior-Senior Prom  on the campus o f Miami
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University in nearby Oxford. School officials denied them entrance because of 
the way each was dressed.
W arren had arrived a t the prom dressed as a  woman, wearing earrings, 
stockings, high heels, a  dress, and a frir cape. Florence, on the other hand, 
wore a black tuxedo and men’s shoes.
In his ruling. Southern Ohio D istrict Court Judge Carl B. Rubin observed 
that “[I]n the present case, the school board’s dress regulations are reasonably 
related to the valid educational purposes of teaching community values and 
m aintaining school discipline.” He cited Jackson v. Dorrier. 424 F.2d 213 (6th 
Circuit, 1970) to the effect th a t the responsibility for m aintaining proper 
standards of decorum and discipline “is not vested in  the federal courts, bu t in 
the principal and faculty of the school.”
Olesen v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 288. 676 F.Supp. 820
(N.D. Illinois, 1987)
In 1987, the association between gang membership and the wearing of 
earrings by high school boys was argued successfully in an Illinois district 
court, which upheld a school ban on the practice. D anyl Olesen J r .’s claim 
that the school policy violated his first am endm ent rights was set aside by 
District Judge Plunkett, who also denied the claim th a t such a policy was in 
violation of 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause because the same ban 
did not apply to female students. The school’s position was strengthened when 
it was shown tha t considerable serious gang problems had been going on a t the
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school over a period o f four years. Although many male students today—and 
possihfy their frithers as well—have adopted the practice of wearing an earring, 
the Olesen court found th a t the F irst Amendment “does not protect a 
student’s wearing of an  earring to express his individuality in violation of the 
school dress code.”
Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools. 899 F.Supp. 556 
(District of New Mexico, 1995)
Since the mid-1990s, many male secondary students have taken to
wearing their trousers so low on their hips as to present the immediate danger
of their sliding the rest of the way to their ankles. Some clothing
manufacturers, ever sensitive to an opportunity to capitalize on a  fad, quickly
b ro u ^ t out garments made expressly to emphasize the style. In most places,
the practice became known as “sagging.”
Freshman Richard Bivens received num erous verbal warnings about
wearing his sagging pants to school during the first several weeks of the 1993-
1994 term  at Del Norte High School in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The
school’s prohibition against sagging pants was put in place in  response to a
gang problem. But Richard contended th a t he was not, and had no desire to be,
a gang member. He said he wore the sagging pants as a  statem ent of his
identity as a black youth and as a way to express his link with black culture
and the styles of black urban youth.
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Ignoring all the warnings, Richard was given a suspension. Although 
notice of a  hearing was sent home, his m other Susan Green claimed not to 
have received it u n til the day after the hearing had taken place. At the 
hearing, officials took account of Richard’s m any warnings and o f the fact that 
he was failing all his classes. He had also accrued excessive absences. His 
suspension was extended th ro u ^  the end of the semester. R ichard’s mother 
responded by filing suit, citing F irst and Fourteenth Amendments. Meanwhile, 
Richard continued his school attendance a t a  different school which did not 
have a ban on sagging. His status was non-credit for the sem ester, however.
District Judge Santiago E. Campos studied the evidence presented as well 
as legal precedents before ruling in favor o f the school district. As to the due 
process claim, he noted th a t a lth o u ^  Mrs. Green was not home to receive the 
hearing notice which had been sent by certified mail, she had received instead 
a postal notice of failure to deliver certified mail over a week before the 
scheduled hearing. She had neither contacted the post office for re-delivery nor 
gone to the post office to collect the item in  person. Commenting on the First 
am endm ent claim, the Judge said:
“Even if the w earing of sagging pants could be construed as protected 
speech, I would have grave doubts about the m erits of P lain tiffs claim. Not all 
constraints on protected excessive conduct by school children are 
unconstitutional...the dress code adopted a t Del Norte was a reasonable 
response to the perceived problem of gangs within the school.” Summary
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judgm ent was granted in  favor of the defendants.
Buttons, Tags, and O ther Signs 
Recall the Burnside and Blackwell rulings discussed in C hapter 2, one 
which upheld the wearing of “freedom buttons” by students in an  environment 
free of disruption and one which ruled in favor of school authorities where 
substantial disruption had occurred. Even before T inker, Blackwell’s 
“presence or absence of disruption” paradigm was key to the court’s ruling. In 
the much later C handler action, described in Chapter 1, the absence of 
“m aterial and substantial disruption” saved the day for students even when 
their buttons bore messages which could have easily ignited trouble had the 
replacem ent teachers taken offense to the messages. The following cases 
present additional food for th o u ^ t where wearing slogans is concerned.
H atter v. Los Angeles Citv High School D istrict. 452 F.2d 673
(9th Circuit, 1971)
Shasta H atter and Julie Johnson wore tags on their dress th a t said
“BOYCOTT CHOCOLATES” as a  protest against the school’s dress code.
Shasta stood across the street from Venice High School and distributed leaflets
as students arrived for dass. They felt that interfering with the an n u a l
chocolate drive, a means by which some school fimctions were financed, they
could call attention to their dissatisfaction w ith the school dress code and other
policies. When a suspension followed, the girls sued by “next friend” alleging
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First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the 
complaints, and the girls filed an  appeal with the N inth Circuit.
On closer deamination of the facts, the appellate court reversed the lower 
court and remanded the m atter with directions to vacate the order and 
conduct further proceedings consistent with the findings.
Guzick v. Drebus. 431 F.Supp. 472 (Eastern Div., N.D. Ohio, 1970)
In March of 1969, a  challenge arose to a long-standing school policy at 
Shaw H i^  School in E ast Cleveland, Ohio. The school’s policy forbade the 
wearing of “buttons, badges, scarves and other means by which the wearers 
identify themselves as supporters of a cause or bearing messages unrelated to 
their education.” Thomas Guzick arrived a t scdiool on March 11, 1969, 
wearing a  button th a t said:
“April 5 Chicago 
G.I. Civilian 
Anti-War 
Demonstration
Student Mobilization Committee”
He and another student also had a number of pamphlets advertising the event. 
They stopped at Principal Donald Drebus’ office to ask permission to distribute 
the pamphlets. Not only was permission denied, but they were also ordered to
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remove th e  buttons from their clothing. The other boy complied, but Guzick 
refused and thereupon Drebus suspended him
W ithin days, an action w£is fried in  district court alleging a  violation of 
Guzick’s F irst Amendment r i^ t s .  I t e  court denied the  prehm inaiy iigunction 
th a t had been requested and dism issed the complaint. Guzick’s attorney fried 
with the Sixth Circuit Court o f Appeals. Regarding the school’s prohibition of 
slogans o r messages worn on the person, the circuit judge observed:
“The rule was created in response to a  problem whidi Shaw 
has had over a period of many years. At the  tim e high school 
fraternities were in vogue, the various fraternities a t Shaw were a 
divisive and disruptive influence on the school. They carved out 
portions of the school cafeteria in which only members of a 
certain fraternity were perm itted to sit. The fraternities were 
competitive and engaged in activities which disrupted the 
educational process a t Shaw...The same problem was 
encountered with inform al clubs, which replaced high school 
fraternities and sororities. The problem again exists as a result of 
racial mixture a t Shaw. Buttons, pins, and  other emblems have 
been used as ‘identifying’ badges. They have portrayed and 
defined the divisions among students in  the schooL They have 
fostered an undesirable form of competition, division, and dislike. 
The presence of these emblems, badges, and buttons are taken to
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represent, define, and depict the actual division o f the students in 
various groups.”
The court w ent on to acknowledge th a t as benign as Guzick’s buttons 
may be, allowing th e ir wear would regenerate practices which had proven to be 
troublesome in the past. In view of w hat the court viewed as an  “incendiary” 
situation a t the high school, the court rejected the T in W  argum ents. The 
opinion cited the district court’s findings as follows:
“The court has concluded that if  all buttons were permitted 
a t Shaw High, many students would seek to wear buttons 
conveying an infiam m atoiy or provocative message o r which 
would be considered an  insult or affront to certain of the other 
students. Such buttons have been worn at Shaw H igh School in 
the past. One button of th is nature, for example, contained the 
message ‘Happy Easter, Dr. King.’ This button caused a fight...in 
the school cafeteria a t Shaw. Other buttons, such as ‘Black 
Power,’ ‘Say It Loud, Black and Proud,’ and buttons depicting a 
black mailed fist have been worn a t Shaw and would likely be 
worn again, if perm itted.”
Affirm in g  the lower court’s decision. Senior Circuit Judge O’Sullivan 
remarked:
“We will not attem pt an extensive review of the many great 
decisions which have forbidden abridgment of firee speech. We
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have been thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned language. 
They are  a  part o f our American heritage. None o f these 
masterpieces, however, were [sic] composed or u ttered  to support 
the w earing of buttons in high school classrooms. We are not 
persuaded th a t enforcement of such a  rule as Shaw High School’s 
no-symbol proscription would have excited like judicial classics. 
Denying Shaw High Sdiool the r i ^ t  to enforce th is small 
disciplinary rule could, and most likely would, im pair the rights 
of its students to an education and the rights of its teachers 
to fulfill their responsibilities. ”
Berner v. Dnlahantv 129 F.3d 20 (1st Circuit, 1997)
This study has probed the findings of the courts to determ ine guidelines 
for school adm inistrators. O ur search has uncovered many divergent 
approaches to choosing precedents which help jurists separate out the facts of 
each case and bring th e ir salient points forward. In the process, the rights of 
students have been shown to be sometimes advancing, sometimes retreating. 
W hat guidance can be gained by looking not at what is said in court but rather 
a t what is done there?
On October 31, 1995, attorney Seth Berner was seated in the galleiy of 
Judge Thomas E. Delahanty’s courtroom, waiting for his tu rn  to appear before 
the court. Berner wore a circular button pinned to his lapel. I t was about two
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inches in diam eter and bore the words “No on 1 - Maine Won’t  Discriminate.” 
The sentiment was in opposition to a  statewide referendum th a t voters were 
scheduled to consider a t the November election. Neither the pin nor its 
message were related to Berner’s business before the court.
At one point during the day’s proceedings. Judge Delahanty called Berner 
to the bench. The following exchange took place;
Judge: Mr. Berner...Can you remove the political pin while 
you’re in the courtroom?
Berner: Your Honor, what happened to my r i ^ t  to political 
speech?
Judge: Not in the courtroom. We don’t take sides.
Berner: 1 w ant the record to reflect that 1 don’t think there’s any 
authority for that.
Judge: The courtroom is not—th a t may be, but the courtroom is 
not a political forum.
Berner: Your honor, 1 want the record to reflect th a t 1 object to 
th a t.”
Berner alleged in district court that the button ban violated the First 
Amendment. D istrict Judge Gene C arter presided over a flurry  of motions, 
including an imsuccessfiil one from Berner for preliminary injunction. The 
defense alleged th a t the action should be dismissed for lack o f standing and 
failure to state a  claim. Judge Carter threw  out the lack of standing argument.
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assum ing that as an a tto m ^r Bem er had standing to sue. The Judge then 
ruled tha t Berner’s com plaint stated no claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Bem er wouldn’t  take no for an answer. He died an appeal w ith the 
F irst Circuit court, and in  the process probably learned a  lesson as the panel 
afBrmed the lower court’s ruling. Circuit Judge Selya said:
"An attorney is dree, like all Americans, to hold political 
sentim ents. In  a courtroom setting, however, lawyers have no 
absolute right to wear such feelings on their sleeves (or lapels, for 
th a t m atter). Judge Delahanty’s policy ... is a  reasonable means 
of ensuring the appearance of fairness and im partialily in  the 
courtroom, and the plaintiff has made no supportable allegation 
that the restriction is viewpoint based. Consecpiently, Berner’s 
complaint fails to state a  claim upon whicdi relief can be granted.
The Bem er m atter is not a student or scdiool related situation, but it does 
shed some light on the kind of reasoning th a t might be brought to bear in 
student expression cases. One might wonder if:
Bem er : œ urtroom  :: student : classroom.
Whereas Judge Delahanty was supported in his insistence th a t no political 
speech dism pt the dignity and neutrality of his courtroom, it is clear dom  a 
carefiil reading of Chandler that a classroom teacher has no sim ilar defense.
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CHAPTERS
SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Summary
O f the 34 principal cases discussed in the study, students prevailed in 18 
while losing out in 14, Two ended in what might  be term ed a “draw.” This 
suggested tha t the chances of a school adm inistrator’s ultimately prevailing 
against willful students in  sim ilar circumstances are s li^ tly  less than 42 
percent. Considering those odds and the high cost of litigation, a  far better 
alternative is knowing one is on solid constitutional footing in the first place. 
To begin, let us address the study questions in tu rn .
1. Do the courts agree on the Supreme Court’s T in k er findings 
after thirty years?
The Supreme Court itself began modifying T inker in 1986 when it 
decided the Fraser case, and continued two years la ter with Hazelwood. 
Although these decisions made it clear that T inker was to remain the authority  
in m atters involving symbolic speech, Fraser and Hazelwood each fenced off 
large chunks of student F irst Amendment issues.
115
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The answer is th a t in the area of symbolic expression. T inker rem ains the 
prim aiy authority in all circuits. Judges in the N inth Circuit’s C handler case, 
which triggered this study, read T ink er like scripture. Consistently in the 
various cases examined by the study, where student expression is passive, the 
courts have challenged school officials to show th a t th e ir curtailm ent of 
student expression was prom pted by a  real threat of m aterial and substantial 
disruption (the Blackwell - T in k er  connection). But when actions accompemy 
symbolic expression, or in cases in which previous incidents helped to forecast 
disruption, schools are m ore likely to be supported. Official dress codes have 
not fared well at all; m ost have been found void for vagueness. Even when 
connections were noted between gang membership and certain lypes of 
apparel, the school authorities’ apparent inability to precisely define “gang” or 
“gang apparel” has led to rulings favoring students.
Fads and trends like hair styles, body piercing, and tattooing are things 
th a t school officials may have to tolerate, knowing th a t they will fade away 
when students move on to something new. Notable exceptions are found in 
H arper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ.. e t al. 655 F.Supp. 1353 (Western Div., S.D. 
Ohio, 1987), where social propriety won out over fidvolous cross-dressing; and 
in Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools. 899 F.Supp. 556 (Dist. of New 
Mexico, 1995), where sagging pants were judged not to be a form of speech.
The courts have no t applied Tinker’s immunity to distasteful slogans or 
illustrations worn on T-shirts. Even with the help of their law professor father.
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two brothers —despite favorable court rulings— finally had to cave in to a 
solid dress code adopted by their school, but not until they had run the 
adm inistrators ragged. Pvle v. South Hadlev Sehnol Committee. et al.. 824 
F.Supp. 7 (Dist. of M assachusetts, 1993) and Pvle v. South Hadlev School 
Committee. e t al.. 861 F.Supp. 157 (Dist. of M assachusetts, 1994).
Student armbands, as long as they don’t  contain slogans th a t offend or 
inflame, are well w ithin T in k e r’s bosom. Every arm band case examined in the 
study supported the students’ First Amendment rights, w ith the exception of 
Wise V. Sauers. 345 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1972), in  which arm bands 
silently urged students to “strike.”
The use of school qm bols like the Confederate Battle Flag, or “Johnny 
Reb” characters may offend segments of the school population, and will not be 
supported by the courts as exercises in protected expression, despite strong 
dissenting opinions such as in Augustus v. School Board of E seamhifl C nnntv . 
Florida, et. al.. 361 F.Supp. 383 (Pensacola Div., N.D. Florida, 1975) and 
Augustus V. School Board of Escamhifl Cnuntv. Florida, et. al.. 507 F.2d 152 
(5th Circuit, 1975)
Recall that T inker also had the effect of defining the school as a limited 
public forum. Issues of student expression can also be evaluated in the 
traditional time, place, and m anner analysis. A rule of thum b when evaluating 
an incident involving student expression paraphrases form er Chief Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes to the effect th a t the reach of one’s arm  ends where the
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other fellow’s nose begins. O ur free speech guarantee does not allow us to 
tram ple on someone else’s r i^ t s .  T in k er  no t withstanding.
2. In the lig^t of relevant case law, what is the meaning of the 
''material or substantial disruption*’ referred to in Tinker?
The mere suspicion th a t order could be disturbed by student expression is 
insufficient, and will not vindicate school officials who have abridged student 
expression. Courts have insisted tha t school officials prove the existence of a 
real and immediate danger of violence o r the collapse of discipline, based on 
student conduct a t the moment o r on th e ir previous performance under sim ilar 
circumstances. If school officials are able to establish that they were actually 
in jeopardy of losing control of a  situation, then  reasonable m easures taken to 
secure o r regain control have been viewed in  court to fall under th e  school’s 
obligation to assure a  safe and orderly environm ent. Examples include Farrell 
V. Joel. 437 F.2d 160 (2nd Circuit, 1971), G ebert v. Hoffinan. 336 F. Supp. 694 
(E.D. Pennsylvania, 1972), and o f course the Blackwell case fix»m which Tinker 
borrowed some of its language.
3. Have the courts’ interpretations of the Tinker precedent 
worked over time to change our general understanding of it?
Apart from the Fraser and Hazelwood modifications, the study has found 
no evidence that any court’s understanding of the Tinker ruling has m aterially 
changed over time. Given D istrict Judge Owen M. Fanner’s scholarly analysis 
in C handler quite the opposite is clear. Judge Fanner said, “We have
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discerned three distinct areas of student speech from the Supreme Court’s 
school precedents: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, (2) 
school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech th a t falls into neither o f these 
categories. We conclude...that the standard for reviewing the suppression of 
vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser. 478 
U.S. a t 683-85, school- sponsored speech by Hazelwood. 484 U.S. a t 273, and 
all other speech by T inker. 393 U.S. a t 513-14. [Emphasis added].
4. Do other circuits follow the conceptual framework set down 
hy the Ninth Circuit Court of ^ p ea ls in Chandler?
To answer th is question, it is necessary to understand w hat concepts the 
C handler panel of judges agreed on. First, they determ ined th a t there had not 
been any real disruption in the school when the students appeared with their 
various “scab” buttons. Even the replacement teachers, a t whom most of the 
insulting slogans were aimed, adm itted tha t the buttons had not prompted any 
serious trouble. The Tinker absence of disruption standard immediately 
disarmed the school officials’ case for suspending David Chandler and E than 
Depweg in the eyes of the circuit court, in spite of the lower court’s having 
applied Fraser and Hazelwood language in dism issing the student’s original 
complaint.
Secondly, the circuit court rejected the earlier Hazelwood-inspired claim 
th a t if the school had allowed the buttons, the language on the buttons might 
be perceived as bearing the im prim atur of the school. Given the positive
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identity of sides in the ongoing labor dispute (school officials versus striking 
teachers), such a  conclusion would defy logic.
Finally, the circuit court properly chose to rule out any concern with 
where the buttons came fix)m, and a t whose instigation they were worn. 
A lth o u ^  it was clear th a t the students had not produced the buttons w ithout 
the help of their parents and the teachers’ union, the only issue the court 
concerned itself with was the behavior of the students and the reaction of the 
school officials. Since the standard of judgment was T inker it was 
unavoidable that the students’ behavior would be seen by the court as 
reasonably bland and passive, while the school officials’ reaction would be 
judged to be disproportionate and legally indefensible.
This said, the examination of similar “button” cases in other circuits (the 
5th and  6th) shows agreem ent on confining deliberations to the claims of the 
parties in dispute. If the interests of the government (in the person of its 
creature, the school) override the expression of thought on the part of 
student(s), then the school wül prevail. If not, the student(s) nearly always win 
in court.
5. When there are religious overtones in symbolic expression, is 
it dealt with differently by the courts than secular symbolic speech?
Four cases in particular provide answers. It may be significant th a t two of 
them  ended in a  “draw” of sorts. In Stephenson v. Davenport Commimitv 
School District. Docket No. 96-1770 (8th Circuit, 1997) a girl with no gang
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affiliation and  a  commendable academic record went through expensive and 
painful procedures to remove a cross tattoo the school district th o u ^ t was 
gang-related. Even though her suspension may have been heavy-handed, the 
complaint in  h er appeal to the E i^ th  C ircuit was denied on grounds th a t she 
had frdled to  exhaust adm inistrative remedies. The district’s policy was 
declared void for vagueness, and B rianna’s claim for damages was upheld. In 
its findings, the court expressed w hat m any other courts may feel;
“[Wje en ter the realm  of school discipline with caution, appreciating th a t 
our perspective of the public schools is necessarily a more d istan t one than th a t 
of individuals working within these schools who m ust prepare pupils for 
citizenship in the Republic.”
In Cheema v. Thompson. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Circuit, 1995), another draw 
situation resulted. Even th o u ^  the young Sikh students eventually wore their 
ceremonial daggers a t a  shorter than  usual length and riveted securely to their 
sheaths, they still wore them. There were no clear whiners.
The young elem entary school boy who was thankful for Jesus in C. H. v. 
Oliva et al.. 990 F.Supp. 341 (Dist. of New Jersey, 1997) lost his bid for f i ^  
expression in the Third Circuit, but the  students who wore their rosaries 
outside th e ir clothing in ChalifmiY y. New Caney Ind. Sch. Dist.. 976 F.Supp. 
659 (S.D. Texas, 1997) won theirs in  the Fifth. There does not appear to be any 
special favorable attention paid by the  courts when religious expression is 
involved; instead, care is taken th a t student activities do not violate the
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establishm ent clause of the First Amendment. There is no detectible difference 
from one circuit to another in this regard.
6. Must someone be called a name out loud to have effect, or can 
an insult take place in the form of a slogan on a button worn on 
another’s person? (Do Scabs Bleed? — We’re Not Listening, Scab — 
Scab, We Will Never Forget).
A lth o u ^  Chandlftr’s replacement teachers voiced no objection to the 
buttons tha t were pu t in their frices, there are people who would consider “Do 
Scabs Bleed?” to have threatening overtones, “We’re Not Listening, Scab” to 
be insolent, and “Scab, We VfiH Never Forget” to s u re s t some kind of future 
retaliation. The apparent purpose for these and other slogans was 
intim idation. According to the legal term s analysis available on the Internet’s 
http://www.lectlaw.com/ref.html, “Intim idate - means to intentionally say or 
do something which would cause a  person of ordinary sensibilities to be fearful 
of bodily harm. I t is not necessary to prove th a t the victim was actually 
frightened, and neither is it necessary to prove that the behavior of the person 
was so violent th a t it was likely to cause terror, panic or hysteria.”
Again, we look to Tinker for part of the answer. No disruption took place. 
The replacem ent teachers were self-assured enough to overlook the intended 
intim idation of the  buttons and were in ten t on doing their tem porary jobs, 
letting adm inistrators deal strike-related problems. The issue o f the slogans 
and whether o r no t they were “vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive” had
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been resolved by the district court. The slogans were obviously no t vulgar, 
lewd, or obscene; and they did not offend the district court judge. Since the 
replacement teachers failed to come forward w ith any complaint, the Judge 
was not obliged to complain on their behalf. Any Fraser evaluation was moot.
If any guidance falls from th is question, perhaps it is embodied in an 
Education Week C handler-inspfrftd article.
“Ivan Gluckman, the director of legal services for the N ational 
Association of Secondary School Principals said he agreed that th is kind of case 
should be governed by the Tinker analysis. B ut as to whether he would advise 
school principals to forbid strike-related buttons, ‘it is ju st going to depend on 
how reasonable the apprehension of disruption is,’ he said.” (Court reinstates 
students’ speech suit over button ban, 1992).
7. Is insulting or intimidating symbolic expression in a public 
school classroom more protected thaw similar insults delivered on a 
public street?
Once more, “disruption” is the key. The Chandlftr buttons were no more 
potentially disruptive than the “strike” arm bands in \\fise v. Sauers. 345 
F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1972). The buttons did not urge students to 
act, but the Wise arm bands did. Marching and chanting pickets m ight be 
considered intim idating by some, but in Cintron v. State Board o f Education. 
384 F.Supp. 674 (Dist. of Puerto Rico, 1974) students who marched were 
upheld.
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I t is interesting to compare the expression on C handler’s  buttons and the 
blatant “Puck the Draft” on th e  young man’s jacket in Cohen v. California  
403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen wore his jacket in the court house and was arrested 
and fined. His conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, which pointed 
out th a t the others in the public area of the court house didn’t  have to look. 
N either did Chandlar’s replacem ent teachers have to pay attention to the 
buttons. I t appears that they did not allow what they saw rile them  visibly.
No student would ever get by with the public outburst in  the case of 
Chaplinak v  v. New H am pshira 315 U.S. 568 (1942), when a frustrated 
Chaplinsky loudly declared th a t the city fathers were crooks and commies and 
racketeers. In fact, young F raser was punished for his objectionable speech. 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
The answer to the question is no. Students are not more insulated in 
school when they express the ir opinions than they would be off school grounds. 
Standards of conduct are w hat they are, even though they may change from 
time to tim e. Today’s society has a more liberal cast than a few decades ago, 
but in keeping with the cyclical nature of th ings, there are also some signs 
of a conservative swing ahead.
M atrix of Cases Studied
Table 1 lists the student i^nnbolic expression cases the study has 
examined, the year in which each was decided, the  geographical circuit, the
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level of jurisdiction, the issue involved, and the outcome—w hether &voring the 
student or school district.
Table 1.
M atrix of S tudent Symbolic Expression Cases.
CASE YR c m LVL ISSUE STÜ SCH
Dunham v. Pulsq>her 70 1 D hair sQde not to code X
Cintron v. St. Bd. o f Ed. 74 1 D picketing X
Pyie V. South Hadley 94 1 D offensive T-shirts X
Frain V. Baron 69 2 D not standing for pledge X
Crossen v. Fatsi 70 2 D hair sQde not to code X
Farrell v. Joel 71 2 C sit-down protest X
Goetz V. Ansell 73 2 C would’t say pledge X
Fricke V. Lynch 80 2 D gays to attend prom X
Elinhom v. Mans 69 3 D arm bands X
Gebert v. Hoffinan 72 3 D sit-in demonstration X
l^ s^e V. Sauers 72 3 D “strike” armbands X
C. H. V. Oliva 97 3 D thanks for Jesus X
Crosby v. Holsinger 88 4 C “Johnny Reb” offends X
Broussard v. Sch. Board 92 4 D T-shirt: “Drugs Suck” X
Phillips V. Anderson 97 4 D Battle flag jacket X
Aguirre v. Tahoka 70 5 D brown arm bands X
Butts V. Dallas 71 5 D black arm bands X
Augustus V. — Escambia 75 5 C “Rebels,” flag offend X
Chalifouz v. New Caney 97 5 D rosaries worn in school X
Guzick V. Drebus 70 6 C anti-war buttons X
Harper v. Edgewood 87 6 D students cross-dressing X
Oleson V. Board of Educ. 87 7 D male student's earring X
Baxter v. Mgo Qity. Sch. 94 7 C Unfair grades T-shirts X
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CASE YR cm LVL ISSUE STU SCH
Dillon V. Pulaski County 78 8 D students kissing in haH X
St^henson v. Davenport 97 8 C tattoo of cross X X
Hatter v. Los Angeles 71 9 C “boycott chocolates” X
Karp V. Becken 73 9 C student protest walkout X
Gano V. Sch. Dist. 411 87 9 D offensive T-shirts X
Chandler v. McMinnville 92 9 C “scab” buttons X
J^lin  V. San Jacinto 93 9 D shirts with advertising X
Cheema v. Thompson 95 9 C religious daggers X X
Hernandez v. Dist. No. 1 70 10 D berets, bad bdiavior X
Mdhtire v. Bethel Sch. 92 10 D liquor slogan on shirts X
Bivens v. Albuquerque 95 10 D sagging pants X
In the column labeled LVL, D=district court and C=drcuit court
In the words o f Law Professor Perry A. Zirkel of Lehigh University, “Ever 
since the Supreme C ourt’s landmark decision in Tinker...Rchool districts have 
had to th ink  twice before attem pting to discipline; Le., to censure or, more 
directly, to censor students for their expression. However, a  p air o f modem 
Supreme Court decisions... [Eraser and Hazelwood!.. .have reinterpreted the 
F irst Amendment Free Speech Clause in  relation to public school students.
A lth o u ^  the legal literature is replete w ith scholarly analyses of these 
successive court pronouncem ents and th e ir lower court progeny, ed u c a tio n  
p ra c titio n e rs  la c k  p ra c tic a l g u id an ce  in  term s of the cu rren t legal 
boundaries established by recent student ^p ression  case law.” [Emphasis 
added]. (Zirkel, 1997).
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Zirkel offers a  checklist th a t he suggests could provide th a t guidance, 
s p e a r in g  in his recent article in the Education Law R eporter was the 
following (Zirkel’s m aterial is indented);
“1. If  your district o r school has a  pertinent policy, is it 
unconstitutionally vague or oveihroad—e.g., does it ban virtually 
every form of student “hate” o r “anti-bias,” speech?
a. If  YES and yon are sued, you’re  likely to lose.
b. If NO, proceed to item  #2.
The problem with this question is that it requires the school official to figure 
for him self what might be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Even school 
district lawyers might be uncomfortable determ ining such a  judgm ent, which 
could be off the m ark in court owing to the predisposition o r persuasion of the 
judge.
2. Has the student engaged in expression th a t is protected 
by the F irst Amendment—e.g., does it convey a  particularized 
message?
a. If NO, the student is likely to lose.
b. If YES, proceed to item  #3.
Again, are school officials able to discern w hat is a  “particularized message? 
Maybe not.
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3. Is the student’s ezqiression “school-sponsored”—Le., 
does a  significant segment o f the community perceive it as having 
the endorsem ent of the adm inistration?
a. I f  YES, proceed to item  #4.
b. I f  NO, proceed to item  #5.
This is easier. It is usually not difficult to determ ine w hat appears to bear the 
im prim atur of the school
4. Do you have a rational justification for any censuring o r 
censoring of the student’s expression—e.g., legitimate pedagogical 
concerns, including values inculcation?
a. If  YES and you are sued, you’re likely to win.
b. I f  NO, proceed to item  #5.
A school-sponsored publication (Hazelwood) or event under school control like 
an assembly (Fraser) provides authorities w ith ample justification for lim iting 
student expression.
5. Is the student’s expression lewd or otherwise 
offensive—e.g., based on sex, alcohol/drugs, or violence?
a. If  YES and you are sued, you are likely to win.
b. If  NO, proceed to item  #6.
This is easy. The courts will not tolerate th is type of expression, whether 
spoken, w ritten, or worn.
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6. Do you have compelling justification for any censuring 
or censoring o f th is residual, narrow  category of student 
expression—can you prove th a t it has caused or imminently wiU 
cause substantial disruption?
a. I f  YES and you are sued, you are likely to win.
b. I f  NO and you are sued, you are likely to lose.
This is the stidsy wicket. In  symbolic expression cases, there m ust be 
compelling proof of (a) im m inent danger of a  breakdown of discipline or (b) a  
pattern  of behavior th a t has caused substan tia l disruption under sim ilar 
circumstances in the past.
7. Is there a  state law in your jurisdiction that provides 
stronger protection for student speech than  does the federal 
Constitution?
a. I f  YES and you are sued, you are likely to lose.
b. I f  NO, the odds still s tro n ^ y  favor you.” 
Knowledge of state law is im portant, but unless your search of pertinent 
statutes uncovers extraordinary protection for student speech, lit^ an ts will be 
basing their complaints on the U.S. Constitution and bringing suit in federal 
district court.
Zirkel’s checklist is the closest thing to a helpful tool for school 
adm inistrators the study has found, but some of its  potential traps argue
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strongly for com petent legal support. The “safest” adm inistrator is a proactive 
one, who decides on action by thinking th ro n g  “w hat if” scenarios before one 
of them jum ps up unsuspectedly.
Conclusions
The significance of the T in k er  decision lay not only in the Court’s 
delineation o f the scope of student F irst Amendment rights but [also] in the 
Court’s willingness to second-guess the school authorities. (Emerson, 1970, 
p. 608). When T in k er  was decided, school officials foimd they had been 
surprised by the  sudden left tu rn  taken by the Supreme Court; a lth o u ^  
followers o f the law m ight have read into Burnside a  h in t  of things to come.
The new trend  didn’t  only involve well-behaved students putting on an 
armband to protest the continuation of what they and their parents believed to 
be a pointless conflict overseas. The T in k er outcome had the effect of inviting 
students to bring a  lot more real o r imagined r i^ t s  into the classroom, as long 
as no serious disruption was caused. Significantly, courts were seen to be fairly 
permissive in  term s of how much commotion they would see as “material and 
substantial disruption.” For adm inistrators, trying to preserve order in their 
schools, the b ar had been raised.
It may be th a t the adoption of Tinkar went too fa r in limiting the ability 
of school officials to control expressive activities w ithin the schools. (Dagley, 
1998, p. 36).
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Justice Black’s fear th a t T ink er ushered in a  “new era” in which courts 
would play a  significant role in  school discipline was well founded. Since 
T ink er hundreds of cases have been brought by students alleging violations of 
their constitutional r i^ ts . (Dever, 1985, p. 1167).
Adolescents have dem onstrated over the years th a t thqy will take on 
causes for the sake of taking som ething on as much as for the support o f the 
cause itse lf T ink er provided ways for imaginative teens to distract teachers 
and school adm inistrators finm  their m ain jobs—helping students leam  the 
curriculum, and providing guidance toward happy, productive citizenship.
Looking a t the cases th a t have been presented in this study, another 
reality can be seen. Controversial student expression seems to run in spurts. 
There was a  heavy concentration of this kind of activity in the courts between 
1969 and 1975—an era in which the Wetnam W ar had capturing the nation’s 
daily attention, engendering lusty controversy. The U.S. presence in Vietnam 
was the main issue, but there were others as w ell A closely related group of 
cases had to do w ith decreasing respect for the flag and any mandatory 
showing of patriotism ; e.g., the Pledge of Allegiance repeated a t the beginning 
of each day in public schools. Cases involving race and ethnicity reflected the 
tum ultuous days of the Civil R i^ ts  movement, when some sections of the 
nation were struggling to convert to unitary, unsegregated school systems.
Only sporadic activity in term s of student Qunbolic expression th a t 
reached the courts occurred firom 1976 th ro u ^  the end of the 1980s. This may
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reflect the nation’s preoccupation with W atergate, the Iranian hostage 
situation, and the inflituation of the boom years when people w ere too busy 
trying to get ahead to w orry about how th e ir kids were behaving in  school and 
w hat school authorities were doing about it.
S tarting in  1992, however, a  gradual increase is seen in  secondary 
student litigation concerning F irst Amendment freedom of expression r i^ ts .
In the six years th ro n g  1997, more such m atters appeared in  th e  federal 
courts than  had been brought in the prior 17 years. This may substantiate the 
theory th a t such things are, indeed, cydicaL
W ith the increases of gang activity in  and around schools and the 
violence th a t attends it, schools are being forced to adopt stric te r enforcem ent 
m easures and codes of dress and deportm ent. It will be a surprise if  those 
codes don’t  prompt another spurt in legal activity as today’s students test their 
own constitutional rights.
The rules have not changed much, however; and th a t should be some 
comfort to adm inistrators. The key elem ent of acceptable student expression is 
still the lack of disruption on campus or in  the classroom. Beyond that, 
Hazelwood guides us through the thicket of school-sponsored studen t w riting 
and its  on-campus distribution. Fraser merely reinforces common sense and 
good taste  when it comes to  what schools m ust perm it students to say.
More help is available. In United States v. O’Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968), 
the Supreme Court established a four-part test to determine w hether a
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governmental regulation th a t incidentally affects free speech is constitutionally 
permissible.
1. The regulation m ust be within the governm ent’s [read as “school’s” 
or “state’s”] constitutional powers.
2. The r^ u la tio n  m ust fu rther “an im portant or substantial 
government interest.”
3. The government in terest m ust be “content-neutral/°” meaning th a t it 
must have a  purpose other than the restriction o f firee speech.
4. The restriction m ust be narrowly tailored to inhibit friee ^ p ressio n  
only to the extent necessary to frn ther its legitim ate goals. (Sarke, 1998, pp.
155,156).
While arm ing themselves for battle against disruptive student 
expression, adm inistrators may also benefit from  a  b rief expression of a  more 
permissive viewpoint—albeit frrom legal academia and no t firom the pubhc 
school trenches.
If the power to control student behavior is exercised to suppress student 
initiative, which is invariably probing and often intentionally provocative, and
10 [T]he Supreme Court has tu rned  increasin^y in  recent years to organizing 
principles th a t cut across the various lines of doctrine. One of the most 
im portant o f these is the distinction between content-based and content- 
neutral regulations of speech. The distinction has eiyoyed growing prominence 
as a  judicial tool for categorizing government actions regarding expression and 
for justifying the level of scrutiny applied to those actions. (Williams, 1991, p. 
616).
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not to prepare students for a public marketplace th a t offers many options and 
knows few restraints, then Maxy B eth [Tinker] will have had reason indeed to 
wear a black arm  band. (Whatever happened to Mary Beth Tinker  and other 
sagas in the academic marketplace o f ideas, 1993, p. 412).
Where, then, is the list of points adm inistrators can take away from the 
study? Perhaps th a t is found in the following:
1. Schools m ay regulate student speech as long as the rationale for doing 
so is reasonably related to a legitim ate pedagogical concern.
2. A school’s toleration of speech is categorically different from its 
sponsorship or promotion of speech. A lth o u ^  schools do no t have to tolerate 
non-school-sponsored expression th a t is not deleterious to its educational 
mission, they do not have to place the school’s im prim atur behind the 
dissemination of student expression.
3. School officials have broad discretion in determ ining student 
expression and may consider the im pact of such expression on the smooth 
running of the school as well as on the r i ^ t s  of other students, staff, and on 
the values of the community.
4. School officials have authority no t only to control expression finm 
inside the school, bu t also to prevent expression to school students firom 
outside sources th a t it considers inappropriate for a  school setting. An 
excellent example is the case of Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada. Inc.
V. Clark Countv School District e t al.. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Circuit, 1991). This
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well-meaning and respectable organization wished to place advertisem ents in  
school-sponsored publications advising students of services in the areas of 
birth control methods, pregnancy testing, and related subjects. When the 
school district declined to accept the advertisem ents. Planned Parenthood 
went to court. The district court upheld th e  school’s authority, and on appeal 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. If student publications have no t been opened as 
public forums, the school’s policies will be upheld in court. This leads directly 
to point 5.
5. School authorities have discretion as to when school fricUities and 
resources may be used as a public forum ; such a forum is no t created where 
school activities are reserved for a  specific pedagogical use.
6. S tudent expression may be regulated by school personnel as long as 
the activity is under the aegis of the school—this would include experiences 
th a t take place off school property.
7. A school need not tolerate studen t speech th a t is considered lewd, 
vulgar, or lacking in respect for authority.
8. School officials have discretion over personal student expression th a t 
merely happens to occur in school only if  it substantially disrupts the smooth 
functioning of the school or has a  deleterious effect on tbe rights of other 
students.
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9. Schools m ust have a  compelling reason for engaging in overt 
viewpoint discrimination against student e3q)ression. (Sperry, Daniel, Huefrrer, 
& Gee, 1997).
The National Association of Secondary School Principals recently 
published an  edition of th e ir NASSP BnMmtin dedicated to school law  subjects 
which adm inistrators may find usefu l It covers areas o f legal concern in  
addition to th a t on which th is study has focused. (Osborne et a l , 1998).
Recommendations for F u rther Study
While the cases presented in this study represent rulings firom the 
federal courts, it is sure th a t the state courts deal w ith many student-related 
m atters which, on examination, would reveal the presence of symbolic 
expression issues that were never elevated to the sta tu s of constitutional 
complaints. This would undoubtedly be true in our m ore populous states. An 
example is found in Phoenix Elem entarv School D istrict No. 1 v. Green e t al.. 
189 Ariz. 476 (Div. 2 Dept. B, Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1997).
After the superior court o f Maricopa County issued a perm anent 
injunction against two students’ wearing clothing th a t violated th e ir school’s 
m andatory dress code, the students and their parents took their appeal to the 
Arizona Court of Appeals. The dress code set forth  a  simple form at for all 
students. Boys were to w ear w hite shirts with collar. No logos. The sh irt could 
be either knitted or broadcloth. Navy blue pants o r shorts. Girls were to wear
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white collared blouses or knitted sh irt No logos. Navy blue pants, shorts, or 
skirt. The navy blue bottom s for all students were to be purchased only a t J. C. 
Penney. Any student not wishing to comply with the dress code would be 
assisted in transferring  to any other same level school in the district. The code 
took effect on Septem ber 5,1995.
On Septem ber 6, the plaintiff students wore non-conforming clothing. 
One wore a  sh irt w ith a  United States flag and wording stating “USA,” “I 
Support My Country,” and “America.” The other student wore a  T-shirt with 
a picture of Jesus Christ, and the slogans “Jesus,” “True Spirit,” and a Bible 
accompanied by the words “The School o f H igher Learning.” The parents 
notified the school th a t (a) they would never comply with such a  stric t dress 
code, (b) they were entitled to opt out of it, and (c) enforcement o f the code 
violated the students’ F irst Amendment righ t of firee speech.
The parents received word from the school district th a t th e  students had 
been transferred to a  different school which did not have a dress code. In 
retaliation, the students and their parents marched into the school without 
permission the following day, distributing an ti dress code literature.
In separate actions, each side sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
After consolidating the cases, the trial court conducted a hearing, made 
extensive findings of fact, and concluded th a t the mandatory dress code did not 
offend the F irst Amendment. The appeal under discussion followed. After 
examining the record of the previous trial, the court ruled th a t th e  school
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district’s “content-neutral dress code constitutionally regulates the students’
first amendment speech rights in  the n o x ^ u h iic  fo n u n  of their school...[it] is
reasonable in view of the[ir] pedagogical m ission...” [Emphasis added].
A survey of school adm inistrators, presenting them with a  variety of
hypothetical situations to analyze based on their understanding of school law
would help shed more light on how well prepared school leaders are to face
legal issues when confinnted by them . A sim ilar survey of classroom teachers
could yield interesting results as w ell
A perhaps more revealing study would be one involving high school
students themselves. A document could be prepared containing the factual
summ aries of actual cases like the ones taken up in
th is study, and the students could be asked to indicate a
their agreement or disagreem ent with various
conclusions drawn fix)m the facts and from the rulings
of the courts.
A  study of student expression in  post-secondary !
education could prove fruitful. One can’t  help '------------------------
Figure 2. UNLV’s
wondering about the fate of the cartoon figure that Rebel Mascot
today represents the U niversity of Nevada, Las Vegas, or of its sports team 
nam es th a t echo the “Rebel” theme should dissident students choose a t some 
tim e to take offense. Perhaps college age students are not so sensitive. 
Ironically, many UNLV student athletes over the years have been African
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Americans. One basketball squad even won the national championship under 
the nam e ‘^ Running Rebels.”
A t some tim e in the future, a replication of th is study m ight be able to 
determ ine the accuracy of our prediction of periodic polar swings of student 
behavior. In  any event, the last word has no t been w ritten on student symbolic 
expression.
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APPENDIX A
THE SUPREME COURT TINKER RULING 
T inker e t  ai. v. Des M oines Independen t ro m im in ity  Srhnnl Distrirt: e t
aL  393 U.S. 503''
C ertioraii to the United States Court of Appeals for th e  E i^ th  Circuit.
Argued November 12,1968 — Decided February 24, 1969.
Petitioners, three public school pupils in Des Moines, Iowa, were 
suspended firom school for w earing black arm bands to protest the 
governm ent’s policy in Vietnam. They s o u ^ t nom inal damages and an 
iidunction against a  regulation th a t the respondents had promulgated banning 
the w earing of armbands. The D istrict Court dism issed the complaint on the 
ground th a t the  regulation was w ithin the board’s power, despite the absence 
of any fin d in g  of substantial interference w ith the conduct of school activities. 
The Court of ^ p e a ls , sitting en banc, affirmed by an  equally divided court. 
Held:
1. In wearing arm bands, the petitioners were quiet and passive. They 
were no t disruptive and did no t impinge upon the r i ^ t s  of others. In these
11 Ju st the  opinion of the nujority , through Justice Abe Portas, is presented.
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circumstances, their conduct was within the protection of the fiee speech 
clause of the  F irst Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth.
2. F irst Amendment r i ^ t s  are available to teachers and students, 
subject to application in  l i ^ t  o f the special characteristics of the school 
environment.
3. A prohibition against expression of opinion, w ithout any evidence 
th a t the ru le is necessary to avoid substantial interference w ith school 
discipline o r the r i^ t s  of others, is not permissible under the F irst and 
Fourteenth Amendments.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and Petitioner Christopher 
Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa.
Petitioner M aiy Beth Tinker, John’s sister, was a 13-year-old student 
in junior high school.
In December 1965 a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a  
meeting a t the Eckhardt home. The group determ ined to publicize their 
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce 
by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on 
December 16 and New Year’s Eve. Petitioners and th e ir parents had 
previously engaged in sim ilar activities, and they decided to participate in the 
program.
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The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to 
wear arm bands. On December 14,1965, they m et and adopted a  poliqr tha t 
any student wearing an arm band to school would be asked to remove it, and if  
he refused he would be suspended until he returned  w ithout the armband. 
Petitioners were aware of the  regulation th a t the school authorities adopted.
On December 16, M ary Beth and C hristopher wore black armbands to 
their schools. John T inker wore his arm band the next day. Thor were all sen t 
home and suspended from school until th ^ r would come ba<^ without their 
armbands. They did not re tu rn  to school un til a fte r the planned period for 
wearing arm bands had expired— th a t is, un til a fte r New Year’s Day.
This complaint was filed in the United S tates D istrict Court by 
petitioners, through their fathers, under Sec. 1983 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code. I t prayed for an  iigunction restraining the respondent school 
officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school 
district from  disciplining the petitioners, and it s o u ^ t  nom inal damages.
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dism issed the complaint. It 
upheld the constitutionaliiy of the school authorities’ action on the ground 
that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline. 258 
F. Supp. 971 (1966). The (Dourt referred to but expressly declined to follow the 
Fifth C ircuit’s holding in a sim ilar case tha t the w earing of symbols likft the 
armbands cannot be prohibited unless it "m aterially and substantially
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interferes” w ith the requirem ents o f appropriate disriplina in the  operation of 
the school” Burnside v. Bvars, 363 P.2d 744, 749 (1966).
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the E i^ th  Circuit considered the 
case en banc. The court was equally divided, and the D istrict C ourt’s decision 
was accordingly affirmed, w ithout opinion. 383 F.2d 988 (1967). We granted 
certiorari 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
The D istrict Court recognized th a t the wearing of an arm band for the 
purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act th a t is: within 
the fi:ee speech clause of the first am endm ent. See Wm«t Virginia y. Barnette. 
319 U. S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v California. 283 U. S. 359 (1931). Cf. 
Thornhill v, Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v Smith Cam iina 372 U.S. 
229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966). As we shall discuss, the 
wearing of arm bands in the circum stances of f bi« case was entirely  divorced 
fix>m actually o r potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in  it. It 
was closely akin to “pure speech” which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to 
comprehensive protection under the F irst Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana. 
379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Adderlevv. Florida. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
F irst Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environm ent, are available to teachers and students. I t can hardly 
be argued th a t either students o r teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
fireedom of speech o r expression a t the schoolhouse gate. This baa been the 
unm istakable holding of this C ourt for alm ost 50 years. In M eyer v. Nebraska.
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262 U.S. 390 (1923), And Bartels v. Iowa. 262 U.S. 404 (1923), th is Court, in 
opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held th a t the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from forbidding the teaching of a 
foreign language to young students. S tatutes to th is effect, the Court held, 
unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty o f teacher, student, and  parent.
See also Pierce v. Societv of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1 ^5 ); West Virginia v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); McCnllum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203
(1948); WiftTPflTi v Updegraff. 344 U.S. 183,195 (1952) (concurring opinion); 
Sweezv v  N ew  Hampshirft 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 
479, 487 (1960); Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Kaviahian v. Board of 
fiegenta, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Epperson v  Arkanaaa ante, p. 97 (1968).
In West Virginia v. Barnette, supra, th is court held tha t under the first 
amendment, the student in public school may not be compelled to salute the 
fiag. Speaking th ro u ^  Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court said:
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applies to the states, protects the 
citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures— boards of education not 
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionaiy 
fimctions, but none th a t they may not perform within the lim its o f the Bill of 
Rights. T hat they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of constitutional freedom of the individual, if  we are not 
to strangle the fiiee m ind a t its source and teach youth to discount im portant 
principles of our government as mere platitudes.” 319 U.S., a t 637.
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On the other hand, the court has repeated^r emphasized the need for 
affirm ing the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials, 
consistent w ith fundam ental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools. See Ennerson v Arkansafi. supra, a t 104;
Mever v. N ebraska, supra, a t 402. Our problem lies in  the area where 
students in  the exercise of F irst Amendment r i ^ t s  collide with the rules of the 
school authorities.
The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of 
the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to h a ir style, or deportment. Cf. 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District. 392 F.2d 697 (1968); Pugslev v. 
Sellniftvftr. 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). I t does not concern aggressive, 
disruptive action or even group dem onstrations. O ur problem involves direct, 
primaxy F irst Amendment r i ^ t s  akin to “pure speech.”
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a  silent, 
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance 
on the p art of petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ 
interference, actual or nascent, w ith the schools’ work or of collision w ith the 
rights of other students to be secure and to be le t alone. Accordin^y, this case 
does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools 
or the r i ^ t s  of other students.
Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school sjrstem wore the black 
armbands. Only five students were suspended for wearing them. There is no
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indication th a t the work of the schools or any class w as disrupted. Outside the 
classrooms, a  few students made hostile rem arks to th e  children wearing 
armbands, b u t there were no th reats o r acts of violence on school premises.
The D istrict C ourt concluded th a t the action of th e  school authorities 
was reasonable because it was based upon their fear o f a  disturbance from the 
wearing of the arm bands. But, in  our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not e n o u ^  to overcome the r i ^ t  to freedom of 
expression. Any departure from absolute regim entation may cause trouble.
Any variation from  the nugority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, 
in class, in  the lunchroom, or on the campus, th a t deviates from the views of 
another person may s ta rt an argum ent or cause a  disturbance. B ut our 
Constitution says we m ust take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1
(1949); and our history says th a t it is th is sort of hazardous freedom - this kind 
of opeimess— th a t is the basis of our national strength and  of the independence 
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in th is  relatively permissive, 
often disputatious society.
In order for the state in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a  particular expression of opinion, it m ust be able to show that 
its action was caused by something m ore than a  mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness th a t always accompany an  unpopular 
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding  and no showing th a t engaging 
in the forbidden conduct would “m aterially and substantially interfere with
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the requirem ents o f appropriate discipline in  the operation o f the  school,” the 
prohibition cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Bvars. supra, a t 749.
In the present case, the D istrict Court made no such finding, and our 
independent exam ination of the record fails to yield evidence th a t the school 
authorities had reason to anticipate th a t the wearing of the arm bands would 
substantially interfere w ith the work of the school or impinge upon the r i^ ts  
of other students. Even an  official memorandum prepared after the 
suspension th a t listed the  reasons for the ban on wearing the arm bands made 
no reference to the anticipation of such disruption.
On the contrary, the action of the sdiool authorities appears to have 
been based upon an  urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might  result 
from the expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, o f opposition to 
this nation’s part in  the  conflagration in ^fietnam. It is revealing, in this 
respect, that the m eeting a t which the school principals decided to issue the 
contested regulation was called in response to a student’s statem ent to the 
journalism  teacher in  one of the schools th a t he wanted to w rite an  article on 
Vietnam and have it published in the school paper. (The student was 
dissuaded.)
I t is also relevant th a t the school authorities did not purport to prohibit 
the wearing of all symbols of political o r controversial significance. The record 
shows that students in  some of the schools wore buttons relating to national 
political campaigns, and some even wore the iron cross, traditionally a symbol
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of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing o f arm bands did not extend to 
these. Instead, a  particular symbol— blac^ arm bands worn to ed iib it 
opposition to th is nation’s involvement in Vietnam— was singed out for 
prohibition.
Clearly, the  prohibition of expression o f one particular opinion, a t least 
without evidence th a t it is necessary to avoid m aterial and substantial 
interference w ith schoolwork o r discipline, is n o t constitutionally permissible. 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism . 
School officials do no t possess absolute authority over their students. Students 
in school as well as out of school are “persons’* under our constitution. They 
are possessed of fundam ental r i ^ t s  which the sta te m ust respect, ju s t as they 
themselves m ust respect their obligations to the state. In our system, students 
may not be regarded as closed-drcuit recipients of only th a t which the State 
chooses to communicate. T h ^  may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentim ents th a t are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to 
freedom of expression of their views. As Judge Gewin, speaking for the  Fifth 
Circuit, said, school officials cannot suppress “expressions of feelings with 
which they do not wish to contend.” Burnside v. Bvars. supra, a t 749.
In Mver v. N ebraska, supra, a t 402, Mr. Justice McReynolds expressed 
this nation’s repudiation of the principle that a  sta te might so conduct its 
schools as to “foster a  homogeneous people.” He said: “In order to submerge
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the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the m ales a t seven 
into barracks and in trusted  their subsequent education and train ing  to official 
guardians. A lth o u ^  such measures have been deliberately approved by men 
of great genius, th e ir ideas touching the  relation between individual and state 
were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it 
hardly will be affirm ed th a t any legislature could impose such restrictions 
upon the people of a  state without doing violence to both le tte r and  spirit of 
the constitution. This principle has been repeated by this C ourt on numerous 
occasions during the  intervening years. Tn Kftvisbian v. Board of Regents. 385 
U.S. 589, 603, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the court, said: “'th e  vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than  in  the 
community of American schools.’ Shelton v. Tucker. (364 U.S. 479,) a t 487.
The classroom is peculiarly the 'm arketplace of ideas.’ The nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained th ro u ^  wide exposure to th a t robust exchange 
of ideas which discovers tru st 'ou t of a m ultitude of tongues, (rather) than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.”’
The principle of these cases is no t confined to the supervised and 
ordained discussion which takes place in  the classroom. The principal use to 
which the schools are dedicated is to acconunodate students during prescribed 
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is 
personal intercommunication among the  students. This is not only an
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inevitable part of the  prooeœ of attending  school; it is also an  im portant part of 
the educational process. A student’s r i ^ t s ,  therefore, do not embrace merely 
the classroom hours. W hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the  authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in  "Nfietnam, if he does so w ithout 
“m aterially and substantially interfering” w ith the requirem ents of 
Appropriate discipline in the operation o f the school” and w ithout colliding 
with the rights of others. Burnside v. Bvars. supra, a t 749. B ut conduct by the 
student, in class or ou t o f it, which for any reason— w hether it  stem s from 
time, place, or type o f behavior-m aterially disrupts dassw ork o r involves 
substantial disorder o r invasion of the r i ^ t s  of others is, of course, not 
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Cf. Blackwell 
V. Issaquena Countv Board of Education. 363 F.2d 749 (c.a. 5 th  Cir.
1966).
Under our constitution, free speech is not a right th a t is given only to be 
so circumscribed th a t it  exists in principle b u t not in fact. Freedom  of 
expression would no t tru ly  exist if  the r i ^ t  could be exercised only in  an area 
th a t a benevolent governm ent has provided as a  safe haven for crackpots. The 
constitution says th a t Congress (and the  states) may not abridge the right to 
free speech. This provision means w hat i t  says. We properly read it to perm it 
reasonable regulation o f speech-connected activities in carefully restricted
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circumstances. But we do no t confine the permissible exercise of F irst 
Amendment r i^ t s  to a  telephone booth or the four com ers of a pamphlet, or 
to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
If a  regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding discussion of 
the Vietnam conflict, o r the expression by any student of opposition to it 
anywhere on school property except as part o f a prescribed classroom exercise, 
it would be obvious th a t the regulation would violate the constitutional r i ^ t s  
of students, a t least if  it could no t be justified by a  showing that the students’ 
activities would m aterially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of 
the school Cf. Hammond v. South  Carolina S tate College. 272 F. Supp. 947 
(D.C.S.C. 1967) (orderly protest meeting on state college campus); Dickev v. 
Alabama State Board of Education. 273 F. Supp. 613 (D.C.M.D.Ala. 1967) 
(expulsion of student editor o f college newspaper).
In  the circumstances of the present case, the prohibition of the silent, 
passive “w itness of the arm bands,” as one of the children called it, is 
no less offensive to the constitution’s guarantees. As we have discussed, the 
record does not dem onstrate any facts which m ight reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or m aterial interference with 
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in 
fact occurred. These petitioners merely went about their ordained round in 
school. T heir deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of 
black cloth, not more than two inches wide. T h^r wore it to exhibit their
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disapproval of the ^fietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a  trace, to make 
their views known, and, by th e ir example, to influence others to adopt them. 
They neither interrupted school activities nor s o u ^ t to intrude in the school 
affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, 
but no interference with work and no disorder. In  the circumstances, our 
Constitution does not permit officnals of the state to deny their form of 
expression.
We express no opinion as to the form of relief which should be granted, 
this being a  m atter for the lower courts to determine. We reverse and rem and 
for A irther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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APPENDIX B 
CASES CITING TINKER (SHEPARDIZED LISTING)
The following pages contain a  listing of 1,277 of the cases in the federal 
court system which contain a reference to Tinker. Counting sta te court entries 
(which were beyond the scope of th is study), there were 2,194 total cases on 
record which have cited the Tinker case. The federal cases in  the foUowing list 
are presented w ith Supreme Court cases first, then entries by circuit. It is firom 
this printout, obtained fium the Lmds/Nexis service available a t the Lied 
School of Business a t the Universily of Nevada, Las Vegas, th a t the cases 
appearing in the study were drawn.
It should be noted that the study does not contain student symbolic 
expression cases from  the 11th Circuit. This is because the cases germane to 
the study took place prior to the creation of the 11th Circuit. Alabama, Florida, 
and Georgia, form erly in  the 5th Circuit, are now part of the 11th.
Most cases in  the study came firom the federal d istrict courts, of which 
there are 95 in the U nited States and its possessions.
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UNLV - The Lied Business Bifoimation Center LESIS/NEXIS
2194 Citing References
Citations to: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comnmnity School 
District, 393 U.S. 503,1909
CASE HISTORY
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School D istrict, 258 F. Supp. 
971
< =10>  Same case
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School D istrict, 383 F.2d 988 
< =11>  Same case 
390 U S. 942 
< =12>  Same case 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
< =13>  p.656
< =14>  Dissenting opinion p.681 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 
< =15>  p.569 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560 
< =16>  p.577 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 
< =17>  Dissenting opinion p.749 
Board of Education of W estside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226
< =18>  p.241 
< =19>  p.250
< =20> Different Opinion p.263
< =21 > Dissenting opinion p.287
Board of Trustees of Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
< =22> Dissenting opinion p.488 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
< =23>  p.404 
Hazelwood School D istrict v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 
< = 24>  p.265
< =  25 > Distinguished p.270
< =26> Dissenting opinion p.277 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
< =27>  p.583
Los Angeles Board of A irport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus Inc., 482 U.S. 
569
< =28> p.573
Bethel School D istrict No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
<=29>  Distinguished p.679
< =30> Different Opinion p.688 
<=31> Different Opinion p.689 
<=32> D issenting opinion p.690
Bender v. VfiUiamsport Area School D istrict, 475 U.S. 534 
<=33>  D issenting opinion p.556 
Renton v. Playtim e Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41
< =34> p.50
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788
< =35> D issenting opinion p.815 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
<=36>  p.336
<=37> Different Opinion p.348
< =38> D issenting opinion p.373 
Regan v. Time Inc., 468 U.S. 641
< =39> D issenting opinion p.678
Clark V. Community for Creative Non-^fiolence, 468 U.S. 288
< =40> p.294
< =41 > Dissenting opinion p.304
Minnesota S tate Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 
<=42> p.293 
Bolger V. Youngs D rug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60
< =43> p.74
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
< =44> Dissenting opinion p. 184 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
< =45> D issenting opinion p.l68
P en y  Educ. Ass’n  v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37
< =46> Distinguished p.44 
<=47>  p.50
< =48> D issenting opinion p.56
Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853
< =49> p.864 
<=50> p.868
<=51>  Different Opinion p.877 
< =  52 > Dissenting opinion p.886 
<=53>  D issenting opinion p.911 
Vfidmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
< =54>  Followed p.268 
United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assocs., 453 
U.S. 114 
<=55>  p. 137
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< = 56>  Dissenting opinion p. 148 
Heffîx>n V. International Society fo r Krishna Consciousness Inc., 452 U.S. 
640
< = 57>  Dissenting opinion p.662 
H Jj. V. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 
< = 58>  Dissenting opinion p.435 
449 U.S. 1043 
< = 59>  Dissenting opinion p. 1046 
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. V irginia, 448 U.S. 555 
< = 60>  p.588
Consolidated Edison Company o f  New York Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of 
New York, 447 U.S. 530 
< = 61>  p.538 
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
< =62> Dissenting opinion p.365 
Bellotti V. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
< = 63>  Explained p.637 
Parham  v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
< = 64>  EHssenting opinion p.627 
Monell V. Departm ent of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 
< = 65>  p.663
< =  66> Difierent Opinion p.711 
Jones V. N orth Carolina Prisoners Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119
< =67> Dissenting opinion p. 141
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 
< = 68>  p.692 
Linm ark Associates Inc. v. Willingfooro, 431 U.S. 85 
< = 69>  p.94 
Ingraham  v. W ri^ t, 430 U.S. 651 
< = 70>  p.682 
429 U.S. 964 
< = 71>  Dissenting opinion p.965 
Planned Parenthood of Central M issouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
< = 72>  p.74
Young V. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
< = 73>  p.82 
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 
< = 74>  Dissenting opinion p.251 
< = 75>  Dissenting opinion p.254 
G reer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 
< = 76>  p.843
< = 77 > Dissenting opinion p.859
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Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
< = 7 8 >  p.213 
Wood V . Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 
< = 7 9 >  p.326 
Goss V . Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 
< —80> p.574
< =81>  D issenting opinion p.590 
Spence v. W ashington, 418 U.S. 405
< = 82>  p.410
Lehm an v. Shaker H e is ts , 418 U.S. 298 
< = 8 3 >  Dissenting opinion p.317 
Saxbe v. W ashington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 
< = 8 4 >  Dissenting opinion p.864 
Pell V . Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
<  = 85>  Dissenting opinion p.837 
Procunier v. M artinez, 416 U.S. 396
< = 8 6 >  Distinguished p.409 
< =  87 > Different Opinion p.424 
Sm ith V . Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 
< = 8 8 >  p.589 
414 U.S. 1097 
< = 8 9 >  Dissenting opinion p. 1099 
< = 9 0 >  Dissenting opinion p. 1100 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
< = 9 1 >  Dissenting opinion p .ll2  
Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v. Democratic N ational Committee, 412 
U .S.94
< = 9 2 >  Dissenting opinion p. 191 
Papish V. Board of Curators of University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 
< = 9 3 >  p.670 
409 U.S. 998 
< = 9 4 >  Dissenting opinion p.998 
Laird v. Tatum , 409 U.S. 824 
< = 9 5 >  p.837 
Healy v. Jam es, 408 U.S. 169 
< = 9 6 >  p. 180 
Healy v. Jam es, 408 U.S. 169 
< =  97 > Different Opinion p.202 
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
< = 98>  p. 116 
< = 9 9 >  Followed p. 117 
Police Dep’t  of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
< =  100> p.97
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W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
<  = 101 >  Dissenting opinion p.244 
404 U.S. 1042
<  = 102> Dissenting opinion p. 1042 
Rosenbloom v. M etromedia hic., 403 U.S. 29
< = 103>  Dissenting opinion p.81 
Cohen v. CaL, 403 U.S. 15 
< = 104>  p.23 
399 U.S. 906 
< = 105>  Dissenting opinion p.908 
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 
< = 106>  p.741 
Jones V . Tennessee S tate Board of Education, 397 U.S. 31
< = 107> p.32
< = 108>  Dissenting opinion p.35 
Cowgill V . California, 396 U.S. 371 
< = 109>  p.372 
394 U.S. 905
< = 110> Distinguished p.905
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 138 L. Ed. 2d 585 
<=111>  Dissenting opinion p.623 
Vem onia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564
< = 112> p.576
< = 113>  Dissenting opinion p.592 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 
< = 114>  p.501 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 
< = 115> Dissenting opinion p.2156 
Vem onia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
< = 116> p.2392
< = 117> Dissenting opinion p.2404
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338
< = 118> p.2345
Bam es v. Glen Theatre Inc., I l l  S. Ct. 2456
< = 119> p.2466 
57 U.S.L.W. 5015
< = 120> Dissenting opinion p.5020 
57 U.S.L.W. 4770
< = 121>  p.4772 
56 U.S.L.W. 4026 
< = 122>  Distinguished p.4080 
< = 123>  Dissenting opinion p.4084 
55 U.S.L.W. 4860
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<=124> p.4861 
65 U.S.L.W. 4855 
<=125>  p.4856 
54U.S.L.W .5054 
<=126> Distinguished p.5055 
<=127> p.5056
<=128> Different Opinion p.5057 
< = 129> Dissenting opinion p.5058 
54U.S.L.W .4307 
< = 130> Dissenting opinion p.4312 
54 U.S.L.W. 4160 
<=131> p.4162 
53 U.S.L.W. 5116 
<=132 > Dissenting opinion p.5123 
53 U.S.L.W. 4083 
<=133> p.4086
< = 134> Different Opinion p.4089
< = 135> Dissenting opinion p.4096 
52 U.S.L.W. 4986
<=136> p.4987
< = 137 > Dissenting opinion p.4990 
52 U.S.L.W. 4187
< = 138> p.4210 
51 U.S.L.W. 4961
<=139> p.4965 
51 U.S.L.W. 4165 
<=140> p.4167
< = 141 > Dissenting opinion p.4170
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4036
< = 142 > Dissenting opinion 
1st Circuit
Yeo V. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241
< = 143> Distinguished p.250 
B em er v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20
< = 144> p.26
Ward V. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 
<=145> p.452 
Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881
< = 146> p.884
Rose V. Nashua Board o f Education, 679 F.2d 279 
<=147> p.283 
Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114
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<=148> p .ll8
Gay Students Organization of University o f New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 
F.2d 652
<=149> p.658 
<=150> p.660 
Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 502 F.2d 789 
<=151>  p.791 
Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 
<=152>  p.98 
<=153> p. 103 
Riseman v. School Committee of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148 
<=154>  p. 149 
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 
<=155>  p. 1283 
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 
< = 156> Dissenting opinion p. 187 
Yeo V. Town of Lexington, 1997 U.S. .^ p . LEXIS 34379 
<=157>  Distinguished 
B em er v. Delahanty, 1997 U.S. ^ p .  T,EXTS 30236 
<=158>
Yeo V. Town of Lexington, 1997 U.S. App. LEIXIS 13198
< = 159 > Dissenting opinion 
<=160>
B em er v. Delahanty, 937 F. Supp. 62 
<=161 > Distinguished p.63 
South Boston Allied W ar Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 
891
<=162> p.911 
Pyle V. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 
<=163> p. 159
< = 164> Distinguished p. 168
Pyle V. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7 
<=165> p.8
< = 166> p.9
<=167> Distinguished p. 10 
Ward V . Hickey, 781 F. Supp. 63 
<=168>  Explained p. 75 
Carey v. Maine School Administrative D istrict #  17, 754 F. Supp. 906
< = 169> Followed p.918
Atlantic Beach Casino Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38 
<=170> p.43
Irish Subcommittee of the Rhode Island H eritage Commission v. Rhode 
Island Heritage Commission, 646 F. Supp. 347
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<=171>  p.356 
Klein v. Smith, 635 P . Supp. 1440 
< =172>  p. 1441 
Sm ith V. H arris, 560 P. Supp. 677 
< =173>  p.697 
Boynton v. Casey, 543 P. Supp. 995 
< =174>  p. 1000 
Sheck V . Baileyville School Committee, 530 F. Supp. 679 
< =175>  p.684 
McCoUester v. Keene, New Hampshire, 514 F. Supp. 1046 
< =176>  p. 1049 
Fricke v. Lynch, 4 9 1 F. Supp. 381 
<=177>  Explained p.386 
< =178>  Explained p.387 
R i^ t  to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee O f 
Chelsea,
454 F. Supp. 703
< = 179> p.710
< = 180> Followed p .713 
Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988
< = 181> p.996
Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Hernandez Colon, 415 F. Supp. 475
< = 182> p.482
M aynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381
< = 183> p. 1386
< = 184> Followed p. 1387 
Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122
< = 185> Distinguished p. 126 
Davis V. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395
< = 186> Distinguished p.398 
Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741
< =187>  p.748 
< =188>  p.749 
Cintron v. State Board of Education, 384 F. Supp. 674
< = 189> p.678
< = 190> p.679
M arin v. University o f Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613 
< =191>  p.620
< = 192> p.628
Cline V . Rockingham County Superior Court, Eîxeter, New Hampshire, 367 F. 
Supp. 1146
< = 193> p. 1149
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Gay Students Organization of University of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 367 
F. Supp. 1088 
< =194>  p. 1093
Vail V. Board of Education of Portsm outh School District, 354 F. Supp. 592 
<=195>  p.597 
<=196>  p.598 
Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372 
< =197>  p. 1378 
M ailloux V. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 
<=198>  p. 1390 
Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 
< =199>  p. 1157 
H asson v. Boothby, 318 F. Supp. 1183 
< =200>  Distinguished p .ll8 7  
DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112
< =201>  p. 121
F arrell v. Smith, 310 F . Supp. 732 
< =202>  p.735 
Antonelli v. Hanunond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 
< =204>  p. 1336 
Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 
< =205>  p.452 
< =206>  p.455 
Close V. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 
<=207>  p.1112 
Lucia V. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 
<=208>  p.117
Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEÎXIS 8715 
< =209>
2nd Circuit 
Bery v. New York, 97 F.3d 689 
< =210>  p.694 
H su V. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839 
< =211>  p.856 
Silano v. Sag H arbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd., 42 F.3d 719 
< =212>  p.722
Piesco v. New York City Departm ent of Personnel, 933 F.2d 1149 
< =213>  p.1159 
Young V. New York City T ransit Anth., 903 F.2d 146 
< = 214>  Distinguished p. 153 
Fox V. Board of Trustees of State University of New York, 841 F.2d 1207 
< = 215>  p.1211
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W estmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 752 F.2d 16 
<=216> p.24
Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 
<=217> p.1054 
<=218> p. 1055
New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232 
<=219> p.237
Pico V. Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School D istrict No. 26, 
646 F.2d 714 
<=220> D issenting opinion p.716 
Pico V. Board o f Education, Island Trees Union Free School D istrict No. 26, 
638 F.2d 404 
<=221> p.412 
<=222> p.415
< =223> Dissenting opinion p.424 
<=224> Ebcplained p.432
< =225> Different Opinion p.438
Brandon v. Board of Education of Guflderland Central School D istrict, 635 
F.2d 971 
<=226> p.980 
Aebisher v. Ryan, 622 F.2d 651 
<=227> p.654 
Concerned Jew ish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 
<=228> Dissenting opinion p.481 
Thomas v. Board of Education Granvüle Central School D istrict, 607 F.2d 
1043
<=229> p. 1049 
<=230> p. 1050 
<=231> Explained p. 1054 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 
<=232> Followed p.516 
<=233> Different Opinion p.520 
<=234> Dissenting opinion p.520 
East H artford Education Assoc, v. Board of Education of E ast Hartford, 562 
F.2d 838
<=235> Dissenting opinion p.849
< =236> Different Opinion p.858
Connecticut S tate Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education, 538 F.2d 
471
<=237> p.477 
<=238> p.479 
Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d 379 
<=239> p.381
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Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252 
<=240>  p.256
Albany Wel&re R i^ ts  Organization v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 
<=241>  p.1323 
Goetz V. AnseU, 477 F.2d 636 
<=242>  Harm onized p.638 
Russo V. Central School District No. 1 o f Rush New York State, 469 F.2d 623 
<=243>  p.631 
<=244> p.632
Jam es v. Board o f Education of C entral D istrict No. 1 of Addison, 461 F.2d 
566
<=245> p.572
Presidents Council D istrict 25 v. Com munity School Board No. 25, 457 F.2d 
289
<=246>  Explained p.293 
Johnson v. New York State Education D epartm ent, 449 F.2d 871 
<=247> D issenting opinion p.882 
Healy v. Jam es, 445 F.2d 1122 
<=248>  p. 1123
<=249>  D issenting opinion p. 1133 
<=250>  D issenting opinion p. 1139 
E isner v. Stam ford Bogud of Education, 440 F.2d 803 
<=251>  p.807 
Katz V . McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 
<=252>  p. 1060 
<=253>  p. 1061
Long Island Vietnam  Moratorium Committee v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 
<=254>  p.349 
Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 
<=255>  p. 164 
U nited States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 
<=256>  p. 1259 
Bery v. New York, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26492 
<=257>
Hone V. Cortland City Sch. Dist., 985 F. Supp. 262 
<=258>  p.269 
Al-Amin v. City o f N.Y., 979 F. Supp. 168 
<=259>  p. 172 
M alsh V. G arda, 971 F. Supp. 133 
<=260>  p. 137
Nakatomi Inv., Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 949 F. Supp. 988 
< =261>  p.996
Rourke v. New York State Dep’t  of Correctional Servs., 915 F. Supp. 525
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<=262>  p.541 
Cooper V . Town o f E . Ham pton, 888 F. Supp. 376 
< =263>  p.379
H su V . Roslyn U nion Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 876 F. Supp. 445 
<=264>p.456 
Champagne v. G intick, 871 F. Supp. 1527 
< =265>  p.1534 
H arris v. Beedle, 845 F. Supp. 1030 
< =266>  p.1035 
Flam er v. White P lains New York, 841F. Supp. 1365 
<=267>  p.1372 
Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp. 147 
<=268>  p.165
New York State Assoc, of Career Schs. v. S tate Educ. Dep’t  of N.Y. State, 
823 F. Supp. 1096 
<=269>  p. 1104 
Grimes v. Cavazos, 786 F. Supp. 1184 
<=270>  p. 1189 
Rothschild v. Board o f Education of Buffido, 778 F. Supp. 642 
<=271>  p.656 
Dangler v. Yorktown C entral Schools, 771 F. Supp. 625 
<=272>  p.629 
Romano v. H arrington, 725 F. Supp. 687 
<=273>  p.688
Serra v. United S tates Gen. Serv. Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042 
<=274>  p. 1055 
Romano v. H arrington, 664 F. Supp. 675 
<=275>  p.680
Fox V. Board of Trustees of S tate University of New York, 649 F. Supp. 1393 
<=276>  p. 1397 
Wilkinson v. Forst, 639 F. Supp. 518 
<=277>  p.532 
Bell V. U-32 Board of Education, 630 F. Supp. 939 
<=278>  p.943 
Olivieri v. Weird, 613 F. Supp. 616 
<=279>  p.620
<=280>  p.621
Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 F. Supp. 403 
<=281>  p.413
American Future Systems Inc. v. State U niversity of New York College at 
Cortland, 565 F. Supp. 754 
<=282>  p.763 
O rshan v. Anker, 550 F. Supp. 538
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<=283>  p.540 
Rosenthal v. United States Postal Service, 513 F. Supp. 45 
< =284>  p.46
Brandon v. Board of Education of Guflderland C entral School District, 487 F. 
Supp. 1219 
< =285>  p.1232
Sellman v. Baruch College o f City University of New York, 482 F. Supp. 475
< =286> Distinguished p.481
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 478 F.
Supp. 114 
< =287>  p. 116 
< =288>  Explained p. 122 
Bum s V . Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 
< =289>  p.277
Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of D irectors, 475 F. Supp.
615
<=290>  p.619
Pico V. Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District, 474 F. 
Supp. 387 
<=291>  Distinguished p.397 
Economou v. Butz, 466 F. Supp. 1351 
< =292>  p. 1362 
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043
< =293> Followed p. 1048
Chapin v. Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170 
< =294>  p. 1177 
S tuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 
<=295>  p. 1243 
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 
<=296>  p.51 
Trachtm an v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198 
<=297>  p.200
< =298> Distinguished p.201 
M artinez v. Oswald, 425 F. Supp. 112
< =299>  Followed p .ll5  
Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F. Supp. 211 
< =300>  p.218
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. 
Supp. 277 
<=301>  p.282
East H artford Education Assoc, v. Board of Education o f E ast Hartford, 405 
F. Supp. 94
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<=302> p.99 
Gilbertson v. McAlister, 403 F. Supp. 1 
<=303> p.6
Population Services International v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 
<=304> p.331 
Paka V . Manson, 387 F. Supp. I l l  
<=305> p .ll6
Jam es v. Board o f Education of C entral D istrict No. 1 of Addison, e t al 
Steuban, New York, 385 F. Supp. 209 
<=306> p.215
Radich v. Criminal Court of New York City, 385 F. Supp. 165 
<=307> p.174 
Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 
<=308> Harmonized p. 1165 
Luparar v. Stoneman, 3812 F. Supp. 495 
<=309> p.499 
Butler V. Preiser, 380 F. Supp. 612 
<=310> p.621- 
Velez V. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 
<=311> p. 1257 
G rant v. Esquire Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 
<=312> p.881 
O’Neill V. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 
<=313> p.569 
Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 
<=314> p.369 
Bowles V. Robbins, 359 F. Supp. 249 
<=315> p.255 
Caplin V. Oak, 356 F. Supp. 1250 
<=316> p. 1255 
Koppell V. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 
<=317> Followed p.459 
Bolling V . Manson, 345 F. Supp. 48 
<=318> p.51 
Thoms V. Smith, 334 F. Supp. 1203 
<=319> p. 1208 
Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104 
<=320> p. 1107 
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 
<=321> p.823 
Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 
<=322> p.632 
Hanover v. N orthrup, 325 F. Supp. 170
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<=323>  p. 172 
K atz V . McAulay, 324 F. Supp. 1047 
<=324>  D istinguished p. 1048 
Hernandez v. Noel, 323 F. Supp. 779 
<=325>  p.782
Long Island V ietnam  M oratorium Com mittee v. Cahn, 322 F. Supp. 559 
< =326> D istinguished p.563 
E isner V. Stamford Board of Education, 314 F. Supp. 832 
<=327>  Followed p.834 
Friedm an v. Union F ree School D istrict No. 1 Islip New York, 314 F. Supp. 
223
<=328>  p.226
< =329> p.227
Dunham  v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 
<=330>  p.416 
Healy v. James, 3 1 1 F. Supp. 1275 
<=331>  p. 1281 
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 
<=332>  p.117 
F rain  v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 
<=333>  Followed p.30 
<=334>  Followed p.31 
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 
<=335>  p. 104 
<=336>  p. 105 
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 
<=337>  p.241
K h i^ t  V. Board of Education of New York City, 48 F.R.D. 108 
< = 3 3 8 > p .lll
Hone V. Cortland City Sch. Dist., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18124 
<=339>
Al-Amin v. City of N.Y., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300 
<=340>
M alsh V. Garcia, 1997 U.S. D ist LEXIS 10264 
<=341>
Rourke v. New York S tate Dep’t  of Correctional Servs., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1461 
< =342>  p.1469, Headnote: symbolic speech 
H arris v. Beedle, 9 1ER Cas. (BNA) 482
< =343> p.486 
3rd Circuit
Phillips V. B o ro u ^  o f Keyport, 107 F.3d 164
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
< =344>  p. 180 
Pro V. Donatucd, 81 F.3d 1283 
< =345>  Dissenting opinion p. 1293 
Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District, 987 F.2d 989
< =346> p.994 
< =347>  p.995
Kreimer v. Bureau o f Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242 
< =348>  Distinguished p. 1253 
Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 
< =349>  p.1118 
Bradley v. P ittsb u rg  Board of Education, 910 F.2d 1172 
< =350>  p. 1176
Johnson v. Lincoln University of Higher Education, 776 F.2d 443 
< =351>  p.453
Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School D istrict, 776 F.2d 431 
< =352>  p.436 
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 
< =353>  Dissenting opinion p. 1071 
American Future Systems Inc. v. Pennsylvania State University, 752 F,2d 
854
<=354>  p.870
Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and Energy v. M unhall, 743 F.2d 182 
<=355>  Dissenting opinion p. 190 
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 741 F.2d 538 
<=356>  p.545 
<=357>  p.547
< =358> p.548
< =359>  Dissenting opinion p.563 
International Society for K rishna Consciousness Inc. v. New Jersey Sports 
and Exposition Authority, 691 F.2d 155 
<=360>  p. 160 
<=361>  p. 162 
Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 
<=362>  p.165 
Ad World Inc. v. Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136 
<=363>  p. 1140
<=364>  Dissenting opinion p. 1144 
Seyûied v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 
<=365>  p.216
<=366>  Different Opinion p.218 
Trotm an v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F.2d 216 
<=367>  p.230 
Aiello V. Wffimington Delaware, 623 F.2d 845
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<=368> p.853
American F uture Systems Inc. v. Pennsylvania State University, 618 F.2d 
252
< =369> Distinguished p.256 
<=370> Distinguished p.257 
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 
<=371> p.l39 
Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 
<=372> p.1087
Zeller v. Donegal School D istrict Board o f Education, 517 F.2d 600 
<=373> p.606 
United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 
<=374> p. 14 
Sill V. Pennsylvania State University, 462 F.2d 463 
<=375> p.467 
Oldroyd v. Kugler, 461 F.2d 535 
<=376> p.540
StuU V. W estern Beaver Junior-Senior High School, 459 F.2d 339 
<=377> p.345 
Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 
<=378> p.207
Mangold v. A lbert Gallatin Area School D istrict, Fayette County, 
Pennsylvania 
438 F.2d 1194 
<=379> p.1195
C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341 
<=380> p.352 
Picarella v. Terrizzi, 893 F. Supp. 1292 
<=381> p. 1297 
Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School D istrict, 789 F. Supp. 1337 
<=382> Distinguished p. 1346 
Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 
<=383> p. 1052 
Slotterback v. Interboro School D istrict, 766 F. Supp. 280 
<=384> p.288 
<=385> Followed p.289 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for M orristown, 765 F. Supp. 181 
<=386> p. 188 
Act-Up V. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281 
<=387> p. 1289
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School District, 673 F. Supp. 1379 
<=388> p. 1385 
<=389> p. 1386
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Bender v. WQliamsport Area School D istrict, 563 F. Supp. 697 
<=390>  p.703 
<=391> p.704
Olsen V. Conmmnications Workers of America, 559 F. Supp. 754 
<=392>  p.767 
Sey&ied v. Walton, 512 F. Supp. 235
< =393> Followed p.237
Azeff V . P enn^lvania, 495 F. Supp. 102 
<=394>  p.107
Crown C entral Petroleum  Corp. v. W aldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 
<=395>  Distinguished p.767 
Reid V . B arrett, 467 F. Supp. 124 
<=396>  p. 127 
Ruhlman v. Hankinson, 46 1 F. Supp. 145 
<=397>  p.149 
M alnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 
<=398> p. 1327 
Koger V. Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375 
<=399>  p. 1385 
Bykofsky v. Middletown, 40 1 F. Supp. 1242 
<=400>  p. 1253 
Planned Parenthood Assoc, v. Fitzpatrick, 401F. Supp. 554
< =401 > Dissenting opinion p.588 
Michini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 837
<=402> p.843 
M erriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 
<=403>  p.918 
Wise V. Sauers, 345 F. Supp. 90 
<=404>  p.93 
Seal V. M ertz, 338 F. Supp. 945 
<=405>  p.951 
Gebert v. Hoffinan, 336 F. Supp. 694 
<=406>  p.696
Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 
<=407> p.1210
<=408> Dissenting opinion p. 1220 
AxteU V. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 
<=409> p. 1080 
M artin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 
<=410>  p.323 
Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852 
<=411>  D istinguished p.855 
<=412>  Distinguished p.857
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Sill V. Pennsylvania S tate University, 318 F. Supp. 608 
<=413>  p.615
Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School D istrict, 310 F. Supp. 579 
< = 414>  p.584 
<=415>  p.585 
Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 
<=416>  p.533
American Civil Liberties Union v. Albert G allatin Area School D istrict, 307 
F. Supp. 637 
< = 417>  p.641 
E inhom  v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169 
<= 418>  Followed p. 1170 
Resistance v. Fairm ount P ark  of Philadelphia, Penn^lvania, 298 F. Supp. 
961
<=419>  p.963 
Poli V . SEPTA, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9935 
< =420>
House of Corrections Block Representatives Comm. v. Creamer, 1998 U.S. 
Dist.
LEXIS 6056 
<=421>
C.H. v. Oliva, 1997 U.S. D ist. LEXIS 21020 
<=422>
Pro V. Donatucd, 111ER Cas. (BNA) 1063 
<=423>  Dissenting opinion p. 1070 
4th Circuit 
Asquith v. City of Beaufort, 139 F.3d 408 
< =424>  p.411 
Boring V. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 
< =425> Dissenting opinion p.375 
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474 
< =426>  p. 1480
IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi F ratern ity  v. George Mason University, 993 
F.2d 
386
< =427>  p.393 
< =428>  p.394 
< =429>  p.395
D.G. R estaurant Corp. v. M yrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140 
<=430>  p. 144
Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 
<=431>  p.802
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Crosby v. Holsinger, 816 F.2d 162 
< = 4 3 2 >  p.164
G rattan  v. Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, 805 F.2d 1160 
< = 433>  Distinguished p .ll6 3  
Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197
< =434> Distinguished p. 1202
Kim V, Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 
< = 435> p .l065
Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society Inc., 628 F.2d 282 
< = 436>  p.286 
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 
< = 437>  p.1205 
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 
< = 438>  p.363
< = 439>  Dissenting opinion p.381 
Gambino v. Fair&x County School Board, 564 F.2d 157
< =440> Dissenting opinion p. 158
Shaw V. Trustees of Frederick Community College, 549 F.2d 929 
< = 441>  Distinguished p.933 
< = 442>  Dissenting opinion p.936 
Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 
< = 443>  p. 166 
N itzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 
< = 444>  Followed p.382 
U nited States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 
< = 445>  p.660
Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498 
< = 446>  p.501 
Baughman v. Freienm uth, 478 F.2d 1345 
< = 447>  p. 1348 
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 
< = 448>  Distinguished p.461 
N ational Socialist W hite People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 
< = 449>  Dissenting opinion p. 1022 
Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 
< =450>  p.776 
Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 
< = 451>  Dissenting opinion p.784 
< = 452>  Dissenting opinion p.785 
Q uarterm an v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 
< = 453>  p.56 
< = 454>  p.59 
Sword V. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091
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<=455>  p. 1096 
Saunders v. Vbrginia Polytechnic Institute, 417 F.2d 1127
< =456> Followed p.1130
Asquith v. City of Beaufort, 1998 U.S. ^ p .  LEXIS 5272 
< =457>
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 1998 U.S. App. LEXTR 2053 
< =458>  Dissenting opinion 
Loudoun V. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 
783
< =459> p.795
Phillips V. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 
< =460>  p.492 
Desroches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542 
< =461>  p.549 
Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F, Supp. 427 
<=462>  p.434 
Peck V. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 941F. Supp. 1478 
< =463>  p. 1482 
Hoffinan v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 
<=464>  p.823 
Scallet V. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999 
< =465>  p. 1010 
S c r u ^  V. Keen, 900 F. Supp. 821
< =466> Distinguished p.827
Broussard v. School Board of Norfolk, 801F. Supp. 1526 
< =467>  p.1534 
< =468>  Followed p. 1535 
<=469>  p. 1537
Hernandez v. Superintendent Fredericksburg-Rappahannock Joint Security 
Center 
800 F. Supp. 1344 
< =470>  p. 1349 
Burnham  v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169 
<=471>  p.1174 
Angell V . Leslie, 650 F. Supp. 55 
<=472>  p.57
Ponton V . Newport News School Board, 632 F. Supp. 1056 
<=473>  p.1062 
Williams v. Spencer, 455 F. Supp. 205 
<=474>  p.207 
MacDonald v. Newsome, 437 F. Supp. 796 
<=475>  Distinguished p.798 
Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531
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< = 476>  p.535
M aryland Public Interest Research Group v. E lkins, 430 F. Supp. 387 
< = 477>  p.391 
< = 478>  p.392 
Gambino v. Fair& x County School Board, 429 F . Supp. 731 
< = 479>  p.734 
Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 
< = 480>  p.301 
< = 481>  p.302 
Burke v. Levi, 391F. Supp. 186 
< = 482>  p. 190
Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843 
< = 483>  p.853 
< = 484>  Distinguished p.855 
Moore v. Gaston County Board o f Education, 357 F. Supp. 1037 
< = 485>  p.1039 
Bean v. D arr, 354 F. Supp. 1157 
< = 486>  p .ll6 1  
Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 
< = 487>  p.208
Moore v. Board of Trustees o f Charleston County Consolidated School 
D istrict,
344 F. Supp. 682 
< = 488>  p.686 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 
< = 489>  p.490
Rum ler v. Board of School Trustees for Lexington County D istrict Number 
One
Schools, 327 F. Supp. 729 
< = 490>  Harmonized p.740 
Cloak V. Cody, 326 F. Supp. 391 
< = 491>  Distinguished p.396 
Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235 
< = 492>  p. 1243 
Bistrick v. University of South Carolina, 324 F. Supp. 942 
< = 493>  p.947 
Hill V . Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 
< = 494>  Distinguished p.57 
< = 495>  Distinguished p.58 
< = 496>  Distinguished p.59 
Lam bert v. M arushi, 322 F. Supp. 326 
< = 497>  p. 329 
< = 498>  p.330
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Sword V . Fox, 317 F. Supp. 1055 
< =499>  p. 1061 
Kom V . EHdns, 317 F. Supp. 138 
< =500>  Followed p. 143 
<=501>  Dissenting opinion p. 145 
American Civil Liberties Union o f^ rg in ia  Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F. 
Supp. 893 
<=502>  p.896 
< =503>  p.897
Dash V . Commanding General Fort Jackson South Carolina, 307 F. Supp.
849
<=504>  Distinguished p.857 
Clemson University Vietnam M oratorium  Committee v. Clemson University, 
306 F. Supp. 129
<=505>  Distinguished p. 132 
Ekehl V. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 558 
< =506>  Explained p.562 
Mermaids, Inc. v. Currituck County Bd. of Comm’rs, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14062 
<=507>
Litm an v. George Mason Univ., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6557 
<=508>
Loudoun V. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 1998 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS 4725 
< =509>
Desroches v. Caprio, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11218 
<=510>
Boring V. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 131ER Cas. (BNA) 1189 
< =511>  Dissenting opinion p. 1197 
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 12 1ER Cas. (BNA) 289 
< =512> p.294, Headnote; F irst Amendment rights of teachers 
5th Circuit 
Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101 
<=513>  p. 109 
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184 
<=514>  p. 188 
Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 
< =515>  p. 1080 
< =516>  p. 1081 
Doe V. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 
< =517>  Distinguished p.165
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Doe V . Duncanville Independent School D istrict, 986 F.2d 953 
< =518> p.959 
Fyfe V. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401
< =519> p.405
M artin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 
<=520> p.588 
Guillory v. St. Landry Parish Police Ju ry , 802 F.2d 822 
<=521>  Distinguished p.825 
< =522> Distinguished p.826 
Texas State Teachers Assoc, v. G arland Independent School D istrict, 777 
F.2d 
1046
< =523> p. 1053
Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 
<=524>  p. 1324 
McBee v. Jim  H o ^  County, 730 F.2d 1009
< =525> Dissenting opinion p. 1025
Ysleta Federation of Teachers v. Ysleta Independent School D istrict, 720 
F.2d 1429 
<=526> p. 1433 
Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354 
<=527>  p. 1359
H orton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470 
<=528>  p.480
Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 677 F.2d 471 
<=529>  p.482
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School D istrict, 669 
F.2d 1038 
<=530>  p. 1048 
Johnson v. Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 
<=531> p. 1072
Dallas Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Dallas 
County Hospital D istrict, 656 F.2d 1175 
<=532>  p. 1179 
Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377 
<=533>  p.385 
<=534>  p.387 
Aladdin’s Castle Inc. v. Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 
<=535>  p. 1042 
< =536>  p. 1043 
D’Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469 
< =537>  p.474
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New Orleans S.S. Ass’n  v. General Longshore Workers Local Union No.
1418,
626F.2d455 
<=538> p.462
Mitchell V. Board o f Trustees of Oxford M unicipal Separate School, 625 F.2d 
660
<=539> p.662
Shamloo v. M ississippi S tate Board of T rustees of Institutions of H i^ e r  
Learning, 620 F.2d 516 
<=540> Followed p.521 
Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A&M Univ., 612 F.2d 160 
<=541> p. 166 
Davis V. Williams, 598 F.2d 916 
<=542> p.919
Pickens v. Okolona Municipal Separate School District, 594 F.2d 433 
<=543> p.437 
Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136 
<=544> Followed p. 143 
Ayers v. W estern Line Consolidated School District, 555 F.2d 1309 
<=545> p. 1317 
Stapp V. Avoyelles Parish School Board, 545 F.2d 527 
<=546> p.530 
Megill V. Board of Regents of Florida, 541 F.2d 1073 
<=547> p. 1085 
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 
<=548> Dissenting opinion p. 1079 
< =549> Dissenting opinion p. 1085 
Abbott V. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695 
<=550> p.699
<=551> Dissenting opinion p.707 
Poe V. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 
<=552> p.790 
Cook V. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 
<=553> Dissenting opinion p.751 
<=554> D issenting opinion p.756 
Adkins v. Duval County School Board, 511 F.2d 690 
<=555> p.694 
Sapp V. Ren&oe, 511 F.2d 172 
<=556> Distinguished p. 178 
Augustus V. School Board of Escambia County Florida, 507 F.2d 152 
<=557> p. 156
Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 506 F.2d 992 
<=558> p. 1002
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<=559>  Distinguished p. 1003 
<=560>  D issenting opinion p.l007 
W i^and  v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 
<=561>  p.306 
Sm ith V. United S tates, 502 F.2d 512 
<=562>  p.516 
Boykins v. Fairfield Board o f Education, 492 F .2d 697
< =563> p.702
W ri^ t V . Houston Independent School D istrict, 486 F.2d 137 
<=564>  p. 138 
R a in ^  v. Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347
< =565> D issenting opinion p.358 
Jones V . Wade, 479 F.2d 1176
<=566>  p. 1179 
Bazzaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 
<=567> p.573
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School D istrict, 475 F.2d 1071 
< = 5 6 8 >  D istinguished p. 1075 
M urray v. W estbaton Rouge Parish School Board, 472 F.2d 438  
< = 5 6 9 >  p.442 
Duke V. North Texas State University, 469 F.2d 829  
< = 5 7 0 >  p.837
Shanley v. N ortheast Independent School D istrict Bexar County Texas, 462 
F.2d 960 
<=571>  p.967
Davison-Paxon Co. v. N ational Labor Relations Board, 462 F.2d 364 
<=572>  p.370 
K arr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 
<=573>  p.613 
Dunn V. Tyler Independent School District, 460 F.2d 137 
<=574>  Distinguished p. 143 
Southeastern Prom otions Ltd. v. West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016 
< =575>  p. 1019
University of Southern Mississippi Chapter of the  Mississippi Civil L iberty 
Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, 452 F.2d 564 
<=576>  p.565 
Piazzola v. W atkins, 442 F.2d 284 
<=577>  p.290 
Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F.2d 201
< =578> p.206
Battle V . Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 
<=579>  p.324 
<=580>  p.325
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
Butts V. Dallas Independent School D istrict, 436 F.2d 728 
<=581> p.729 
Bayless v. M artine, 430 F.2d 873
< =582> Distinguished p.878 
<=583> Distinguished p.880 
<=584> Distinguished p.882
Harkless v. Sweeny Lidependent School D istrict, 427 F.2d 319 
<=585> Distinguished p.322 
Stevenson v. Board of Education of W heeler County Georgia, 426 F.2d 1154 
<=586> p. 1156
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 425 F.2d 1211
< =587> D issenting opinion p. 1218 
Griffin v. Tatum , 425 F.2d 201
<=588> p.203
Pred V. Board o f Public Instruction o f Dade County Florida, 415 F.2d 851
< =589> p.856 
<=590> p.857
H iett V. United States, 415 F.2d 664 
<=591> p.671 
United States v. Sm ith, 414 F.2d 630 
<=592> Distinguished p.635 
<=593> Different Opinion p.638 
Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 1997 U.S. ^ p .  LEXIS 3261 
<=594>
Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664 
<=595> p.674 
DFW Vending, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 991 F. Supp. 578 
<=596> p.586 
Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. D ist., 976 F. Supp. 659 
<=597> p.665 
<=598> Followed p.666 
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. D ist., 864 F. Supp. 1473 
<=599> p. 1484
Hill V. Rankin County Mississippi School D istrict, 843 F. Supp. 1112 
<=600> p.1115
Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of Big Sandy 
Independent 
School District, 817 F. Supp. 1319
< =601 > Followed p. 1333
Clark V. Dallas Independent School D istrict, 806 F. Supp. 116 
<=602> p. 119 
<=603> Followed p. 120 
United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 294
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<=604>  p.308
C la it V . Dallas Independent School D istrict, 671F. Supp. 1119
< =605> p .ll2 2
Texas Review Sodely v. Cunningham, 659 F. Supp. 1239 
<=606>  p.1245 
Dumas v. Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 
<=607>  p.1069 
632 F. Supp. 203 
<=608>  p.204 
Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F. Supp. 134 
<=609>  p. 140
Jones V. Latexo Independent School D istrict, 499 F. Supp. 223 
<=610>  p.230
H all V. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County Alabama, 496 F. 
Sapp.
697
<=611>  p.708 
<=612>  p.709 
Kite V. M arshall, 494 F. Supp. 227 
<=613>  Explained p.231 
Dean v. Timpson Independent School D istrict, 486 F. Supp. 302 
<=614>  p.304 
Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 484 F. Supp. 1252 
< =615>  Followed p. 1256 
<=616>  Followed p. 1257 
Süunora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp. 199 
<=617>  p.204
Dallas Association of Community O rganization for Reform Now v. Dallas 
County
H ospital District, 478 F. Supp. 1250
< =618> Followed p. 1255 
Jordan v. Cagle, 474 F. Supp. 1198
<=619>  p. 1212 
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 
<=620>  Followed p.92 
<=621>  Distinguished p.93 
<=622>  Followed p.93 
High o r  Times Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 
< =623>  p. 1039 
< =624>  p. 1041 
<=625>  Followed p. 1042 
Kite V. Marshall, 454 F. Supp. 1347 
< =626>  p. 1349
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Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County College, 454 F. Supp. 552 
< = 627>  p.557
Local 2263 International Association of F ire F i l te r s  v. Tupelo Mississippi, 
439 F. Supp. 1224 
< = 628>  p. 1232 
Collier v. M iller, 414 F. Supp. 1357 
< = 629>  p.1367 
J . L. V . Parham , 412 F. Supp. 112 
< = 630>  p. 127
Hgynes V . Dallas County Ju n io r CoUege D istrict, 386 F. Supp. 208 
< = 631>  p.211 
P rin tin g  Industries of Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801 
< = 632>  p.814 
S toner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 
< = 633>  p.587 
Cook V . Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855 
< = 634>  p.859
Moore v. School Board of G ulf County, Florida, 364 F. Supp. 355 
< = 635>  p.361 
Alabama Education Assoc, v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682 
< = 636>  p.686 
M urdock v. Jacksonville, Florida, 361 F. Supp. 1083 
< = 637>  p. 1095 
A ugustus V . School Board of Escam bia County, 361 F. Supp. 383 
< = 638>  p.388 
Rhyne v. Childs, 359 F. Supp. 1085 
< = 639>  p. 1091 
Doherty v. I^^lson, 356 F. Supp. 35 
< = 640>  p.41 
Abbott v. Thetford, 354 F. Supp. 1280 
< = 641>  Distinguished p. 1291 
Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 
< = 642>  p.870 
Wood v. Davison, 351F. Supp. 543 
< =643> p.546 
McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp. 1111 
< = 644>  p.1121 
M edrano v. AUee, 347 F. Supp. 605 
< = 645>  p.623 
M erkey v. Board of Regents o f Florida, 344 F. Supp. 1296 
< = 646>  p. 1305 
Cooper V . Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101 
< = 647>  p. 1109
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Caldwell v. Cannacb^, 340 F. Supp. 835 
< = 648>  p.839 
Duke V . N orth Texas State University, 338 F. Supp. 990 
< =649> p.998
Egner v. Texas City Independent School D istrict, 338 F. Supp. 931 
< = 650>  p.943
C enter for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126 
< = 651>  p . 134
Graham  v. Houston Independent School District, 335 F. Supp. 1164 
< = 652>  p.1165 
< = 653>  p.1166
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Atlanta, Georgia, 334 F. Supp. 634 
< = 654>  p.640
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 333 F. Supp. 1149 
< =655>  p. 1159 
Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 
< = 656>  p. 1326 
D unn V . T^ler Independent School District, 327 F. Supp. 528 
< = 657>  Followed p.532 
< = 658>  Followed p.534 
Press V. Pasadena Independent School District, 326 F. Supp. 550 
< = 659>  p.563
New Left Education Project v. Board of Regents of University of Texas 
System,
326 F. Supp. 158 
< = 660>  p. 164
Valdes v. Monroe County Board of Public Instruction, 325 F. Supp. 572 
< =661>  p.575 
L indquist v. Coral Gables, 323 F. Supp. 1161 
< = 662>  p. 1163 
Pound V. HoUaday, 322 F. Supp. 1000 
< = 663>  p. 1002 
W atson V . Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394 
< =664>  p.396 
Douglas V . Pitcher, 319 F. Supp. 706 
< = 665>  p.712 
Glover v. Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070 
< = 666>  p. 1075 
Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529 
< =667>  p.531 
Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253
< = 668>  p. 1266
< = 669>  p. 1273
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Shoemaker v. V^Uiams, 317 F. Supp. 1211 
<=670> p. 1215
Channing Club v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University, 317 F. Supp. 
688
<=671> p.691 
P ratz V. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872 
<=672> p.877
<=673> Dissenting opinion p.889 
Parducd v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 
<=674> p.354
Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 
<=675>  p.289 
<=676> p.291 
<=677>  p.295
Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School D istrict, 311F. Supp. 664 
<=678> FoUowed p.666 
<=679>  Followed p.667 
Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School D istrict, 309 F. Supp. 1034 
<=680> p. 1046
Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District, 308 F. Supp. 570 
<=681> p.574
Wood V. Alamo H e is ts  Independent School D istrict, 308 F. Supp. 551 
<=682> p.553
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 307 F. Supp. 1328 
<=683> p. 1338 
<=684> p. 1339 
Stacy V. V^Uiams, 306 F. Supp. 963 
<=685> p.971
B utts V. Dallas Independent School District, 306 F. Supp. 488 
<=686> Distinguished p.489 
<=687> Distinguished p.491 
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education, 306 F. Supp. 97
<=688> p. 100
Calbillo V. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 
<=689> p.859
Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 
<=690> p.828
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School D istrict of Sweeny, T ^ a s , 300 F. 
Supp. 794 
<=691> Explained p.805 
Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School D istrict, 300 F. Supp. 748 
<=692> Distinguished p.749 
Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
193
<=693> p.62 
Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526 
<=694> p.536 
Tompkins v. Cyr, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340 
<=695>
Tompkins v. Cyr, 1998 U.S. Dist. TEXTS 180 
<=696>
Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. D ist., 1997 U.S. Dist. TEXTS 13567 
<=697> Followed 
Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 121ER Cas. (BNA) 950 
<=698> p.956 
6th C ircuit 
Settle V. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 
<=699> Different Opinion p. 156 
<=700> Ebcplained p. 156 
<=701> Distinguished p. 159 
Americans U nited for Separation of Church and State v. G rand Rapids, 980 
F.2d 1538 
<=702> p. 1542 
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 
<=703> p.885 
Poling V. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 
<=704> p.762
<=705> Distinguished p.763 
<=706> Dissenting opinion p.765 
Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 
<=707> p.827
Fowler v. Board of Education of Lincoln County, Kentucky, 819 F.2d 657 
<=708> p.661
<=709> Distinguished p.663 
<=710> Different Opinion p.667 
Gallagher v. Pontiac School District, 807 F.2d 75 
<=711> p.78 
M artin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236 
<=712> p.241 
Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 
<=713> p.981
Rowland v. Mad River Ix)cal School D istrict Montgomery County Ohio, 730 
F.2d444
<=714> Dissenting opinion p.453 
Columbus Educ. Assoc, v. Columbus City Sch. Dist., 623 F.2d 1155 
<=715> p. 1160
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Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 
<=716>  p.571
M inarcmi v. StrongsvOle City School D istrict, 541 F.2d 577 
<=717>  p.582
Mahaley v. Cuyahoga M etropolitan Housing A uthority, 500 F.2d 1087 
<=718>  Dissenting opinion p. 1097 
Akron Board of Education v. S tate Board of Education of Ohio, 490 F.2d 
1285
<=719>  p.1291 
W hitsel V. Southeast Local School District, 484 F.2d 1222 
<=720>  p.1228 
H etrick v. M artin, 480 F.2d 705 
<=721>  p.708
Robinson v. Regents of E astern  K en tu c^  University, 475 F.2d 707 
<=722>  Explained p.709 
<=723>  p.710 
Melton V. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 
<=724>  p. 1335
<=725> Dissenting opinion p. 1336 
Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 
<=726>  p.240 
Bright V. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 
<=727>  p.249 
Gfell V. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 
<=728>  p.446 
Guzick V. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 
<=729>  Distinguished p.595 
<=730>  Dissenting opinion p.601 
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 
<=731>  Distinguished p.217 
Norton v. Discipline Committee of East Tennessee State University, 419 F.2d 
195
<=732>  p.199
<=733>  Dissenting opinion p.204 
Salehpour v. University of Tenn., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21381 
<=734>
DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools, 799 F. Supp. 744 
<=735>  p.748 
<=736>  Explained p.752 
Quappe V . Endry, 772 F. Supp. 1004 
<=737>  Followed p. 1010 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. M artin L uther K ing Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. 
Supp. 745
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< =738>  Followed p.751 
H arper v. Edge wood Board of Education, 655 F. Supp. 1353 
< = 739>  p.1355 
M ozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 
< =740>  p.1201 
Davis V . Crush, 646 F. Supp. 1192 
< =741>  p. 1194 
Cales V . Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 
< = 742>  p.457
Low Income People Together Inc. v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501 
< =743>  p.514 
Breen v. Runkel, 614 F. Supp. 355 
< = 744>  p.359 
< =745>  p.360
Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education, 610 F. Supp. 577 
< = 746>  p.580 
Thomas v. Farm er, 573 F. Supp. 128 
< = 747>  p. 132 
Darby v. Schoo, 544 F. Supp. 428 
< = 748>  p.439 
B ahr v. Jenkins, 539 F. Supp. 483 
< = 749>  p.486 
S tem  v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 
< =750>  p.35
D etroit F ire F i l te r s  Association, Local 334 v. D etroit, 508 F. Supp. 172 
< =751>  Distinguished p. 176 
< = 752>  p. 177 
Petaey v. F la u ^ e r, 505 F. Supp. 1087 
< =753>  p. 1090 
< = 754>  p. 1091 
Kelly V . USPS, 492 F. Supp. 121 
< = 755>  p. 128 
< = 756>  p. 130
Princeton Education Ass’n  v. Princeton Board of Education, 480 F. Supp. 
962
< =757>  p.969
< = 758>  Distinguished p.971 
Solid Rock Foundation v. Ohio State University, 478 F. Supp. 96 
< =759>  p. 102 
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306 
< =760>  p.391
International Society for K rishna Consciousness Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 
414
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< = 761>  p.420 
< = 762>  p.422 
< = 763>  p.425 
Kucmich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp. 1101 
< =764>  p . l l l l  
Doe V . Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 
< = 765>  p.1210 
Smyth V . Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 
< = 766>  Followed p.785 
M inardni v. Strongsville City School D istrict, 384 F. Supp. 698 
< = 767>  Distinguished p.707 
Lopez V . V^Uiams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 
< =768>  p. 1294 
Ambuigçy v. Cassady, 370 F. Supp. 571 
< =769>  Explained p.576 
Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139 
< = 770>  p. 150 
Dixon V. Beresh, 361F. Supp. 253 
< =771>  p.254 
Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101 
< =772>  p. 1103 
Davis V. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 
< =773>  Followed p.301 
Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp. 757 
< =774>  p.760
Church V . Board of Education of Saline Area School D istrict of Washtenaw 
County MichigEUi, 339 F. Supp. 538 
< = 775>  p.541 
Sm ith V. Ellington, 334 F. Supp. 90 
< =776>  p.93 
Melton V . Young, 328 F. Supp. 88 
< =777>  Harmonized p.95 
West Tennessee ACLU v. Memphis Tennessee, 323 F. Supp. 234 
< =778>  p.238 
Alberda v. Noell, 322 F. Supp. 1379 
< =779>  p. 1381 
Mercer v. Lothamer, 321 F. Supp. 335 
< = 780>  p.338
Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 320 F. Supp. 335 
< =781>  p.380 
Jackson v. Ellington, 316 F. Supp. 1071 
< =782>  p.1074 
Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953
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<=783> p-959
Brownlee v. Bradley County Tennessee Board of Education, 311F. Supp. 
1360
<=784> p.1364 
Hobson V. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 
<=785> p. 1400 
McAlpine v. Reese, 309 F. Supp. 136 
<=786> Distinguished p. 139 
Vought V . Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 
<=787> Distinguished p. 1391 
Guzick V . Drebus, 305 F. Supp. 472 
<=788> Distinguished p.478 
Smith V . U niversity of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 
<=789> p.781 
Junger v. Daley, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10225 
<=790> Distinguished 
7th C ircuit
Boucher v. School Bd. of Greenfield Sch. Dist., 134 F.3d 821 
<=791> p.825 
Muller V. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 
<=792> p. 1535 
<=793> Followed p. 1539 
United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370 
<=794> p. 1374 
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 
<=795> p. 1013
Vfiemerslage v. Maine Township High School D istrict 207, 29 F.3d 1149 
<=796> p. 1152 
Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728 
<=797> p.736 
<=798> Distinguished p.738 
Graff V. Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 
<=799> D issenting opinion p. 1336 
Hedges v. Wauconda Community U nit Sch. Dist. 118, 9 F.3d 1295 
<=800> p. 1297 
Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 
< =  801 > Dissenting opinion p .ll2 4  
Schaill V. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 
<=802> p. 1324 
May V. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105 
<=803> p.1112 
Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731
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<=804> p.736 
Vfisconsin Action Coalition v. Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248 
<=805> p.1252 
P en y  Local Educators Assoc, v. H ohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 
<=806>  p.1298 
<=807>  p. 1300 
Schleiffer v. M eyers, 644 F.2d 656 
<=808> D istinguished p.665 
Zykan v. W arsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 
<=809>  p. 1304 
Palm er V . Board o f Education of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271 
<=810> D istinguished p.l273 
W ynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 
<=811> p. 1383 
Collin V. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
<=812> p.1201
Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 
<=813> p.755 
Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 
<=814> D istinguished p.828 
Brubaker v. Board o f Education School D istrict 149 Cook County Illinois, 
502 
F.2d 973
< =  815 > D issenting opinion p.991 
Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 
<=816> p.52
M iller v. School D istrict Number 167 Cook County Illinois, 495 F.2d 658 
<=817> p.662 
Jacobs V. Board o f School Commissioners, 490 F.2d 601 
<=818> Elxplained p.605 
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 
<=819> p. 1342 
C lark V. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 
<=820> p.931
Cinecom Theaters Midwest States Inc. v. F ort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297 
<=821> p. 1302
Hostrop V. Board of Jun io r College D istrict No. 515 Counties of Cook and 
Will Illinois, 471 F.2d 488 
<=822> p.491 
Asher v. H arrington, 461 F.2d 890 
< =823> D issenting opinion p.896 
Fujishim a v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 
<=824>  p. 1357
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
<=825> Elxplained p. 1358 
Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 
<=826> p.943 
Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59 
<=827> p.60 
Roth V. Regents of S tate Colleges, 446 F.2d 806 
<=828> Dissenting opinion p.815 
Lee V. Board of Regents of S tate Colleges, 441 F.2d 1257 
<=829> p.1260 
Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 
<=830> p.750 
Banks v. M unde Conmmniiy Schools, 433 F.2d 292 
<=831> Distinguished p.298 
Crews V. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259 
<=832> p.1263 
<=833> p.1265
Scoville V . Board of Education o f Joliet Township High School D istrict 204, 
425 F.2d 10 
<=834> Followed p. 12 
<=835> Followed p. 13 
<=836> Dissenting opinion p. 15 
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 
<=837> p. 1036
<=838> Dissenting opinion p. 1039 
Soglin V. Kaufiman, 418 F.2d 163 
<=839> p.167 
Robson V . Malone, 412 F.2d 848 
<=840> p.850
Willis V. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 1998 U.S. ^ p .  LFXTS 21923 
<=841>
Boucher v. School Bd. o f Greenfield Sch. Dist., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 453 
<=842>
Muller V. Jefferson L i^ th o u se  Sch., 1996 U.S. App. TEXTS 28279 
<=843> Followed 
Todd V. Rush County Schs., 983 F. Supp. 799 
<=844> p.804 
Bills V. Homer ConsoL Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 1063 
<=845> p. 1065 
Ayres v. Chicago, 966 F. Supp. 701 
<=846> p.711 
Qvyjt V. Lin, 953 F. Supp. 244 
<=847> Followed p.248 
Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339
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< =848>  p. 1345 
< =849>  Ebcplained p. 1350 
Qvyjt v. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100 
< =850>  p. 1108 
Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789 
< =851>  p.797 
Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97 
< =852>  p.99
Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-M arion County Building Auth., 870 F. Supp.
1450
< =853>  p. 1457 
U nited States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 
<=854>  p.858
Wiemerslage v. Maine Township High School District, 824 F. Supp. 136 
< =855>  p. 141 
< =856>  p. 142
Hedges v. Wauconda Community U nit School D istrict 118, 807 F. Supp. 444 
<=857>  Explained p.451 
< =858>  Explained p.454 
UWM Post Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin System, 774 
F. Supp. 1163 
<=859>  Distinguished p .ll7 6  
Fort Wayne Women’s H ealth Organization v. Brane, 734 F. Supp. 849 
<=860>  p.851 
Nelson v. Moline School D istrict 40, 725 F. Supp. 965 
< =861>  Distinguished p.969 
Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais H i^  School, District 307, 707 F. Supp. 1005 
< =862>  p. 1009 
Fong V. Purdue University, 692 F. Supp. 930 
< =863>  p.951 
Schaill V. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 
< =864>  p.851
Grove School v. Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, 642 F. Supp. 1043 
< =865>  Distinguished p. 1048 
M artens v. D istrict No. 220 Board of Education, 620 F. Supp. 29 
< =866>  p.31
Grove School v. Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, 596 F. Supp. 1361 
<=867>  p. 1366
Clergy and Laity Concerned v. Chicago Board of Education, 586 F. Supp.
1408
<=868>  p. 1411 
< =869>  p. 1413 
Zbaraz v. H artigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452
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<=870>  p. 1456 
Wrzeski v. Madison, Wisconsin, 558 F. Supp. 664 
<=871>  p.668 
Dodd V. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 
<=872>  p.27 
<=873>  Followed p.28 
Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Industrial U niversity 
502 F. Supp. 789 
<=874>  p.799
Substitutes U nited for B etter Schools v. Rohter, 496 F. Supp. 1017 
<=875>  Followed p. 1019 
Doe V. Renftow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 
<=876>  p. 1022 
<=877> p. 1023 
Palm er v. Board of Education o f Chicago, 466 F. Supp. 600 
<=878> p.603 
Collin V. Sm ith, 447 F. Supp. 676 
<=879>  p.693 
<=880>  p.700
Gaiy-Northwest Indiana Women’s Services Inc. v. Bowen, 42 1 F. Supp. 734 
<=881> p.736 
Ficha V. Vfielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214
<=882> p. 1218
Rasche v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 353 F. Supp. 973 
<=883>  p.977 
Bucha V. Illinois High School Assoc., 351F. Supp. 69 
<=884>  p.73 
James v. Nelson, 349 F. Supp. 1061 
<=885>  p. 1063
Jacobs V. Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis in Indiana, 349 F. 
Supp. 605 
<=886> p.609 
Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740 
<=887> p.743 
Bouse V. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 
<=888>  p.518 ^
Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 
<=889>  p.99 
Bright V . Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 
<=890> p. 1391 
Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 
<=891> Distinguished p.7 
Whitfield V. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889
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<=892> p.893
< =893> D issenting opinion p.898 
Crews V. Clones, 303 F. Supp. 1370 
<=894> p. 1375 
Hilton V. Linc»ln-Way High Sch., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 508 
<=895>
Todd V. Rush County Schs., 1997 U.S. Dist. TEXTS 20483 
<=896>
8th C ircuit 
Burnham v. lann i, 119 F.3d 668 
<=897> p.674 
<=898> Followed p.677 
Stephenson v. Davenport Community Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 
<=899> p. 1306 
Burnham v. lanni, 98 F.3d 1007 
<=900> p. 1014
<=901 > D issenting opinion p. 1022 
United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 
<=902> D issenting opinion p. 1307 
Jamison v. St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280 
<=903> Followed p. 1285 
Bystrom v. Fridley High School Independent School D istrict No. 14, 822 F.2d 
747
<=904> p.752 
<=905> Explained p.754 
<=906> Different Opinion p.759 
<=907> D issenting opinion p.759 
Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 
<=908> p.191 
Lewis V. H arrison School D istrict No. 1, 805 F.2d 310 
<=909> p.315 
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School D istrict, 795 F.2d 1368 
<=910> Followed p. 1371 
<=911> Followed p. 1375 
<=912> D issenting opinion p. 1378 
Hughes V. W hitmer, 714 F.2d 1407 
<=913> p. 1422
Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. U nited States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 
<=914> Followed p. 1020 
<=915> D issenting opinion p. 1026 
P ratt V. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 
<=916> p.776
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Clark V. M ann, 562 F.2d 1104 
<=917> p.1118 
Turdûck v. United States, 561 F.2d 719 
<=918> p.722 
Gay Lib v. University of M issouri, 558 F.2d 848 
<=919> p.853 
<=920> p.856
< = ^ 1 >  Dissenting opinion p.858 
M. S. V. W ermers, 557 F.2d 170 
<=922> Dissenting opinion p. 177 
Teterud v. B um s, 522 F.2d 357 
<=923> p.362 
Watts V. Universiiy of Missouri, 495 F.2d 384 
<=924> p.389 
Birdwell v. Hazelwood School D istrict, 491 F.2d 490 
<=925> Distinguished p.494 
Tollett V. U nited States, 485 F.2d 1087 
<=926> p. 1093 
Rozman v. E lliott, 467 F.2d 1145 
<=927> p. 1149
Papish V. Board of Curators of U niversity of Missouri, 464 F.2d 136 
<=928> p. 138
<=929> D issenting opinion p. 146 
Ahem v. Board of Education of School D istrict of Grand Island, 456 F.2d 399 
<=930> p.404 
United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849 
<=931> p.853
Tate v. Board of Education of Jonesboro, Arkansas, Special School District, 
453 F.2d 975 
<=932> Distinguished p.978 
Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 
<=933> p .779
<=934> Dissenting opinion p.781 
McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 
<=935> Distinguished p. 196 
Bishop V. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 
<=936> p. 1078 
Pickings v. Bmce, 430 F.2d 595 
<=937> p.598 
Esteban v. C entral Missouri S tate College, 415 F.2d 1077 
<=938> p. 1085 
<=939> p. 1086
<=940> Dissenting opinion p. 1093
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
204
Lacks V. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R -2 ,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13187 
<=941>
Fister v. M innesota New Country Sch., 1998 U.S. ^ p .  lEX IS 9508 
<=942>
Burnham v. lanni, 1997 U.S. ^ p .  TEXTS 17343 
<=943>
Stephenson v. Davenport Community Sch. D ist., 1997 U.S. ^ p .  LEXIS 6529 
<=944>
Burnham v. lanni, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26841 
< =945> Dissenting opinion 
<=946>
Peterson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 811, 999 F. Supp. 665 
<=947> p.675 
Burnham v. lanni, 899 F. Supp. 395 
<=948> p.404 
Harper v. Crockett, 868 F. Supp. 1557 
<=949> p. 1576 
Video Software Dealers Assoc, v. Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275 
<=950> p. 1278
Bull V. Dardanelle Public School D istrict #15 , 745 F. Supp. 1455 
<=951> p. 1459 
Bush V. Dassel-Cokato Board of Education, 745 F. Supp. 562 
<=952> Followed p.564 
<=953> p.565
Lundberg v. West Monona Community School District, 731F. Supp. 331 
<=954> Distinguished p.338 
Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 686 F. Supp. 1387 
<=955> Followed p. 1391 
<=956> p. 1392 
Wise V. Pea Ridge School District 109, 675 F. Supp. 1524 
<=957> p. 1528 
Brands v. Sheldon Community School, 671 F. Supp. 627 
<=958> p.634 
Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 667 F. Supp. 1269 
<=959> p. 1281 
Gay and Lesbian Students Assoc, v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045 
<=960> p. 1054
Brown v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674 
<=961> p.679
Boyd V. Board of Directors of McGehee School D istrict No. 17, 612 F. Supp.
86
<=962> p.91
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District, 607 F. Supp. 1450
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< =963>  p. 1455 
< = 964>  Distinguished p. 1462 
U pper Midwest Booksellers Assoc, v. M inneapolis, 602 P. Supp. 1361 
< = 965> p .l365  
Kuhlm eier v. Hazelwood School District, 578 F. Supp. 1286 
< = 966>  p.1291 
Russ V . White, 541F. Supp. 888 
< =967>  p.895 
Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 
< = 968>  p. 1253 
Hickingbottom v. Easley, 494 F. Supp. 980 
< = 969>  p.985 
Chess V . V^dmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 
< =970>  p.918 
Bergstrom  v. Bergstrom , 478 F. Supp. 434 
< =971>  p.440 
M rs. A.J. V. Special School D istrict No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418 
< =972>  p.430 
Cooper V. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 
< =973>  p.809 
< =974>  Followed p.810 
Dillon V. Pulaski County Special School D istrict, 468 F. Supp. 54 
<=975>  p.56 
Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 
< =976>  p.1158 
< =977>  p. 1159 
Gay Lib v. University o f M issouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350 
< =978>  p.1367
Planned Parenthood of C entral Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 
< =979>  Dissenting opinion p. 1376 
Hibbs V . Board of Education of Iowa C entral Community College, 392 F.
Supp.
1202 
< =980>  p. 1206 
< =981>  p. 1208
Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School D istrict No. 101, 387 F. Supp. 
1237 
< =982>  p. 1244 
Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 
< =983>  p. 158 
Lofton V. McLucas, 383 F. Supp. 1208 
< =984>  Distinguished p. 1211 
O rr V. Icefoot, 377 F. Supp. 673
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< = 985>  p.681
Peterson v. Board of Education o f School District No. 1 of Lincoln Nebraska, 
370 F. Supp. 1206 
< = 986>  Followed p. 1213 
United S tates v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245 
< -987>  p.1247 
Veed V . Schwartzkopf, 353 F . Supp. 149 
< = 988>  p. 152 
Birdwell v. Hazelwood School D istrict, 352 F. Supp. 613
< =989> Distinguished p.620 
< = 990>  Distinguished p.621 
< = 991>  Followed p.621
Graham v. Knutzen, 351F. Supp. 642 
< = 992>  p.669 
D o u ^m iy  v. Walker, 349 F. Supp. 629 
< =993>  p.644 
Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 
< =994>  p.400 
Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 
< =995>  p. 165
Webb V . Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F. Supp. 791 
< =996>  p.799 
< =997>  p.807 
Vfilderman v. Nelson, 335 F. Supp. 1381 
<=998>  p. 1383 
Rozman v. Elliott, 335 F. Supp. 1086 
< =999>  p. 1097 
Paladino v. Omaha, 335 F. Supp. 897
< = 1000> Followed p.898
Reed v. Board of Education o f Parkway School D istrict, 333 F. Supp. 816
< = 1001> p.819
Hodges V . Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504
< = 1002> Distinguished p.507
Papish V . Board of Curators o f University of M issouri, 331F. Supp. 1321
< = 1003> Distinguished p. 1332
Downs V . Conway School D istrict, 328 F. Supp. 338
< = 1004> p.345 
<=1005> p.346
Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821
<=1006>  p.828
Parker v. F iy, 323 F. Supp. 728
< = 1007> p.731
< = 1008> p.738
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Turley v. Adel Community School D istrict, 322 F. Supp. 402 
<=1009> p.405 
C arter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 
<=1010> Distinguished p.95 
McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 
<=1011> p.815 
Bishop V . Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445 
<=1012> Distinguished p.449 
Giangreco v. Center School D istrict, 313 F. Supp. 776 
<=1013> Distinguished p.780 
Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 
<=1014> p.813 
<=1015> p.815 
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 
<=1016> p.251 
Sims V. Colfax Community School D istrict, 307 F. Supp. 485 
<=1017> p.487 
Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 
<=1018> p.711 
<=1019> p.713
Peterson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 811, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5012 
< = 1020>
Lacks V. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R -2 ,141ER Cas. (BNA) 24 
<=1021> p.29 
9th C ircuit 
Roulette v. City of Seattle, Ct. App. 9th Dkt. No. 94-35354 
—  Dissenting opinion 
Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331,118 F.3d 1351 
<=1023> Dissenting opinion p. 1361 
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 
<=1024> p.950 
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 
<=1025> Dissenting opinion p.307 
American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379 
<=1026> p.385 
Lovell V. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 
<=1027> p.371 
Lovell V. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 79 F.3d 1510 
<=1028> p. 1514 
<=1029> Followed p. 1517 
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 78 F.3d 1425 
<=1030> Dissenting opinion p. 1431
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Yniguez v. Arizonans for O fSdal E n glish, 69 F.3d 920 
<=1031>  p.934 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for O fSdal English, 42 F.3d 1217 
<=1032>  Distinguished p. 1231 
Peloza V . Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 
<=1033>  Followed p.522 
Acton V . Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 
<=1034> p.1525 
Chandler v. McMinnville School D istrict, 978 F.2d 524 
<=1035>  Explained p.527 
<=1036>  Explained p.532 
Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 
<=1037>  Dissenting opinion p. 1382 
Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada Inc. v. Clark County School 
District,
941 F.2d 817 
<=1038> p.822
< = 1039> Dissenting opinion p.842 
Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991
< = 1040> p. 1008
Garza v. Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763
< = 1041> p.775
White v. Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421
< = 1042> p. 1425
Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada Inc. v. Clark County School 
District,
887 F.2d 935
< = 1043> p.941
G arnett v. Renton School D istrict No. 403, 874 F.2d 608
< = 1044> Distinguished p.613
G arnett v. Renton School D istrict No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121
< = 1045> Distinguished p. 1127 
Burch V. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149
< = 1046> Followed p. 1150
< = 1047> p.1153
San Diego Conunittee Against Registration and  the Draft v. Governing Board 
of Grossm ont Union High School District, 790 F.2d 1471
< = 1048> Followed p. 1479
< = 1049> Dissenting opinion p. 1484 
Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277
< = 1050> p. 1287
Fraser v. Bethel School D istrict No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356
< = 1051> Followed p. 1358
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<=1052>  Dissenting opinion p. 1366 
Bolanos-Hemandez v. Im m igration & N aturalization Service, 749 F.2d 1316 
<=1053>  p.1326 
Cinevision Corp. v. Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 
<=1064> p.567 
<=1055> p.572 
Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 
< =1056>  p. 1466
< =1057>  Dissenting opinion p. 1472 
Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 
<=1058> p. 197
Nicholson v. Board of Education Torrance Unified School D istrict, 682 F.2d 
858
<=1059>  p.863 
Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735 
<=1060> p.739 
Collins V . Chandler Unified School D istrict, 644 F.2d 759 
<=1061>  p.763 
U nited States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545 
<=1062> p.549 
Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 
<=1063> p. 1046
< = 1064> Distinguished p. 1048 
<=1065> Followed p. 1050
Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 537 F.2d 1031 
<=1066>  Dissenting opinion p. 1034 
Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 
<=1067>  p.934 
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171
< = 1068> Distinguished p. 174 
U nited States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96
<=1069> p. 100 
<=1070> Harmonized p. 102 
H atter v. Los Angeles City High School D istrict, 452 F.2d 673
< = 1071> p.675
King V . Saddleback Junior College D istrict, 445 F.2d 932
< = 1072> Distinguished p.937
Jones V. Board of Regents of U niversity of Arizona, 436 F.2d 618 
<=1073> p.621 
King V. Saddleback Junior College D istrict, 425 F.2d 426 
<=1074>  p.428
Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331,1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
36357
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<=1075>  Dissenting opinion 
Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331,1997 U.S. App. TEXTS 
16780
<=1076>  Dissenting opinion 
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 1997 U.S. App. LEXTS 13409 
<=1077>
Doe V. Petalum a City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415
< = 1078> p. 1426
Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407 
<=1079>  Distinguished p. 1413 
Jeglin V. San Jacinto Unified School District, 827 F. Supp. 1459 
<=1080>  Followed p. 1461 
Smedley v. Capps Staples W ard H astings & Dodson, 820 F. Supp. 1227 
<=1081> p.1229 
Peloza V . Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412 
<=1082>  p.1419 
Hoppock V . Twin Falls School D istrict No. 411, 772 F. Supp. 1160 
<=1083> p.1163 
United S tates v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 
<=1084>  p.417
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060
< = 1085> Distinguished p. 1081
Heidy v. U nited States Customs Service, 681F. Supp. 1445
< = 1086> p. 1448 
<=1087> p. 1452
Gano V. School District No. 411 o f Twin Falls County Idaho, 674 F. Supp. 
796
<=1088>  p.798 
Burch V. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 1149 
<=1089> p.1153
KTSP-Taft Television and Radio Co. v. Arizona State Lottery Commission, 
646 
F. Supp. 300 
<=1090>  p.307 
H eim b au ^  v. San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 
<=1091>  p. 1576 
H earn v. M orris, 526 F. Supp. 267 
<=1092>  p.271 
Bilbrey v. Brown, 481F. Supp. 26 
<=1093> p.27 
Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 
<=1094>  p. 1362 
< =1095>  p. 1363
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Pliscou V. Holtville Unified School D istrict, 411 F. Supp. 842 
<=1096> Distinguished p.847 
<=1097> Distinguished p.8S0 
Mabey v. Reagan, 376 F. Supp. 216 
<=1098> p.221 
Vanderzanden v. Lowell School D istrict No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67 
<=1099> p.71 
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267
<=1100> p. 1280
<=1101> Followed p. 1284 
Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F. Supp. 789 
<=1102> Distinguished p.792 
S ta rs ^  V . V^lhams, 353 F. Supp. 900 
<=1103> Followed p.917 
League of Academic Women v. Regents of University of California, 343 F. 
Supp. 636 
<=1104> p.642 
Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 
<=1105> p.619 
Jefiers v. Yuba City Unified School D istrict, 319 F. Supp. 368 
<=1106> Distinguished p.371 
King v. Saddleback Junior College D istrict, 318 F. Supp. 89 
<=1107> p.90 
Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 
<=1108> p. 1394 
H atter v. Los Angeles City H i^  School D istrict, 310 F. Supp. 1309 
<=1109> Distinguished p. 1312 
Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 
<=1110> p. 194 
Siegel V. Regents of University of California, 308 F. Supp. 832 
<=1111> p.836 
<=1112> Distinguished p.838 
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517 
<=1113> Distinguished p.521 
Olff V. East Side Union High School D istrict, 305 F. Supp. 557 
<=1114> p.559 
Locks V. Laird, 300 F. Supp. 915 
<=1115> p.918
Yniguez v. Arizonans for OfGdal English, 66 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) P43726 
<=1116> Distinguished, Headnote: symbolic speech 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for OfBdal English, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P43348 
<=1117> Distinguished 
Peloza V. Capistrano Unified Sch. D ist., 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P43246
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<=1118>
Smedley v. Capps Staples W ard H astings & Dodson, 62 EmpL Prac. Dec. 
(CCH)
P42591
< =1119>
Smedley v. Capps Staples Ward H astings & Dodson, 61 F air EmpL Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1360 
< =1120>  p.1361
Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331,121ER Cas. (BNA) 1773 
<= 1121>  Dissenting opinion p. 1781 
10th C ircu it 
Seam ons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226
< =  1122> Followed p. 1237
Miles V . Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773 
< =1123>  p.775 
Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047
< =  1124> p.1055
< = 1125> Followed p. 1056 
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557
< = 1126> p. 1567 
Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882
< = 1127> p.884
Acom V. Tulsa Oklahoma, 835 F.2d 735
< = 1128> Distinguished p.742
Mini Spas Inc. v. South Salt Lake City Corp., 810 F.2d 939
< = 1129> p.941
Bell V. Little Axe Independent School D istrict No. 70 o f Cleveland County,
766 F.2d 1391
< = 1130> p. 1401
N ational Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 
1270
< = 1131> p. 1274
< = 1132> Dissenting opinion p. 1276 
M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281
< = 1133> p. 1289
Atencio v. Board of Education of Penasco Independent School D istrict No. 4, 
658 F.2d 774
< = 1134> p.780
Caiy V . Board of Education of Adams-Arapahoe School D istrict 28-J, 598 
F.2d 
535
< = 1135> p.539
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<=1136> p.540 
<=1137> p.543
Bertot V . School D istrict No. 1 Albany County Wyoming, 522 F.2d 1171 
<=1138> p.1183 
Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 
<=1139> p.544 
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 
<=1140> p.1098 
Smith V . Losee, 485 F.2d 334 
<=1141> p.339 
Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820 
<=1142> p.823 
Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 
<=1143> Followed p. 1081 
Fisher v. W alker, 464 F.2d 1147 
< = 1144> Dissenting opinion p. 1158 
Benson v. Rich, 448 F.2d 1371 
<=1145> p. 1373 
Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 
<=1146> Elxplained p.260 
V^Uiams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 
<=1147> Followed p.430 
Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d 1196 
<=1148> p. 1198 
James v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 959 F. Supp. 1407 
<=1149> p. 1413 
Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. 1, 918 F. Supp. 1475 
<=1150> Distinguished p. 1491 
Case V. Unified Sch. Dist. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 
<=1151> p.874 
Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 
<=1152> p.559 
James v. Unified Sch. Dist. 512, 899 F. Supp. 530
< = 1153> p.534
Siblerud v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506 
<=1154> Distinguished p.l518 
Case V. Unified Sch. District 233, 895 F. Supp. 1463 
<=1155> p.1469 
Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465
< = 1156> p. 1486
Mclntdre v. Bethel School, 804 F. Supp. 1415 
<=1157> Followed p. 1420 
United S tates v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963
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<=1158>  p.967 
<=1159>  Distinguished p.969 
Hemry v. School Board of Colorado Springs School D istrict 11, 760 F. Supp. 
856
<=1160>  Explained p.860 
<=1161>  E ^ la in ed  p.861 
Heller v. Woodward, 735 F. Supp. 996 
<=1162>  Followed p.998 
Rivera v. E ast Otero School D istrict R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189 
<=1163> Followed p .ll9 2  
<=1164> Distinguished p .ll9 3  
<=1165> p.1194 
Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505 
<=1166>  p. 1512 
<=1167>  p. 1518 
Hysaw v. W ashburn University of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 
<=1168> Distinguished p.946 
Haverkamp v. Unified School D istrict 380, 689 F. Supp. 1055 
<=1169> p. 1058 
Hayes v. Unified School D istrict 377, 669 F. Supp. 1519 
<=1170> p. 1525
University of U tah Students Against Apartiieid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp.
1200
<=1171> p. 1203
Country H ills Christian Church v. Unified School D istrict No. 512 Kansas, 
560 F. Supp. 1207 
<=1172> p. 1214 
Home Box Office Inc. v. W ilkinson, 531F. Supp. 987 
<=1173>  p.996 
Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F. Supp. 1365 
<=1174> p. 1375
Sixteenth of September Planning Committee Inc. v. Denver Colorado, 474 F. 
Supp. 1333
< = 1175> p. 1338
Wright V . Raines, 457 F. Supp. 1082
< = 1176> p. 1089
Maple V . Citizens National Bank & Trust Co., 437 F. Supp. 66 
<=1177> p.68
Cary v. Board of Education of Adams-Arapahoe School D istrict 28-J, 427 F. 
Supp. 945
< = 1178> p.951 
<=1179> p.955
T H V. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873
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<=1180> p.880
<=1181 >  D issenting opinion p.886 
Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439 
<=1182> Followed p.445 
Fanning V. School Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. #23 of Jefferson County, 395 F. 
Supp. 18 
<=1183> p.22 
Foe V . Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 
<=1184> p.953 
Farm er V. CatmuU, 339 F. Supp. 70 
<=1185> p.72 
Williams v. Eaton, 333 F. Supp. 107 
<=1186> Distinguished p .ll4  
Sims V. Board o f Education of Independent School D istrict No. 22, 329 F. 
Supp. 678
< = 1187> Distinguished p.681
< = 1188> Distinguished p.688 
Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200
<=1189> Explained p. 1202 
Evans v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture, 325 F. Supp. 1353 
< = 1190> Distinguished p. 1354 
<=1191> Distinguished p. 1356 
Trujillo V. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266
< = 1192> p. 1269
< = 1193> p. 1270
Freeman v. Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531
< = 1194> p.537
Hernandez v. School District Num ber One Denver Colorado, 315 F. Supp. 
289
<=1195> p.292
Local 858 of American Federation of Teachers v. School District No. 1 in 
Denver Colorado, 314 F. Supp. 1069
< = 1196> p. 1073
Brick V. Board o f Education School D istrict No. 1 Denver Colorado, 305 F. 
Supp. 1316 
<=1197> Distinguished p. 1319
< = 1198> Distinguished p. 1320 
11th Circuit
James v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4493 
<=1199>
Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 
<=1200> p.508
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Chabad-Lubavitch o f Georgia v. M iller, 5 F.3d 1383 
<=1201> p.1387 
Bishop V . Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 
<=1202> Distmguished p. 1072 
Stew art v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499 
<=1203> p.1504 
Searcey v. H arris, 888 F.2d 1314 
<=1204>  p.1319
Arnold v. Board o f Education of Escam bia County Alabama, 880 F.2d 305 
<=1205> p.311 
<=1206> p.314
Alabama S tudent Party  v. Student Gov’t  Ass’n of Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 
1344
<=1207> p. 1346 
Virgil V. School Board of Columbia County Florida, 862 F.2d 1517 
<=1208> p. 1520 
<=1209> Criticized p. 1521 
Maples V . M artin, 858 F.2d 1546 
<=1210> p. 1553 
Carroll v. Parks, 755 F.2d 1455 
<=1211> p.1457 
Sabel V. Stymchcombe, 746 F.2d 728 
<=1212> p.730 
Monroe v. Georgia Court of Fulton County, 739 F.2d 568 
<=1213> p.571
< = 1214> p.575
Leonard v. Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 
<=1215>  p. 1304 
M uir V . Alabama Educational Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033 
<=1216>  p. 1051
Hall V. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile Alabama, 681 F.2d 965
< = 1217> p.968
Garcia v. U nited States, 666 F.2d 960
< = 1218> p.964
Chandler v. Jam es, 998 F. Supp. 1255
< = 1219> p. 1263
K ick li^ te r v. Evans County Sch. D ist., 968 F. Supp. 712
< = 1220> p.719
Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County, 959 F. Supp. 1481
< = 1221> p. 1484 
<=1222> Followed p. 1485
Chandler v. Jam es, 958 F. Supp. 1550
< = 1223> p. 1559
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Johnston-Loehner v. O’Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575 
<=1224> p.579 
Johnston-Loehner v. O’Brien, 837 F. Supp. 388 
<=1225> p.392 
Thompson v. Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066 
<=1226> p.1072 
<=1227> p.1077 
Chabad-Lubavitch o f Georgia v. H arris, 752 F. Supp. 1063
<=1228> p.1066
N aturist Society Inc. v. Fillyaw, 736 F. Supp. 1103 
<=1229> p . l l l l  
Bishop V . Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 
<=1230> p.1566 
Jones V. Key West Florida, 679 F. Supp. 1547 
<=1231> p.1554
Virgil V. School Board of Columbia County Florida, 677 F. Supp. 1547
< = 1232> p.1550
DeWeese v. Palm Beach, 616 F. Supp. 971 
<=1233> p.976 
<=1234> p.979 
M ustin V. Hayes, 594 F. Supp. 102
< = 1235> p. 105
Stough V. Crenshaw County Board of Education, 579 F. Supp. 1091
< = 1236> p. 1097
Mid-Fla Coin Exchange Inc. v. GrifGn, 529 F. Supp. 1006 
<=1237> p. 1017 
Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10872
< = 1238> Followed
Chandler v. James, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4603
< = 1239>
Action for Children’s Television v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 11 
F.3d 170
< = 1240> p. 178
< = 1241> p. 180
Finzer v. Bany, 798 F.2d 1450
< = 1242> Dissenting opinion p. 1491
White House Vigil for ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518
< = 1243> p. 1540
U.S. Southwest AMca-Namibia Trade & C ultural Council v. United States, 
708 F.2d 760
< = 1244> p.771
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. W att, 703 F.2d 586 
<=1245> p.593
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<=1246>p.597
<=1247> Different Opinion p.606 
< = 1248> Dissenting opinion p.613 
< = 1249> D issenting opinion p.624 
Taxation with Representation of W ashington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 
<=1250> p.727 
N ational Black United Fund Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d 173 
<=1251> p. 180 
Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193 
<=1252> p.1198 
Culver V . Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 
< = 1253> Dissenting opinion p.637 
Pacifica Foundation v. Federal Conununications Commission, 556 F.2d 9 
<=1254> p.28 
Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840 
<=1255> p.849 
Bullock V. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384
< = 1256> Eîxplained p.388
Women Strike For Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 
<=1257> p.1280 
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283
< = 1258> p.295
Doe V. McMillan, 459 F,2d 1304
< = 1259> Dissenting opinion p. 1325 
Joyce V . United States, 454 F.2d 971
< = 1260> Distinguished p.987
< = 1261> Distinguished p.989
Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. Federal Communications 
Comm’n,
450 F.2d 642
< = 1262> p.656
Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226
< = 1263> p.228
W ashington Free Community Inc. v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 1213
< = 1264> Dissenting opinion p.l219 
Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597
< = 1265> p.601
Women Strike For Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273
< = 1257> p.1280 
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283
< = 1258> p.295
Doe V. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304
< = 1259> Dissenting opinion p. 1325
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Joyce V. United States, 454 F.2d 971 
<=1260> Distinguished p.987 
< =I261>  Distinguished p.989 
Business Executives Move for Vietnam  Peace v. Federal Communications 
Comm’n,
450 F.2d 642 
<=1262> p.656 
Hoffinan v. U nited States, 445 F.2d 226 
<=1263> p.228 
Washington Free Community Inc. v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 1213 
< = 1264> D issenting opinion p. 1219 
Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597 
<=1265> p.601 
Amatel v. Reno, 1998 U.S. i^ p . LEXIS 22540
< = 1266> D issenting opinion 
<=1267>
Hutchins v. D istrict of Columbia, 1998 U.S. ^ p .  LEDQS 10303 
< = 1268>
Hutchins v. D istrict of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 
<=1269> p.671 
Kam  V. United S tates Dep’t  of State, 925 F. Supp. 1
< = 1270> Distinguished p .l2
Friends of Vietnam Veterans M emorial v. Kennedy, 899 F. Supp. 680 
<=1271> p.682
Stewart v. D istrict of Columbia Armory Board, 789 F. Supp. 402 
<=1272> p.405 
United States v. Eichman, 731F. Supp. 1123 
<=1273> p. 1127 
Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605 
<=1274> p.610 
DC Circuit
Kroll V. United S tates Capitol Police, 590 F. Supp. 1282 
<=1275> p. 1288 
Stolte V, Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 
<=1276> p. 1404 
<=1277> p. 1405
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